United States v. Wilder
2016 CAAF LEXIS 217
C.A.A.F.2016Background
- Appellant Carlton Wilder Jr., a Marine, was arrested in Nov. 2012 after an NCIS undercover operation alleging attempts to engage in sexual acts with minors and related offenses.
- He was confined Nov. 14, 2012; the Government preferred the original charges Dec. 4, 2012; arraignment on those original charges occurred Apr. 23, 2013.
- During post-arrest interrogation, Wilder admitted to additional misconduct (possession/distribution of child pornography; communications with a 15‑year‑old). The Government preferred three sets of Additional Charges in Apr. and July 2013; arraignment on those Additional Charges took place Aug. 5, 2013.
- Wilder moved to dismiss the Additional Charges under R.C.M. 707 (120‑day speedy‑trial rule), Article 10, UCMJ, and the Sixth Amendment, arguing the speedy‑trial clock began at his Nov. 14, 2012 restraint because the Government then possessed "substantial information" about the Additional Charges.
- The NMCCA struck an impermissible pretrial‑agreement clause that forced Wilder to withdraw his R.C.M. 707 motion, but rejected his speedy‑trial claims, holding R.C.M. 707’s plain‑language triggers (preferral or restraint) govern the clock and that the Additional Charges were arraigned within 120 days of preferral.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the R.C.M. 707 speedy‑trial clock runs from the date the Government obtained "substantial information" about a charge or from the specific triggers listed in R.C.M. 707(a) | Wilder: clock began Nov. 14, 2012 when Government had substantial information about his communications with the minor | Government: R.C.M. 707 controls; for each charge clock begins on the R.C.M. 707(a) trigger (preferral, restraint, or entry on active duty) | Court: R.C.M. 707’s plain text governs; clock for Additional Charges began at preferral dates, not when Government first possessed substantial information; no R.C.M. 707 violation |
| Validity of PTA provision requiring withdrawal of the R.C.M. 707 motion | Wilder: provision impermissibly required withdrawing a speedy trial motion | Government: provision part of plea negotiations | NMCCA: provision impermissible and was stricken (affirmed by CAAF in substance) |
Key Cases Cited
- Leahr v. United States, 73 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F.) (speedy trial review is legal question; arraignment stops R.C.M. 707 clock)
- Kossman v. United States, 38 M.J. 258 (C.M.A.) (distinguishing Article 10 and R.C.M. 707; R.C.M. 707 is a distinct, bright‑line protection)
- Mizgala v. United States, 61 M.J. 122 (C.A.A.F.) (Article 10 requires reasonable diligence independent of R.C.M. 707)
- Cooper v. United States, 58 M.J. 54 (C.A.A.F.) (trial stops Article 10 clock)
- Danylo v. United States, 73 M.J. 183 (C.A.A.F.) (Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial analysis uses Barker factors)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (Supreme Court) (framework for Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claims)