United States v. White
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5479
10th Cir.2015Background
- James White, convicted in North Carolina (2007) of taking indecent liberties with a child, moved from Oklahoma to Texas in 2013 without updating his sex-offender registration as required by SORNA; he was federally indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
- White entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appeal rights on constitutional challenges to SORNA and on sentencing issues.
- The PSR classified White as a SORNA "tier III" offender, yielding a Guidelines base offense level of 16 and a recommended range of 18–24 months; White argued he is a "tier I" offender (Guidelines range 10–16 months).
- At sentencing the district court relied on state indictment and prosecution records to treat White’s prior North Carolina conviction as comparable to federal abusive sexual contact against a child under 13, leading to tier III classification; it imposed 18 months and special supervised-release conditions restricting contact with minors unless approved/supervised by probation.
- White appealed: (1) constitutional challenges to SORNA (Commerce Clause, Ex Post Facto, Tenth Amendment); (2) the tier classification used to calculate his Guidelines range; and (3) two supervised-release conditions as infringing familial-association rights and improperly delegating sentencing authority to probation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commerce Clause validity of SORNA | SORNA regulates inactivity and thus exceeds Commerce power (relying on NFIB reasoning). | SORNA regulates interstate travel and persons in interstate commerce and contains an express interstate-travel element; Hinckley controls. | Court upheld SORNA under the Commerce Clause (first/second Lopez prongs); NFIB did not undermine Hinckley. |
| Ex Post Facto challenge | Applying SORNA to pre‑Act offenders increases punishment for past crimes. | SORNA is regulatory; penalties attach only to future failures to register. | Rejected; bound by Lawrance—SORNA is regulatory, not an ex post facto violation. |
| Tenth Amendment / commandeering | SORNA effectively forces states to operate federal registry even if they haven’t implemented SORNA. | SORNA conditions federal funding but does not commandeer state officials or compel state administration of the federal program. | Rejected; SORNA does not commandeer states and is a permissible conditional‑spending scheme. |
| Tier classification & supervised‑release conditions | White: his NC conviction lacks physical‑contact element and thus is not comparable to §§ 2241/2242/2244 federal offenses; he should be tier I. He also challenged release conditions as infringing familial association and delegating judicial power. | Gov: district court permissibly relied on indictment and prosecution records to find conduct comparable to abusive sexual contact against a child under 13 and properly delegated limited discretion to probation. | Court held the district court erred: categorical comparison controls (with limited circumstance‑specific inquiry into victim age); NC statute does not require physical contact, so White is a tier I offender. Vacated sentence and release conditions and remanded for resentencing; provided guidance on familial‑association analysis and permissible probation discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding SORNA under Commerce Clause based on interstate-travel/commerce elements)
- National Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Supreme Court plurality and opinions discussing limits of Commerce Clause and regulation of inactivity)
- United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2008) (SORNA is regulatory; application to pre‑Act offenders not ex post facto)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anti‑commandeering principle under the Tenth Amendment)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (describing categorical and modified categorical approaches for comparing prior convictions to federal predicates)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standards for procedural and substantive reasonableness of sentencing)
- United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) (heightened scrutiny for supervised‑release conditions that infringe parental familial‑association rights)