United States v. Wey
256 F. Supp. 3d 355
| S.D.N.Y. | 2017Background
- Defendant Benjamin Wey was later indicted on fraud, wire fraud, money-laundering, and Section 13(d) disclosure counts arising from an alleged scheme (2007–2011) to use nominees and reverse mergers to control and profit from several small-cap issuers.
- On Jan 24–25, 2012 the FBI obtained and executed two nearly identical warrants: one for NYGG’s Manhattan offices and one for Wey’s apartment. Each warrant’s Exhibit A listed broad categories of documents to seize and Exhibit B listed ~220 people/entities (including NYGG and the Weys).
- The supporting Komar and Garwood affidavits (not physically incorporated into the warrants) described specific alleged misconduct tied to a handful of issuers (SmartHeat, Deer, CleanTech, etc.) and set out more detailed probable-cause narratives and proposed computer-search protocols.
- During execution, the FBI seized thousands of hard-copy documents and dozens of electronic devices; much electronic data (≈18 TB) was imaged and retained for years while multi-stage reviews using evolving search-terms were conducted well after the warrants issued.
- Wey moved to suppress. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court found the warrants insufficiently particular and overbroad, found the government’s reliance not objectively reasonable, and granted suppression of all evidence seized.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether warrants were sufficiently particular | Wey: warrants were general, failed to identify crimes, lacked limiting linkage to alleged misconduct, and had no temporal bounds | Gov: exhibits and affidavit described securities/financial fraud; categories were illustrative and warrants not a blanket ‘all records’ grab | Court: Warrants lacked particularity — they did not identify crimes, used sweeping generic categories, and effectively authorized seizure of all records related to NYGG/Weys |
| Whether all-records (permeation) exception applies | Wey: affidavit did not show NYGG or the home was permeated with fraud; exception inapplicable | Gov: investigation showed pervasive fraud justifying broad seizure | Court: Exception did not apply — affidavits showed specific transactions and legitimate aspects of NYGG; no probable cause that entire business or home was a scam |
| Whether the good-faith exception saves the searches | Wey: officers could not reasonably rely on facially defective warrants; execution and post-seizure review showed recklessness | Gov: officers acted in objective good faith; briefings and warrant issuance by magistrate justify reliance | Held: Good-faith exception rejected — reliance was not objectively reasonable given clearly established law and the agents’ conduct (overseizure, lack of constraints, and later expansive electronic searches) |
| Appropriate remedy | Wey: suppress all fruits of searches | Gov: suppression too severe; limit remedy to items clearly beyond scope | Court: All seized evidence suppressed; warrants not severable and government offered no viable narrower remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (warrant must itself be particular; supporting affidavit cannot cure a facially deficient warrant)
- United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (warrant lacking linkage to alleged crimes; good-faith exception may apply only in narrow, fact-specific circumstances)
- United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (particularity requirement and heightened concern for electronic searches)
- United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (digital-search particularity and limits; warrants must link sought evidence to crimes)
- United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (retention and later searches of electronic data implicate Fourth Amendment; need for reasonable review protocol)
- Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (context on exclusionary rule’s purpose and limits)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (exclusionary rule and focus on deterrence; good-faith contours)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule and when reliance on warrant is unreasonable)
