United States v. Werra, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5741

Detectives and state trooper entered 63 Menlo Street by force to execute an arrest warrant for Daley, encountering Werra who was not the subject of the warrant.
Officers conducted a stop and frisk of Werra, finding a firearm in his pocket, which led to a federal felon-in-possession charge.
The district court ruled the entry was lawful and Werra’s detention and frisk were reasonable safety measures; Werra pled guilty conditionally after suppression was denied.
On appeal, Werra argued the entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that he had a privacy interest in the foyer and common areas enabling suppression of the gun; alternatively he challenged the frisk.
The First Circuit held the officers lacked sufficient grounds to enter without consent and Werra showed a privacy interest in the foyer, rendering the stop-and-frisk unconstitutional and the gun suppressible.
The court vacated Werra’s conviction and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the entry into 63 Menlo Street lawful without consent?	Werra: unlawful entry violated privacy; Payton not satisfied.	Government: reasonable belief Daley lived there and was inside justified entry.	Unlawful entry; Payton not satisfied; suppression required.
Did Werra have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the foyer and common areas?	Werra had privacy in the foyer as part of a single-family-like dwelling.	No privacy in foyer due to shared/common spaces in a nontraditional housing arrangement.	Werra had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the foyer; privacy invalidated the entry.
If entry was unlawful, was the stop-and-frisk and gun seizure admissible as tainted fruit?	Fruit of the poisonous tree; suppression warranted.	Even if entry were unlawful, frisk/seizure could be justified by officer safety or independent grounds.	Gun suppression required as fruit of unlawful entry.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (arrest warrants permit entry into residence when suspect likely inside)
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (U.S. 1981) (limited detention during lawful search to ensure safety and efficacy)
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1968) (risk-based frisk in dangerous settings permissible)
United States v. Rheault, 561 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (two-prong privacy inquiry; fact-specific analysis of living arrangements)
United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2004) ( residential privacy and entry considerations in the First Circuit)
United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (Payton-like reasoning in determining entry validity in residential contexts)
Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (time-of-day and residency considerations in Payton prongs)
United States v. Hayes, 209 Fed.Appx. 548 (7th Cir. 2006) (timing and residency factors in Payton context)
United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2004) (limits on applying Terry in residential settings; two-prong Payton analysis)
Gorman v. United States, 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) (Payton standard considerations; reasonable belief vs probable cause)