United States v. Wayne Fisher, 25 F.4th 1080

Background

Fisher pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute ≥50 grams of methamphetamine; the Government sought a statutory enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on a prior Minnesota first-degree burglary conviction.
The prior Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.582(1), contains three paragraphs: (a) occupied dwelling, (b) weapon/explosive, and (c) burglary with assault; paragraph (a) carries a mandatory six-month minimum, (b) and (c) do not.
Fisher objected to the enhancement, arguing the Minnesota statute is broader than generic burglary and not divisible, and he also sought credit for time served in tribal jail for related tribal convictions.
The district court held the Minnesota statute is divisible, that Fisher was convicted under subdivision 1(c) (burglary with assault), and that that conviction qualifies as a “serious violent felony,” triggering the 15‑year mandatory minimum.
The district court denied credit for tribal jail time, concluding it lacked authority to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. Fisher appealed; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Minnesota first‑degree burglary qualifies as a “serious violent felony” under § 841(b)(1)(A) (force element inquiry).	Fisher: statute is broader than generic burglary and paragraphs are alternative means (not divisible), so prior conviction cannot serve as a force‑element predicate.	Government: statute is divisible into separate crimes; Fisher was convicted under 1(c) (assault), which has a force element and therefore is a serious violent felony.	The statute is divisible; Fisher was convicted under 1(c) (burglary with assault), which satisfies the force‑element definition and qualifies as a serious violent felony—enhancement affirmed.
Whether the district court erred by refusing to credit tribal jail time against Fisher’s federal sentence.	Fisher: sentencing guidelines (§5G1.3 or §5K2.23) permit adjusting/crediting time served in tribal jail even against a mandatory minimum.	Government: §5G1.3(b)(1) applies only to undischarged terms; §5K2.23 permits a downward departure but cannot authorize a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum absent separate statutory authority.	Court did not plainly err. §5G1.3 inapplicable; §5K2.23 does not permit departures below statutory minimums absent statutory exceptions—denial affirmed.
Whether different treatment of discharged vs. undischarged sentences violates due process.	Fisher: unequal treatment violates due process.	Government: differential treatment has a rational basis (uncertainty with undischarged terms).	No plain error; Eighth Circuit follows Otto: rational basis supports different treatment—due process challenge rejected.

Key Cases Cited

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (categorical/means‑vs‑elements framework and divisibility analysis)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (modified categorical approach; limited use of conviction records)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (documents permissible under modified categorical approach)
United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925 (application of categorical approach in Eighth Circuit)
United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043 (issue‑waiver principle invoked by the court)
United States v. Moore, 918 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. conclusion that §5K2.23 cannot authorize a sentence below a statutory minimum)
United States v. Otto, 176 F.3d 416 (Eighth Circuit: rational basis for treating discharged vs. undischarged sentences differently)
United States v. Oliver, 987 F.3d 794 (de novo review of predicate‑offense legal determination)