940 F.3d 152
2d Cir.2019Background:
- On June 16, 2018, Larry Watkins fired nine rounds at a fleeing vehicle; he later led FBI agents to a fully loaded semi‑automatic pistol after being promised he would not be charged for possession of the firearm.
- Watkins, a convicted felon recently discharged from supervised release, was indicted for possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
- The Government moved to detain Watkins pending trial; the magistrate ordered detention and the district court (Vilardo, J.) affirmed in an October 9 Order.
- Central legal question on appeal: whether the Government was entitled to a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (crime of violence) or § 3142(f)(1)(E) (any felony that involves possession/use of a firearm), and whether the Bail Reform Act’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.
- The Second Circuit affirmed: held the residual clause is not void for vagueness, possession of ammunition by a felon is categorically a "crime of violence" under § 3142(f)(1)(A), and § 3142(f)(1)(E) permits a conduct‑specific inquiry (Watkins had discharged the ammunition).
Issues:
| Issue | Government's Argument | Watkins's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the Bail Reform Act’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague? | Not vague; § 3142(f)(1) is regulatory/advisory and does not fix punishment or create a new offense. | Void for vagueness under Johnson/Dimaya. | Not vague; due‑process vagueness challenge rejected. |
| Does felon possession of ammunition qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 3142(f)(1)(A)? | Yes; categorically qualifies under the residual clause (ordinary case involves risk of force). | No; possession of ammunition lacks an element of force. | Yes; possession of ammunition by a felon is categorically a crime of violence. |
| Can a detention hearing be triggered by a factual nexus to an uncharged crime of violence (prefatory "in a case that involves")? | Yes; "involves" permits considering related violent conduct. | No; the charged offense itself must constitute a crime of violence. | No; "in a case that involves" requires the charged offense itself be a crime of violence. |
| Does § 3142(f)(1)(E) permit a conduct‑specific inquiry into firearm possession/use? | Yes; "that involves" in (E) allows looking beyond elements to actual conduct (e.g., firing a gun). | No; requires firearm possession/use to be an element of the charged offense. | Yes; (E) allows conduct‑specific inquiry and applies here because Watkins fired the ammunition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied vagueness analysis to INA residual clause)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines’ residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (interpreted identically worded residual clause and limited conduct‑specific approach)
- United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (possession of a firearm by a felon is a crime of violence under § 3142(f)(1)(A))
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding Bail Reform Act’s pretrial detention framework)