United States v. Victor Stitt
860 F.3d 854
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Victor Stitt was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court applied the ACCA enhancement based on nine prior violent-felony convictions, six of which were Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions.
- The government conceded that Johnson invalidated three of Stitt’s prior predicates, leaving the six Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as the sole basis for ACCA status on appeal en banc.
- Tennessee aggravated burglary is burglary of a "habitation," and Tennessee defines "habitation" to include structures "designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons," expressly listing mobile homes, trailers, tents, and self-propelled vehicles that are actually occupied at initial entry.
- Under the ACCA, the term "burglary" is interpreted by federal courts using the Supreme Court’s "generic burglary" definition (Taylor) and the categorical approach (Descamps/Mathis): unlawful entry into a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime.
- The panel concluded Tennessee’s statute is broader than generic burglary because it reaches vehicles and movable enclosures (even if limited to those "habitable"), the statute is indivisible (lists means not alternative elements), and thus convictions under it are not ACCA predicates.
- The court overruled United States v. Nance (6th Cir. 2007), remanded for resentencing, and three judges filed separate concurrences; Judge Sutton dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stitt) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee aggravated burglary categorically qualifies as ACCA "burglary" (generic burglary) | Stitt: Tennessee statute is broader than generic burglary because it includes vehicles and movable enclosures and is indivisible; thus convictions are not ACCA predicates | Gov't: Tennessee’s "habitation" language limits coverage to habitable places (dwellings), aligning with the generic concept; Taylor and state practice support inclusion | Held: No. Statute broader than generic burglary because it covers movable enclosures/vehicles; statute is indivisible; aggravated-burglary convictions do not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. |
| Whether the Taylor Court’s “building or other structure” phrase should be read to include habitable vehicles/temporary structures | Stitt: Taylor excludes vehicles and movable enclosures; focus is on form/nature not use; Taylor and progeny consistently treat vehicles as outside generic burglary | Gov't: Taylor drew on MPC and state practice; many states include habitable movable structures so generic burglary should encompass them | Held: Taylor’s language and subsequent Supreme Court decisions distinguish vehicles/movable enclosures from buildings/structures; the state-law practice and MPC do not alter Taylor’s plain distinction. |
| Whether the Tennessee definition of "habitation" is divisible (permitting modified categorical approach) | Stitt: The definition is indivisible—lists illustrative examples (means) not alternative elements | Gov't: (argued for narrowing to dwellings) modified categorical approach could identify only dwelling-based convictions | Held: Indivisible. The statutory list is non-exhaustive illustrative "includes" language; modified categorical approach not available. |
| Whether to adhere to or overrule Nance (6th Cir.) | Stitt: Nance misapplied the categorical approach by failing to analyze the statutory definition of "habitation" and comparing truncated language from precedent | Gov't: Relied on Nance precedent | Held: Nance overruled; it misapplied the categorical approach by overlooking the statutory inclusion of vehicles and movable enclosures. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines "generic burglary" for ACCA purposes as unlawful entry into a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (clarifies ACCA burglary applies to burglaries in buildings/enclosed spaces, not boats or motor vehicles)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (distinguishes vessels from buildings for generic-burglary analysis)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (vehicle burglary falls outside generic burglary)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explains categorical vs. modified categorical approaches and divisibility doctrine)
- United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2007) (overruled) (previously held Tennessee aggravated burglary matched generic burglary)
- United States v. Coleman, 655 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2011) (addressed similar Ohio statute and reached opposite conclusion)
- United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (analyzes generic burglary and relation to state statutes)