444 F.Supp.3d 56
D.D.C.2020Background
- On Sept. 8, 2019 GRU officers in an unmarked but identifiable car approached a group in a high-crime D.C. neighborhood after Officer Torres observed a hand-to-hand exchange and saw Veney begin to walk away.
- Torres approached Veney and asked brief questions; Veney refused to comply and said he would walk off.
- Torres then said, “No. I just want to make sure you don’t got no guns,” while walking alongside Veney and testified he observed an abnormal bulge in Veney’s front waistband.
- Torres stepped in front of Veney, placed hands on his chest, and performed a pat-down; he felt the outline of a gun and later revealed a loaded 9mm pistol in Veney’s waistband.
- Veney moved to suppress the gun as the product of an illegal seizure, arguing he was seized when Torres made the “guns” statement and that Torres lacked reasonable suspicion; the Government contended the seizure occurred only when Torres blocked Veney and that reasonable suspicion existed by then.
- The Court concluded Torres’s statement was a show of authority a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore, but Veney did not submit to it; the seizure occurred when Torres blocked his path, and at that moment officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk Veney. Motion to suppress denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Veney) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Torres’s verbal statement (“I just want to make sure you don’t got no guns”) constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure | That statement was a show of authority that seized Veney without reasonable suspicion | The statement was an investigatory question; seizure occurred only when officer physically blocked Veney | Court: Statement was a show of authority a reasonable person wouldn’t feel free to ignore, but not a seizure because Veney did not submit |
| 2. Whether Veney submitted to the asserted authority at the time of the statement | Veney contends the exchange effectuated a seizure | Government: Veney continued walking, so he did not submit until his path was blocked | Court: Veney did not submit at the statement; he continued walking, so no seizure until Torres blocked his path |
| 3. Whether reasonable suspicion existed at the moment of seizure (when Torres blocked Veney) | Veney: Officer lacked articulable facts to detain him at that moment | Government: Torres observed an abnormal waistband bulge, furtive movements, and was in a high-crime area—these together gave reasonable suspicion | Court: Reasonable suspicion existed based on the bulge plus contextual factors; Terry stop and frisk justified |
| 4. Whether the pat-down exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk | Veney: Officer manipulated the weapon beyond a frisk | Government: The pat-down was a proper, non-intrusive sweep to ensure officer safety | Court: Pat-down was appropriate and did not exceed Terry’s scope |
Key Cases Cited
- California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (seizure requires physical force or submission to a show of authority)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may briefly detain on reasonable, articulable suspicion)
- Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (submission to authority depends on what person was doing before the show of authority)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (presence in a high-crime area and unprovoked flight are contextual factors in Terry analysis)
- United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reasonable-person test for show of authority; continued walking after command may still indicate submission depending on context)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (officer may frisk if reasonable suspicion that suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons)
- Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (factors indicating seizure include threatening presence, display of weapon, physical touching, or language indicating compliance compelled)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (reasonable-suspicion inquiry focuses on totality of the circumstances and officer’s reasonable inferences)