United States v. Van McDuffy, 890 F.3d 796

On Oct. 16, 2013, Van McDuffy robbed a Bank of America in Reno, Nevada, brandished a handgun, shot customer Charles Sperry during an attempted disarm, and Sperry died; McDuffy then completed the robbery and was arrested.
McDuffy was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (bank robbery provisions) including the death-result enhancement in § 2113(e), which prescribes life or death if "death results" during the commission of the offense.
§ 2113(e) contains no express mens rea for the death-result clause; the district court instructed the jury that the enhancement applies even to accidental killings and convicted McDuffy; he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal McDuffy argued the court should read a separate mens rea (e.g., "knowingly" caused death) into § 2113(e); the government argued no separate intent element is required beyond the mens rea for the underlying bank robbery.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the jury instruction de novo and analyzed statutory text/structure and Supreme Court precedent (notably Dean v. United States) to decide whether § 2113(e) requires a separate intent to kill.
The court held § 2113(e) does not require a separate mens rea for the killing; the enhancement applies if death results during the underlying bank robbery, even if accidental. The only required mens rea is that for committing the underlying bank robbery.

Issue	McDuffy's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether § 2113(e)'s "if death results" clause requires a separate mens rea (intent to kill or knowledge of death)	§ 2113(e) must be read to require a specific mens rea (e.g., knowingly caused death)	No separate mens rea is required; the enhancement applies based on the fact of death during the felony	No separate mens rea is required; the enhancement applies even to accidental killings when committed during the bank robbery

Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009) (holding a § 924(c) discharge enhancement applies even if firearm discharge was accidental)
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (interpreting mens rea for § 2113(a) as general intent)
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (courts must infer scienter when necessary to avoid punishing otherwise innocent conduct)
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (presumption of scienter applies to elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct)
X-Citement Video, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (scienter requirement prevents criminalizing innocent acts)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (omission/inclusion in statutory text indicates congressional intent)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimums must be submitted to a jury)
United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing § 2113(a) as generic bank robbery)
United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting "use" of a weapon under § 2113(d) to require awareness by victims)