United States v. Valbrun
877 F.3d 440
1st Cir.2017Background
- DEA intercepted calls on suspected kingpin Jacques Victor's phone during a probe of a Maine drug-distribution ring; Victor participated in calls with Valbrun.
- Valbrun was arrested driving a rental car from Massachusetts to Maine; officers found 225 g heroin and 106.2 g crack concealed in the vehicle.
- Valbrun was tried separately on possession with intent to distribute heroin and crack and aiding and abetting.
- Government introduced thirteen wiretapped calls; Victor testified about the calls, identifying voices, explaining slang, and providing context.
- Valbrun's defense: he did not know drugs were in the car. He objected to portions of Victor’s interpretive testimony and to a willful‑blindness jury instruction.
- Jury convicted Valbrun; district court sentenced him to 28 months; First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Victor’s interpretive testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 701 | Victor’s lay interpretations were admissible as based on his perception and familiarity with conspirator jargon | Much of the language was clear; Victor’s gloss was unnecessary and sometimes changed meanings, so testimony should be excluded | Court affirmed admission: Victor’s testimony was rationally based on perception, helped the jury, and did not require specialized knowledge; challenges went to weight, not admissibility |
| Use of Rule 403 to exclude Victor’s testimony | Government did not rely on Rule 403; Victor’s Creole fluency and contextual help outweighed any risk of confusion | Testimony was misleading and materially altered recorded statements, thus prejudicial under Rule 403 | Defendant did not invoke Rule 403 at trial; appellate claim not preserved; plain‑error review failed—no abuse of discretion in admission |
| Willful‑blindness jury instruction (sufficiency of evidence to justify instruction) | Government argued red flags and circumstantial evidence (calls about hiding things, references to ‘‘putting the thing,’’ appellant’s replies) supported instruction | Appellant argued evidence insufficient to show purposeful avoidance or knowledge of drugs; relied on Pérez‑Meléndez analogy | Court upheld instruction: evidence supported conscious avoidance or knowledge; willful blindness properly charged |
| Distinction from Pérez‑Meléndez (insufficient evidence) | Government: here calls, Victor’s explanations, and appellant’s responses provided red flags specific to narcotics | Valbrun: earlier precedent shows mere suspicion of illegality, absent narcotics‑specific red flags, is insufficient | Court distinguished Pérez‑Meléndez: record here contained ample narcotics‑specific indicators, so Pérez‑Meléndez is not controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (willful blindness treated as actual knowledge)
- United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2006) (coconspirator may give lay opinion on code words)
- United States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2017) (lay interpretation of drug slang admissible under Rule 701)
- United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (circumstantial red flags can support willful‑blindness instruction)
- United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming willful‑blindness instruction where defendant affirmatively responded to jargon)
- United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439 (1st Cir. 2012) (weight of lay opinion goes to jury)
- United States v. Pérez‑Meléndez, 599 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2010) (insufficient evidence where no narcotics‑specific red flags)
- United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (district court has considerable discretion admitting lay opinion)