UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. DANIEL PEREZ-MELENDEZ, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. ANGEL RIVERA-RIOS, Defendant, Appellant.
Nos. 08-2225, 08-2226
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
March 17, 2010
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa,
Before Torruella, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Lydia Lizarribar-Masini, for appellant Rivera-Rios.
Maria Soledad Ramirez-Becerra, for appellant Perez-Melendez.
Ernesto Lopez-Soltero, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Luke Cass, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
I. Background
A. Facts
We outline the facts relevant to the appeals. Other details may be found in the district court‘s opinion. See United States v. Perez-Melendez, 571 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.P.R. 2008).
1. Doral Freight Logistics
When she testified at trial, Virginia Maria Cruz-Martinez (“Cruz-Martinez“) had been a customer service employee for three years at Doral Freight Logistics (“Doral“), a Caribbean shipping company based in Amelia Industrial Park in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. Cruz-Martinez testified that shipments from the Dominican Republic come to Doral via a sealed van on a boat that docks at Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, and then are driven by the shipper to Doral‘s
According to Cruz-Martinez, Industria de Sobres Dominicanos, S.A. (“ISD“), a company in the Dominican Republic, sent six shipments of wrapped pallets of reams of paper to Doral between May and October of 2007, to be ultimately delivered to another company, Industrial Paper, in Puerto Rico. Cruz-Martinez testified that it is not Doral‘s company policy to unwrap such
Cruz-Martinez testified that she was present at work for four of the six shipments ISD sent to Doral for Industrial Paper, and that appellants picked up all four of them. These shipments were dated May 15, June 9, August 18, and October 6 as the dates of departure from the Dominican Republic. Cruz-Martinez further testified that Rivera-Rios signed for three of the shipments but that he twice indicated his first name was “Angel” and the third time indicated it was “Raul.” Cruz-Martinez stated that the signature on the fourth receipt -- dated October 11, 2007 as the pick-up date -- was difficult to read but that she thought that the first name was “Raul,” “David,” or “Daniel,” and the last name was “Melendez-Perez.”
2. Vehicle Identification
On October 11, 2007, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Luis Crespo (“Crespo“), an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
3. Vehicle Search
At 3:15 p.m., Perez-Melendez provided handwritten consent to ATF and Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA“) agents to search the truck. Perez-Melendez wrote the consent in Crespo‘s presence and signed it, along with a different ATF agent and a DEA agent. The agents then searched the truck, in which they found what appeared
Later that day, Crespo and other agents sought a search warrant to search the truck, as identified by its license plate number, model, color, and Vehicle Identification Number. During that process, the truck was taken to the DEA‘s High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area office in Hato Rey. After a judge authorized the search warrant at 11:38 p.m. and until around 3:00 a.m. the following day, Crespo and other agents unloaded and searched the pallets of paper, discovering what amounted to forty kilograms of cocaine. Expert witnesses for the government testified at trial about the specific characteristics and value of the cocaine. One expert stated that the shipment was cocaine hydrochloride, 70.4 percent pure, with a net weight of 20.02 kilograms. Another expert stated that the value of the cocaine was, per kilogram, $16,000 wholesale or $40,000 retail, for a total street value of $1.6 million. Crespo and other agents were not able to determine the cargo‘s destination either during their fourteen-hour intervention or by the time Crespo testified on April 28, 2008.
Neither appellant testified at trial. As such, “no question is raised about what inferences a jury may rationally draw from its observation of [their] testimony.” United States v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597, 601 (1st Cir. 2007). However, both appellants were questioned on October 11, 2007.
a. Perez-Melendez Questioning
During the intervention in Caguas, ATF Special Agent Mayea Sumalla (“Sumalla“) and ATF Special Agent Salez Nunez advised Perez-Melendez of his Miranda rights, after which Perez-Melendez signed a written waiver of those rights and submitted himself to questioning while seated inside a government vehicle. Perez-Melendez told the agents that he was a self-employed truck driver who did not own the truck he was driving that day or any other vehicle. Perez-Melendez stated he had known the passenger of the truck for about three years but could not tell the agents his name, although he said he believed it started with the letter “A.” Perez-Melendez then consented to a search of his cell phone, which revealed calls from someone named “Angelo,” whom Perez-Melendez identified as Rivera-Rios. Perez-Melendez reported that he received a telephone call from Rivera-Rios that morning at 9:00 a.m., during which Rivera-Rios asked Perez-Melendez if he could work as a truck driver that day. Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., Perez-
According to Sumalla, Perez-Melendez contradicted himself on at least three issues. First, Perez-Melendez offered inconsistent statements “several times” about whether he or Rivera-Rios rented the truck. At one point during the questioning, Perez-Melendez said that Rivera-Rios had rented the truck, and was already waiting for him with it when they met at the gas station. At another point, Perez-Melendez stated that he himself had rented the truck, from a friend.
Second, Perez-Melendez offered inconsistent statements “several times” about who provided instructions to him on where to drive and what to do. At one point during the questioning, Perez-Melendez stated that Rivera-Rios gave him instructions the entire time. Rivera-Rios allegedly told him the specific warehouse to which to drive, where a warehouse employee loaded onto the truck six pallets of what Perez-Melendez said he believed to be reams of paper, and after which Rivera-Rios told him to drive on an expressway and stop at a second warehouse, in Caguas. At another point, Perez-Melendez stated that, once he and Rivera-Rios drove onto the expressway between Catano and Caguas, Perez-Melendez began receiving telephone calls from what sounded like a male person whose identity Perez-Melendez did not know and whom Perez-Melendez did not question but from whom Perez-Melendez had received calls
Third, Perez-Melendez offered inconsistent statements about the extent to which he knew and had worked with Rivera-Rios, and about their professional relationship. At one point during the questioning, Perez-Melendez stated that he had “done jobs” for Rivera-Rios in the past. Rivera-Rios would pay Perez-Melendez $100 for those assignments, either before or at the conclusion of the job. By the time of the interview, Perez-Melendez reported, he had not yet been paid for the job that day. Later in the interview, Perez-Melendez stated that October 11, 2007 was the first time he had worked for Rivera-Rios. At still another point in the interview, Perez-Melendez described Rivera-Rios not as the former‘s employer but as his assistant.
b. Rivera-Rios Questioning
ATF Task Force Agent Marcos Rodriguez-Mercado (“Rodriguez-Mercado“) was among the agents who followed and then arrested Perez-Melendez and Rivera-Rios on October 11, 2007. After Rodriguez-Mercado read Rivera-Rios his Miranda rights, Rivera-Rios signed, at 7:00 p.m. in the ATF office, a written waiver of those
DEA Special Agent Eduardo Alamo-Ramos (“Alamo-Ramos“) was among the DEA agents whom the ATF agents called to Caguas to assist them on October 11, 2007. Alamo-Ramos questioned Rivera-Rios after Rodriguez-Mercado finished his own interview with the appellant. At trial, Alamo-Ramos testified to what Rivera-Rios said during that interview. Rivera-Rios reportedly said that on October 9, 2007, at approximately 10:00 p.m., he received a telephone call from a male person whose name Rivera-Rios did not know. That male caller asked Rivera-Rios if he was available to deliver a shipment
B. Procedural History
1. 2007 Indictment and Relevant Statutes
On October 17, 2007,2 a grand jury sitting in the
2. 2008 Trial and Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal
A jury trial was held from April 28 to 30, 2008.6 At the close of the government‘s case, Perez-Melendez‘s attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal under
3. 2008 Jury Instructions and Conviction
The district court instructed the jury that, in order to convict appellants of the charged crime, the government had to
After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant‘s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. If the court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government‘s evidence, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so.
(b) Reserving Decision.
The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict. If the court reserves decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.
[t]his means that the Government must prove that one or the other Defendant consciously shared the other Defendant‘s knowledge of the underlying criminal act and intended to help him. The Defendant need not perform the underlying criminal act, be present when it is performed, or be aware of the details of its execution to be guilty of aiding and abetting. But a general suspicion that an unlawful act may occur or that something criminal is happening is not enough. Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are also not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting.
During a charging conference, defense counsel for Perez-Melendez objected to the district court‘s plan to issue a jury instruction concerning the willful blindness doctrine.
In deciding whether Daniel Perez-Melendez and Angel Rivera-Rios acted knowingly, you may infer that they had knowledge of a fact if you find that they deliberately closed their eyes to a fact that otherwise would have been obvious to them. In order to infer knowledge, you must find that two things have been established. First, that Daniel Perez-Melendez and Angel Rivera-Rios were aware of a high probability that illegal drugs were packaged within the pallets. Second, that Daniel Perez-Melendez and Angel Rivera-Rios consciously and deliberately avoided learning of that fact. That is to say, Daniel Perez-Melendez and Angel Rivera-Rios willfully made themselves blind to that fact. It is entirely up to you to determine whether they deliberately closed their eyes to the fact and, if so, what inference, if any, should be drawn. However, it is important to bear in mind that mere negligence or mistake in failing to learn the fact is not sufficient. There must be a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of the fact.
Counsel for Perez-Melendez then reminded the district court judge of her objection to this jury instruction during the charging conference. The judge denied the objection. Because the charging conference had not been on the record, the judge instructed counsel for Perez-Melendez to put the objection in writing.
On April 30, 2008, the jury found appellants guilty of the indicted charge.
On May 6, 2008, Perez-Melendez filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal and objection to the willful blindness instruction. The same day, Rivera-Rios filed a motion, which was granted, to join Perez-Melendez‘s motion.
Regarding the motion for a judgment of acquittal, Perez-Melendez argued that the government had fallen short of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crime because it had not provided any evidence of his knowing affirmative or willfully blind participation in the illegal activity or that he had specific knowledge of the presence of narcotics.
Regarding the objection to the willful blindness instruction, Perez-Melendez argued that the requirements for giving the instruction were not satisfied. To establish the requirements, Perez-Melendez cited our ruling in United States v. Gabriele, which found that
A willful blindness instruction is warranted if (1) the defendant claims lack of knowledge; (2) the evidence would support an inference that the defendant consciously engaged in a course of deliberate ignorance; and (3) the proposed instruction, as a whole, could not lead the jury to conclude that an inference of knowledge was mandatory.
63 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1995). Perez-Melendez argued that the instruction was not warranted because the government failed to
5. 2008 United States’ Motion
On May 22, 2008, the United States filed a motion in opposition. The United States argued that evidence presented at trial, specifically the testimony of law enforcement agents and appellants’ own statements not made at trial, demonstrated appellants’ knowledge as to what they were transporting in the truck they were riding in on October 11, 2007. The United States argued that the jury could have found appellants’ knowledge based on either an actual knowledge or willful blindness theory. The evidence to which the United States pointed was the following: the truck was carrying narcotics, appellants occupied the truck while the cocaine was inside, and it had been proven that appellants had made similar deliveries “four” times before.8 The United States concluded that Perez-Melendez‘s motion should be denied because, viewing the evidence in the required light most favorable to the prosecution, each of the elements of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
On August 8, 2008, the district court denied appellants’ motion for judgment of acquittal. Perez-Melendez, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 329. The district court determined that “the government provided sufficient evidence, including reasonable inferences, that when considered as a whole, warrant the jury‘s conclusion that the defendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 329. The district court also found the willful blindness instruction to the jury to have been proper. Id. On August 21, 2008, the district court sentenced each of the appellants to 120 months of imprisonment, supervised release for a term of five years, and a monetary penalty of $100.
On August 22, 2008, Perez-Melendez filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. Three days later, Rivera-Rios also filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. Appellants contend that the district court erred in two matters. First, they argue, the district court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict. Second, they claim, the district court erred in issuing a willful blindness instruction to the jury despite appellants’ objection because the evidence the government presented at trial did not support an inference that appellants consciously engaged in a course of deliberate ignorance, one of the three
II. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellants argue that the district court committed error in denying the Rule 29 motion Perez-Melendez filed and which Rivera-Rios joined. We agree. As discussed below, we reverse the district court‘s ruling.
1. Standard / Scope of Review
We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Troy, 583 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009). In so doing,
we examine the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict. We do not assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury. Nor need we be convinced that the government succeeded in eliminating every possible theory consistent with the defendant‘s innocence. Rather, we must decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If a reasonable jury could have found that the government had proven each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction.” United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). “We
2. Legal Framework
We have previously found that,
[i]n order to establish aiding and abetting liability, the government must prove, first, that the principal committed the substantive offense charged, and second, that the accomplice became associated with the principal‘s criminal endeavor and took part in it, intending to assure its success. While we have acknowledged that the challenge in aiding and abetting cases is framing the intent element for the jury, we have explicitly declined to require the shared intent language found in some of our opinions and in the First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions. Instead, we have observed that a showing that the defendant consciously shared the principal‘s knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help him is one way for the government to fulfill its burden to show that a defendant participated in the venture and sought by his actions to make it succeed.
United States v. Gonzalez, 570 F.3d 16, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[M]ere association with the principal, or mere presence at the
scene of a crime, even when combined with knowledge that a crime will be committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability.” United States v. Medina-Román, 376 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004). Rather, “proof of sufficient participation in the crime, as well as knowledge of it, is required to convict . . . . [W]here, as here, a defendant actively participates in a venture, but denies any knowledge of the venture‘s illegal nature, the government must adequately prove knowledge, more so than participation.” United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).Willful blindness serves as an alternate theory on which the government may prove knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Evidence presented at trial may support either a finding of actual knowledge or a finding of willful blindness.“); Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 343 (holding that evidence supports “a finding of positive knowledge, or at least deliberate ignorance“). The willful blindness instruction given in this case permitted the jury to infer knowledge if the jury found that the government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants (1) “were aware of a high probability that illegal drugs were packaged within the pallets,” and (2) “consciously and deliberately avoided learning of that fact.” App. 10; see United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 86 (1st Cir. 2006) (approving nearly identical instruction). Such an instruction
3. Analysis
a. The Government‘s Task
To convict appellants under
b. The Circumstantial Evidence and the District Court‘s Inferences Drawn Therefrom
The government relied upon circumstantial evidence to prove appellants’ knowing participation or willful blindness in the transportation of a controlled substance. The circumstantial evidence the government presented was: (1) inconsistent statements each appellant made, (2) inconsistent statements between appellants and Cruz-Martínez, and (3) appellants’ statements or omissions concerning particular aspects of their delivery on October 11, 2007. Taken as a whole, the government argued, “[t]he evidence at trial showed the defendants knowingly and intentionally possessed, either actually or constructively, a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute. The evidence supported a finding of either actual knowledge or willful blindness for the crime‘s intent element.” Reply Br. at 12-13.
“In circumstantial cases such as this one, the evidence is sufficient to convict if it adequately supports the requisite two-step inference: (1) that the vessel was engaged in obviously illegal activity and (2) that each defendant was ready to assist in the criminal enterprise.” Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 342. As we discuss below, the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to convict because it did not adequately support the inference that appellants either actually knew about or were willfully blind to
Appellants contradicted themselves on multiple issues. Pérez-Meléndez, when questioned on October 11, 2007, offered inconsistent statements about three matters: (1) whether he or Rivera-Ríos rented the truck, (2) who provided instructions to him on where to drive and what to do, and (3) the extent to which he knew and had worked with Rivera-Ríos, and about their professional relationship. Rivera-Ríos also contradicted himself when questioned on the same date. When speaking to ATF Task Force Agent Rodríguez-Mercado and DEA Special Agent Álamo-Ramos, Rivera-Ríos alternated between saying that the person who issued instructions to him that day was his friend, “David,” and an unidentified male caller. The district court concluded that “[t]he inconsistencies in defendants’ recollections of events when speaking to law enforcement raise the inference that they lied to conceal their knowledge of the illegal nature of the activity in which they were involved.” Pérez-Meléndez, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
Not only did appellants contradict themselves, but appellants contradicted a third party, in that Pérez-Meléndez contradicted Cruz-Martínez at one point during his questioning on at least one issue. Cruz-Martínez‘s testimony at trial conflicted with appellants’ statements during their questioning on October 11, 2007. Cruz-Martínez testified that appellants made at least three
The district court makes much ado about what it refers to as appellants’ “explanation, or more succinctly, their lack of explanation, to law enforcement of certain details concerning the delivery job.” Id. First, appellants claimed that, when they accepted and initiated the delivery on October 11, 2007, they did not know their precise final destination other than that it was in Caguas. Appellants claimed to have received more specific instructions once en route. Second, appellants may not have known who, exactly, hired them. Pérez-Meléndez said it was either Rivera-Ríos or an unidentified male caller. Rivera-Ríos said it was either an unidentified male caller or a male caller identified only as “David.” The district court noted that Rivera-Ríos stated he had done another job for the same client, which involved transferring merchandise from one truck to another. Id. Third,
All of these details raise additional questions such as who accepts jobs from an unknown individual to deliver to an unknown location? Another question is why hire a truck and driver to deliver a shipment if the shipment is only to be delivered to another truck rather than a fixed location? These questions beg for answers. The implausible nature of the delivery jobs, as described by defendants to law enforcement, suggests that defendants closed their eyes to the criminal activity in which they were involved. It also allows the inference that defendants knew they were involved in transporting drugs because a legitimate business would not typically act as the defendants did or as their mysterious client did in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
c. Our Analysis of the Circumstantial Evidence
Some of the inferences the district court draws are certainly plausible, but their significance is limited. A rational factfinder could have drawn a plausible inference that appellants knew they were involved in an illegal activity because appellants’ statements and omissions concerning their job and the manner in which they were hired for and performed that work earlier the same day are suspicious. However, we find that a rational factfinder could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants committed the charged crime because reasonable doubt should have remained that (1) appellants knew that the precise nature of that activity involved controlled substances generally or cocaine
As we have previously observed, “knowledge that one is guilty of some crime is not the same as knowledge that one is guilty of the crime charged.” Nieves-Castaño, 480 F.3d at 601 (emphasis in original). A significant body of case law from other circuits exists in which insufficiency of evidence was found where a defendant may have known he was participating in an illegal activity but there was little or no evidence to suggest that the defendant knew that the activity involved drugs specifically, and we adopt that position here. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he government failed to introduce sufficient evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of aiding and abetting a drug-related crime because “[p]roof that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough.“) (emphasis in original); United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he evidence adduced at trial did not support an inference that [defendant] knew he was participating in a transaction that involved a controlled substance, as opposed to some other form of contraband . . . . Although [the] evidence may be sufficient to prove that [defendant] knew he was participating in some sort of illegal transaction, these facts nonetheless are
While over-emphasizing the factors mentioned above, the district court under-emphasized other factors in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that the pallets of reams of paper they transported contained a controlled substance. Specifically, the district court downplays the significance of the cocaine‘s packaging and the fee appellants received for transporting the pallets, stating: “The fact that the drugs were artfully concealed within reams of paper and that the plaintiffs told law enforcement that they were not paid an unusually excessive amount in the past (between $100 and $400) are not outcome determinative.” Pérez-Meléndez, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 329. While we agree these factors are not “outcome determinative,” we also find that, partly because of them, a rational factfinder should have retained reasonable doubt that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that the pallets contained a controlled substance. The cocaine was concealed so well in packaging Doral left unwrapped that a team of law enforcement agents could not detect it themselves and needed a trained canine to do so. Although “[w]e have eschewed a myopic inquiry into whether one particular indication of knowledge (such as a smell) did, or did not, exist[,] . . . we turn to other
There were other factors the district court did not identify that should have further left a rational factfinder with reasonable doubt that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that the pallets contained a controlled substance. Doral, an authorized company in Puerto Rico engaged in the lawful business of transporting shipments from, among other places, the Dominican
Although the government is allowed to prove by circumstantial evidence that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that the pallets in question contained drugs, here it only succeeded in establishing, at most, that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that something illegal was afoot.9 Any conclusion by the jury beyond that, specifically imputing to appellants knowledge of or willful blindness to the contents of the pallets, was the product of pure speculation. This is particularly true when one considers that the burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Idowu, 157 F.3d at 270 (holding that there was insufficient evidence that the object of the transaction was drugs and that “no reasonable jury could have concluded that the government had met its burden of proof, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt“); United States v. Olivo-Infante, 938 F.2d 1406, 1409 (1st Cir. 1991).
The evidence the government presented in this case would have been just as consistent with that of a case involving the smuggling of contraband other than a controlled substance. This contraband could plausibly have been other goods, such as weapons, stolen jewels or computer chips, counterfeit currency, diamonds and
This case can be distinguished from other recent cases in which we have found that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a jury‘s verdict where defendants were charged with similar crimes. For example, in Azubike I and Azubike II, we ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant for conspiring to
We thus find that there is insufficient evidence that appellants knew or were willfully blind to the fact that controlled substances were hidden in the pallets of reams of paper. We thus find that the evidence was not sufficient to convict appellants because it did not adequately support the requisite two-step inference that (1) the truck Pérez-Meléndez was driving and in which Rivera-Ríos was a passenger was engaged in the obvious transportation of a controlled substance or (2) that each appellant was ready to assist in that criminal enterprise. The evidence would not allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants committed the charged crime. Thus, because the government failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged against appellants by proof beyond a reasonable doubt — that appellants knowingly possessed cocaine — the Constitution mandates acquittal on the charge against both appellants. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.“).
B. Willful Blindness Jury Instruction
Having found the evidence insufficient to sustain the jury verdict against appellants, we need not deal with appellants’ argument concerning the adequacy of the willful blindness jury instruction. See United States v. Carucci, 364 F.3d 339, 340, 347 n.8 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the court need not address a defendant‘s challenge to the trial court‘s willful blindness instruction to the jury where the court held that the evidence against the defendant was insufficient to establish criminal liability under the relevant statute).
III. Conclusion
In light of the specific facts in this case, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence of appellants’ criminal scienter that they were transporting five kilograms or more of cocaine specifically or a controlled substance generally. We therefore hold that no reasonable jury could have concluded that the government had met its burden of proof, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be reversed. Appellants’ convictions and sentences are vacated and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed, Vacated and Remanded.
Notes
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.”
(a) Before Submission to the Jury.