United States v. Uri Ammar
842 F.3d 1203
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Uri Ammar was indicted Sept. 1, 2011 for an armed robbery/killing; trial was scheduled by the district court for Oct. 9, 2012 after a Sept. 13, 2011 scheduling conference.
- Some co-defendants and the DOJ sought a long continuance to accommodate the DOJ death-penalty decision process; Ammar opposed a year-long delay and asked for an earlier trial.
- The district court set the year-out trial date and its written order cited the DOJ death-penalty process and defense resource needs; the order did not expressly invoke the Speedy Trial Act’s “ends of justice” findings.
- Ammar moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act (70-day rule) before trial; the district court denied the motion at an Oct. 4, 2012 calendar call, repeatedly stating the continuance was by agreement of the parties and refusing to make express ends-of-justice findings.
- The jury convicted Ammar; on appeal the Eleventh Circuit considered only the Speedy Trial Act claim and held the Act was violated because the court refused to make the required on-the-record ends-of-justice findings, reversing and remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment (district court to decide with or without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Ammar's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s year-long continuance tolled the Speedy Trial Act 70-day clock | Court failed to make required on-the-record “ends of justice” findings; parties’ agreement alone insufficient | The record supports tolling; parties’ agreement and the court’s earlier discussion justify exclusion and the court could make findings before ruling | Held for Ammar: court violated Speedy Trial Act because it refused to make express on-the-record ends-of-justice findings (Zedner controls) |
| Whether parties’ agreement can substitute for judicial findings under the Act | Agreement cannot substitute; the court must make the statutory balancing on the record | Agreement and the scheduling discussion render the delay reasonable; court could cure record by making findings when ruling | Held for Ammar: party agreement is not a lawful substitute; Zedner forbids waiver by parties alone |
| Whether a court may make required findings after the fact or on remand | Post-hoc findings cannot cure the absence of on-the-record findings | Court could articulate its findings at the calendar call or on remand to cure defect | Held for Ammar: Zedner prohibits making those findings on remand; the failure is fatal and the time counts against the 70 days |
| Appropriate remedy for Speedy Trial Act violation | Dismiss indictment; consider prejudice factors to decide with/without prejudice | Dismissal unnecessary if court can justify the delay or make findings now | Held for Ammar: dismissal required under §3162(a)(2); remanded for district court to determine dismissal with or without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (Speedy Trial Act requires express on-the-record ends-of-justice findings; parties cannot waive Act’s protections)
- United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988) (statutory dismissal is mandatory upon Speedy Trial Act violation; court’s scheduling discretion is confined by Act)
- Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional guarantee)
- United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (superseding indictment does not reset speedy-trial timetable)