United States v. Ullmann
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9622
10th Cir.2015Background
- Ronald Ullmann pleaded guilty to making a false statement after sexually explicit online chats with an undercover agent posing as a 13‑year‑old; sentenced to 60 months imprisonment and three years supervised release.
- The Probation Office replaced twelve device/Internet conditions with a boilerplate Computer and Internet Monitoring Program (CIMP) condition authorizing “restrictions and/or prohibitions” on Internet/computer and Internet‑capable devices, monitoring, and inventory/password disclosure.
- Probation intended CIMP as the district’s standard sex‑offender supervision condition; its manual, however, stated Tenth Circuit law forbids absolute computer bans and allowed monitored access.
- Ullmann accepted monitoring but objected to language potentially authorizing an absolute ban and to overbroad device categories; district court orally clarified the condition restricts but does not prohibit Internet/device use and retained judicial oversight.
- The district court adopted the modified condition in writing; Ullmann appealed arguing (1) greater than necessary deprivation of liberty, (2) inconsistency with the Sentencing Guidelines, and (3) unconstitutional delegation to probation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the CIMP language ("restrictions and/or prohibitions") imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary | Ullmann: language ambiguous and could be read to permit a complete ban on Internet/use of devices, which is excessive given modern dependence on the Internet | Gov: condition should be read in light of district court’s oral clarification (no prohibition) and Probation’s manual; not seeking total ban | Court: Affirmed—condition lawful only because district court’s oral statement limits it to restrictions, not prohibitions; complete bans typically violate §3583(d)(2) |
| Whether the condition conflicts with Sentencing Commission policy statements | Ullmann: condition inconsistent with Guidelines recommendation limiting computer restrictions to those related to the offense | Gov: condition restricts rather than prohibits use and thus does not directly conflict | Court: No conflict—condition, as limited, is consistent with policy statements required by §3583(d)(3) |
| Whether the condition unconstitutionally delegates judicial authority to probation | Ullmann: phrase “[a]s directed by the U.S. Probation Officer” improperly delegates sentencing decisions to probation | Gov: district court retained authority via oral clarification; probation’s role is ministerial | Court: No unlawful delegation—the court’s oral directions show it retained decision‑making authority and delegated only ministerial implementation tasks |
| Whether boilerplate CIMP language is permissible for future cases absent oral clarification | Ullmann: boilerplate is ambiguous and could enable improper bans or delegations | Gov: relies on implementation and manual limitations | Court: Cautions that boilerplate alone is problematic; ambiguous language unaccompanied by oral clarification could violate precedents and should be avoided |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (ambiguously worded condition that could be read to ban Internet access is impermissible)
- United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001) (Internet is central to modern life; limiting but not banning Internet use may be permissible)
- United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008) (§3583(d) standards for supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Barwig, 568 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2009) (oral pronouncement controls over written sentence language)
- United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011) (construe conditions to render them legally sound; limits on delegation)
- United States v. Wayne, 591 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2010) (review of delegation challenges; distinction between ministerial tasks and judicial decisions)
- United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2015) (White II) (Article III limits on delegating sentencing authority)
- United States v. Dotson, 715 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2013) (troubled by outright Internet bans given employment/modern‑life reliance)
- United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for supervised‑release conditions)