United States v. Tywan Hill
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15060
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Tywan Hill was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- At trial Hill requested a jury instruction that the constructive-possession element include the word "knowingly"; the district court declined to insert that specific term.
- The government sought an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on Hill’s prior Florida convictions, including resisting an officer with violence (Fla. Stat. § 843.01) and battery on a law enforcement officer (Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03, 784.07(2)(b)).
- The district court denied the ACCA enhancement; the government cross-appealed and argued those Florida convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Hill’s conviction (finding the constructive-possession instruction adequate) but vacated his sentence and remanded because one prior Florida conviction—resisting an officer with violence—categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause.
- The court directed the district court on remand to determine separately whether Hill’s prior drug convictions qualify as ACCA "serious drug offenses," and to correct a clerical error in the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hill) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the constructive-possession jury instruction must expressly include the word "knowingly" | The instruction omitted the word "knowingly," allowing conviction without proof Hill knew of the firearm | The given instruction and the elements charge sufficiently covered the knowledge requirement | Court: No abuse of discretion; instruction adequately implied knowledge; conviction affirmed |
| Whether Hill's Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence is a violent felony under the ACCA (elements clause) | Hill contended it did not qualify | Government argued it does qualify (and relied earlier on residual-clause precedent) | Court: Conviction for resisting with violence categorically qualifies under ACCA elements clause; district court erred; sentence vacated and remanded |
| Whether Hill's prior Florida battery-on-officer conviction is a violent felony under the ACCA | Hill argued it did not qualify under the elements clause | Government argued it qualified (primarily under residual clause earlier) | Court: Government concedes battery on an officer does not categorically qualify under the elements clause; residual-clause argument foreclosed by Johnson; district court must reassess ACCA predicates on remand |
| Whether ACCA residual-clause precedent supporting qualification of the prior convictions survives Johnson (2015) | Hill relied on Johnson to avoid ACCA enhancement | Government relied on pre-Johnson Eleventh Circuit residual-clause cases | Court: Johnson (2015) rendered the residual clause void; prior residual-clause precedent no longer controlling; government’s residual-clause arguments foreclosed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011) (standards for reviewing refusal to give a requested jury instruction)
- United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011) (definition of constructive possession requires knowing power or right and intent to exercise dominion)
- United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601 (11th Cir. 1990) (jury instruction implying knowledge suffices for constructive-possession knowledge element)
- United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (ACCA and residual-clause discussion; categorical approach)
- United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2012) (Florida § 843.01 conviction treated as ACCA predicate under prior Eleventh Circuit law)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (holding ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague; limits use of residual clause)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" for ACCA purposes and limiting categorical application)
- McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2002) (obligation to follow state supreme court on state-law elements; otherwise follow intermediate appellate decisions)
- United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2009) (elements of § 922(g)(1) include knowing possession)