895 F.3d 410
5th Cir.2018Background
- In summer 2015 Tyrone Smith lived with Lacoya Washington; Smith met B.R., a 14-year-old who told him she was 19, and brought her to Shreveport.
- B.R. testified Smith directed her to have sex with men, photographed her, posted ads on Backpage, and controlled pricing; Washington rented hotel rooms, drove B.R. to clients, paid for rooms, and provided cocaine.
- Police executed a sting, detained B.R., found Smith’s phone, a prepaid card, and a loaded gun in the hotel room rented under Washington’s name; both defendants made statements to police.
- Both were charged with sex trafficking of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 1591); Smith faced an additional interstate prostitution-by-coercion charge; both tried jointly in a three-day bench trial.
- Trial court convicted both; Washington received 292 months; Smith received concurrent long sentences. On appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed Washington’s conviction and sentence but reversed Smith’s convictions for a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence against Washington (§1591) | Washington: her conduct was "innocent" or passive failure to stop; no intentional assistance. | Government: Washington knowingly participated—paid/used funds, provided email, approved ad text/photos, drove B.R., arranged rooms and pricing. | Affirmed – substantial evidence supports knowing assistance and joint enterprise. |
| Motion to sever (joinder with Smith) | Washington: prejudiced by Smith’s disruptive pro se behavior; severance warranted. | Government: bench trial mitigates spillover prejudice; judicial economy and victim protection favor joint trial. | Affirmed – no abuse of discretion; no specific, compelling prejudice shown. |
| Sentencing challenges (Guidelines enhancements; Eighth Amendment) | Washington: undue-influence and computer-use two-level enhancements improper; sentence substantively unreasonable and cruel and unusual. | Government: enhancements supported (rebuttable presumption re age; joint enterprise for computer use); Guideline-range sentence presumptively reasonable. | Affirmed – district court did not err applying enhancements; 292 months reasonable and not Eighth Amendment violation. |
| Denial of Smith’s motion to reassert right to counsel (Faretta withdrawal) | Smith: after electing pro se, sought to reassert right to counsel on morning of trial due to complexity and emotional inability to proceed. | Government/District Court: request was a last-minute delay tactic; standby counsel available; denial appropriate to prevent disruption. | Reversed (Smith) – court erred by denying reassertion without determining whether elevating standby counsel would have impeded orderly administration; record lacks finding that appointment would cause delay. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pollani, 146 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court errs denying belated request for counsel when no finding that appointment would impede orderly administration of justice)
- United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2013) (standard for sufficiency review in bench-trial convictions)
- United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2010) (severance abuse-of-discretion standard; need specific and compelling prejudice)
- United States v. Groce, 784 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2015) (two-step reasonableness review for sentences)
- United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014) (computer-use enhancement can apply when defendant facilitates others’ online advertisements)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel is fundamental)
- Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (Eighth Amendment benchmark for proportionality review)