35 F. Supp. 3d 650
M.D. Penn.2014Background
- Remand from the Third Circuit after Arthur Andersen and Fowler decisions; Tyler convicted in 2000 for obstruction of justice (counts II and III) and given life sentence; convictions upheld on direct appeal and survived §2255 challenges; Third Circuit remanded to consider actual innocence under Arthur Andersen and Fowler; hearing potential but parties relied on trial record; court must assess actual innocence under the Fowler standard; aggravated focus on whether Proctor would have made a relevant federal communication.
- Facts: Proctor murdered April 21, 1992; she was an informant for a state narcotics investigation coordinated by the Tri-County Drug Task Force; Diller, Pennsylvania BNI official, acted as Task Force coordinator and interfaced with federal agencies; evidence suggested Proctor could have provided information linking to federal drug investigations; the government argued the relevant communications provision could be satisfied if there was a reasonable likelihood she would have communicated with a federal officer (Diller).
- The government concedes official-proceeding provision cannot sustain the convictions; focus is on whether conduct violated the investigation-related communications provision under §1512; the court must determine actual innocence by the standard that no reasonable juror would convict given all evidence; if only one provision is satisfied, remedy may require vacating that conviction and granting a new trial on that count.
- Court applied Fowler: required evidence that a reasonable likelihood existed that the victim would have made a relevant communication to a federal officer; Third Circuit’s Tyler II standard applied to show a reasonable likelihood; evidence showed Diller’s role as adviser/consultant to federal government and Proctor’s information potentially implicating federal authorities; court found a reasonable likelihood that Proctor would have communicated with Diller, a federal-law-enforcement-adviser, thus sustaining the actual-innocence theory for Counts II and III; the remedy is vacating Counts II and III and granting a new trial on those counts.
- Outcome: Vacate Counts II and III and grant a new trial on those counts for obstruction of justice based on a violation of the investigation-related communications provision.
- Procedural posture: Case on remand following Third Circuit’s instruction to assess actual innocence under Fowler/Arthur Andersen; no new evidence introduced; reliance on trial and related state-court record to assess probability of federal communication by Proctor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tyler is actually innocent under Fowler's standard. | Tyler argues no reasonable likelihood Proctor would communicate with federal officers. | Tyler contends no credible likelihood of federal-contact communication; requires evidence ruling out any federal linkage. | No; court finds reasonable likelihood exists that Proctor would have made a relevant federal communication. |
| Whether Proctor would have contacted a federal officer through Diller as adviser/consultant. | Proctor's connection to Diller could lead to federal contact. | Diller’s adviser/consultant status disputed; argues not clearly federal-adviser role. | A reasonable juror could find Proctor would have contacted Diller (federal-adviser) and thus satisfied the provision. |
| What is the proper remedy if actual innocence is found on one provision but not the other? | Vacate and retry the affected counts where actual innocence is shown. | Remedy should align with Third Circuit guidance to grant new trial where valid. | Vacate Counts II and III and grant a new trial on those counts. |
| Does the government’s concession about the official-proceeding provision affect the analysis? | Not dispositive; only the investigation-related provision remains viable. | Concession narrows issues to the investigation-related provision. | Yes; the analysis focuses on the investigation-related provision. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (U.S. 2005) (establishes framework for official-proceeding violations and contemplation of proceedings)
- Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045 (U.S. 2011) (requires a reasonable likelihood of a relevant federal communication when general intent to prevent communications is shown)
- In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) (establishes actual-innocence standard for post-conviction claims under changed law)
- United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (Tyler II; clarifies actual-innocence standard and Fowler-based test for investigation-related communications)
- United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir. 1997) (precedent on official-proceeding provision and convictions without a specific federal proceeding contemplated)