United States v. Tucker, 61 F.4th 194

Tucker operated a heroin distribution and prostitution enterprise (via Backpage) from 2013–2014, recruiting and supplying women with heroin in exchange for sex; several women testified at trial.
Jasmine, the minor underlying the §1591 count, worked for Tucker and turned 17 during the charged period; multiple witnesses testified Tucker knew her age.
After a four‑day jury trial (defense rested, instructions and closings given), juror comments before deliberations prompted the judge to interview jurors, dismiss two jurors, refuse a defense mistrial motion, and substitute an alternate; the jury convicted on all counts.
Months after conviction the government disclosed it had inadvertently failed to disclose that witness Morgan had been arrested on a state drug charge and that the U.S. Attorney had considered federal prosecution; Morgan had testified under an immunity grant.
Tucker moved for a mistrial (based on juror misconduct) and for a new trial under Rule 33 / Brady–Giglio (based on the undisclosed impeachment material); the district court denied both motions.
On appeal the First Circuit affirmed, holding the district judge did not abuse his discretion on either the mistrial or the suppressed‑evidence claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Tucker)	Held
Whether denial of mistrial after judge dismissed two jurors for comments was an abuse of discretion	District court properly investigated, excused implicated jurors, questioned panel, found no pervasive taint; remedial steps adequate	Judge applied wrong standard (invoked "manifest necessity") and failed to cure juror predeliberation/bias; jury tainted	Affirmed — no abuse of discretion: judge conducted a careful inquiry, dismissed jurors, found remaining jurors impartial; any invocation of "manifest necessity" was invited and harmless
Whether suppression of impeachment evidence (Morgan's state arrest and possible federal referral) required a new trial under Brady/Giglio	Nondisclosure was inadvertent but cumulative and of marginal impeachment value; Morgan already testified to pending charge and immunity; her testimony was corroborated	Suppressed evidence showed ongoing motive to curry favor (strong impeachment) and was material — reasonable probability of different result	Affirmed — no Brady/Giglio prejudice: evidence was weak/cumulative and Morgan's testimony was corroborated; no reasonable probability of a different outcome

Dinitz v. United States, 424 U.S. 600 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (different considerations apply when defendant requests a mistrial)
McIntosh v. United States, 380 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 2004) (manifest necessity and retrial analysis)
Maldonado‑Peña v. United States, 4 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021) (importance of prompt, adequate inquiry into juror taint and appellate review standard)
Therrien v. United States, 847 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (framework for investigating juror misconduct and remedies)
Peake v. United States, 874 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2017) (deference to trial judge on materiality/prejudice of belatedly disclosed evidence)
Paladin Associates, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2014) (factors for assessing materiality of suppressed impeachment evidence)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (Brady obligation extends to impeachment information)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (Brady standard and prejudice inquiry)