United States v. Tsarnaev
157 F. Supp. 3d 57
D. Mass.2016Background
- Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was tried in the District of Massachusetts for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings; jury found him guilty on all counts in April 2015 and imposed death on six counts in May 2015.
- Post-trial, Tsarnaev moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 and 29 for a new trial or judgment of acquittal, reasserting venue objections and challenging multiple 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions.
- He argued Johnson v. United States (2015) invalidated the § 924(c) “residual” clause as unconstitutionally vague and that certain predicate offenses did not qualify as “crimes of violence.”
- The court conducted extended briefing and oral argument, then examined venue (Skilling factors) and statutory construction of § 924(c)(3)’s force and residual clauses.
- The court denied the motion: reaffirmed venue in the District of Massachusetts and upheld the § 924(c) convictions, distinguishing Samuel Johnson’s holding and finding the jury instructions and predicates proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venue — presumptive prejudice from local publicity | Local marathon coverage, anniversary events, courthouse surroundings, and social media saturated the jury’s community and presumptively prejudiced trial venue | Trial publicity and local events created an atmosphere making trial in Massachusetts improper; defendant sought change of venue | Court: No presumption of prejudice under Skilling factors; community large/diverse, publicity national, time elapsed, jury verdicts show careful deliberation; venue affirmed |
| § 924(c) — residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) vagueness | Samuel Johnson’s invalidation of ACCA residual clause shows any statutory “substantial risk” residual formulation is unconstitutionally vague, so § 924(c)(3)(B) must fall | Samuel Johnson addressed a different statutory text and context (ACCA). §924(c) predicates are federal, adjudicated as-applied, and do not pose the same irresolvable categorical problems | Court: Samuel Johnson does not compel invalidation of §924(c)(3)(B); §924(c) differs structurally and practically, so residual clause stands |
| § 924(c) — force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)) categorical application | Curtis Johnson requires “violent force”; several predicate offenses (e.g., WMD by non-explosive means, carjacking, Hobbs Act robbery) can be committed nonviolently, so they may not categorically meet the force clause | Curtis Johnson was narrower; many predicates inherently involve violent force; statutes (and jury instructions/indictment) show the alternatives involve force or are divisible so Shepard records confirm force-based convictions | Court: Curtis Johnson does not doom these predicates; many predicates plainly involve violent force; Hobbs Act robbery is First Circuit law as violent; carjacking and related counts either indivisible or divisible with Shepard-documents proving force; challenge fails (also likely waived) |
| Death penalty constitutionality | Relies on Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent raising systemic concerns about capital punishment’s reliability and arbitrariness | Binding Supreme Court precedent allows federal death penalty; dissent does not control | Court: Rejected challenge; Glossip majority governs, so constitutional challenge fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (assessment of presumptive prejudice factors for venue change)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Samuel Johnson) (invalidated ACCA residual clause on vagueness)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Curtis Johnson) (limited ACCA interpretation requiring "violent force" in certain battery statutes)
- In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2015) (prior First Circuit proceedings addressing publicity and venue)
- United States v. Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d 380 (1st Cir. 2015) (media impact and community characteristics in venue/prejudice analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (statutory divisibility and limits on modified categorical approach)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach to defining generic offenses)
- Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (excessive media creating courtroom carnival and prejudice)
- Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (media presence causing trial disruption)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (use of force may include indirect means causing bodily harm)
- Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (death-penalty challenges; majority and dissent referenced)