United States v. Tsarnaev
595 U.S. 302
SCOTUS2022Background
- In April 2013 Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon; three killed and hundreds wounded. Dzhokhar later was arrested, indicted on 30 federal counts (17 capital), and convicted.
- The parties proposed a 100-question juror questionnaire; the District Court adopted most questions probing publicity and bias but refused a proposed question requiring each prospective juror to list the facts they had learned about the case from media (calling it ‘‘unfocused’’ and ‘‘unguided’’).
- The court conducted three weeks of individualized voir dire after culling an expanded jury venire; jurors were instructed to decide on the evidence presented at trial. The jury convicted and recommended death on multiple counts.
- At sentencing Tsarnaev sought to admit hearsay from Ibragim Todashev (who was killed by FBI agents during an interview) alleging Tamerlan’s involvement in an earlier unsolved triple homicide in Waltham to show Tamerlan’s domineering role; the District Court excluded the Waltham evidence under 18 U.S.C. §3593(c) as lacking probative value and likely to confuse the jury.
- The First Circuit vacated Tsarnaev’s capital sentences on two independent grounds: (1) district court abused discretion by not asking each juror about the content/extent of media exposure (relying on Patriarca); and (2) district court abused discretion by excluding the Waltham-murder evidence at sentencing.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the First Circuit, holding (a) no constitutional or supervisory rule required the specific media-content question and the district court had broad discretion over voir dire, and (b) the exclusion of the Waltham evidence was a permissible exercise of the District Court’s gatekeeping/balancing authority under §3593(c).
Issues
| Issue | United States (Petitioner) Argument | Tsarnaev (Respondent) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by refusing to ask each prospective juror to list facts learned from media (content question) | No; trial judge has broad discretion over voir dire and the court’s questionnaire + three weeks of individualized voir dire and instructions adequately probed bias | Yes; failure to ask content question prevented meaningful inquiry into juror exposure/bias (Patriarca required such questioning) | Court: No abuse of discretion; no constitutional requirement and appellate courts may not impose prophylactic supervisory rule overriding district-court discretion |
| Whether exclusion of Todashev/Waltham statement and related evidence at penalty phase was abuse of discretion under §3593(c) | No; evidence lacked probative value, risked confusing the jury and would produce an unhelpful mini‑trial with no living corroborating witnesses | Yes; the evidence was highly probative of Tamerlan’s violent leadership and was critical mitigating evidence showing Tsarnaev’s lesser culpability | Court: No abuse of discretion; District Court reasonably excluded the evidence after balancing probative value against risk of confusion/prejudice under §3593(c) |
| Whether a court of appeals may use supervisory power to impose specific voir dire procedures (e.g., Patriarca rule) | Supervisory power does not allow lower courts to create prophylactic rules that circumvent Supreme Court precedent on trial-court discretion | First Circuit claimed supervisory authority to require the media-content question in high-profile cases | Court: Limits supervisory power; appellate courts may not override the broad discretion granted to trial judges by imposing blanket procedural rules |
| Whether §3593(c)’s balancing test violates the Eighth Amendment by permitting exclusion of mitigating evidence | §3593(c) is consistent with Eighth Amendment; it is permissive and preserves a defendant’s opportunity to present mitigation while allowing reasonable evidentiary limits | Excluding marginally relevant mitigating evidence (like Waltham evidence) impermissibly limits sentencer’s consideration and undermines Eighth Amendment protections | Court: §3593(c) valid; Congress may channel evidence through a probative-value balancing test without violating Eighth Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (trial judge has broad discretion over voir dire and local judge’s appraisal especially persuasive on pretrial publicity issues)
- Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (no blanket constitutional rule requiring specific media-content questions; wide trial-court discretion in voir dire)
- Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1968) (First Circuit decision that had required inquiry into kind and degree of juror exposure to publicity)
- United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (limits on supervisory power; lower courts may not create rules that circumvent Supreme Court precedent)
- United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (standard and deference for abuse-of-discretion review)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality: sentencer must be able to consider any aspect of defendant’s character or circumstances as mitigation)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (mitigating circumstances must be considered by sentencer)
- Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (States may set reasonable limits on mitigating evidence; gatekeeping respects probative value)
- Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (2006) (sovereign retains authority to set reasonable limits on the evidence a defendant may submit and how it is presented)