United States v. Tsarnaev, 1:13-cr-10200

Background

After the Boston Marathon bombing, agents executed warrants and warrantless entries between April and July 2013 at 410 Norfolk St. Apt. 3 (residence linked to Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev) and Dzhokhar’s UMass Dartmouth dorm room; agents also pursued digital searches of two Yahoo! accounts, a Sony VAIO laptop, and two Gmail accounts.
April 19: warrant for Norfolk St. Apt. 3; April 21: warrant for dorm room; May 3: additional Norfolk St. warrant executed May 5; June 27: UMass staff (with an FBI agent present) cleared the dorm room and an agent took notes/photos without a warrant; July 24–26: warrants obtained and executed to search the dorm room and items taken by UMass.
Digital warrants: April 19 warrant for two Yahoo! accounts (Yahoo! also provided emergency disclosure), April 23 warrant for the Sony VAIO laptop (seized April 19 from a friend), July 3 warrant for two Gmail accounts.
Defendant challenged: (1) standing to contest searches (apartment and dorm), (2) particularity and scope of physical and electronic warrants, (3) warrantless June 27 entry and whether it tainted the July warrant, (4) probable cause for electronic warrants and search procedures for electronically stored information.
The court denied suppression motions in full, holding defendant had standing to challenge the apartment search but not the June 27 UMass entry; found warrants sufficiently particular or, alternatively, that Leon good-faith reliance applied; found digital search procedures acceptable under Rule 41(e)(2)(B) and denied an evidentiary hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing for Norfolk St. apartment search	Gov: Dzhokhar had moved to dorms and was an occasional guest; no standing	Dzhokhar: residence of record; reasonable expectation of privacy remained	Court: Dzhokhar has standing to challenge the Norfolk St. search
Standing / lawfulness of June 27 UMass entry	Gov: housing contract ended; UMass could enter and consent to agent’s presence	Dzhokhar: entry was warrantless and observations by agent tainted later warrant	Court: Dzhokhar lacks standing to challenge physical entry; UMass had right to clear room and consented to agent presence
Particularity and scope of physical and electronic warrants	Gov: warrants tied searches to specific crimes and listed categories; tailored to nexus	Dzhokhar: Attachment language ("including but not limited to") and broad categories permit general rummaging	Court: Warrants sufficiently particular when read in context; overly broad subparts would be handled item-by-item; Leon good-faith applies if any deficiency
Probable cause and search procedure for electronic searches	Gov: affidavits established nexus and that accounts/devices likely contain evidence; used Rule 41 two-step copying-then-review approach	Dzhokhar: insufficient nexus for email accounts/laptop; searches lacked protective filter/taint procedures and potentially enabled general rummaging; some warrants tainted by challenged hospital statements	Court: Magistrates could reasonably infer fair probability evidence would be in accounts/devices; procedures consistent with Rule 41(e)(2)(B); prior searches not tainted so later warrants valid; Leon good-faith applies; no evidentiary hearing required

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Vilches-Navarrate, 523 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (standing/expectation of privacy framework)
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (privacy expectancy analysis)
United States v. Kuc, 737 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (warrant particularity assessed in context)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (executing officers’ discretion to determine search details)
United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2007) (probable cause nexus and deference to magistrate)
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 1999) (search must conform to warrant)