United States v. Townsend
897 F.3d 66
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2015 Tyrek Townsend was arrested; police recovered a firearm and alprazolam (Xanax). He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute alprazolam (21 U.S.C. § 841) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
- The PSR treated a prior New York conviction under NYPL § 220.31 (fifth‑degree criminal sale of a controlled substance) and a New Jersey aggravated assault as predicates, raising Townsend’s Guidelines base offense level from 20 to 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
- Townsend objected, arguing the NYPL conviction was overbroad because New York’s schedule included HCG (human chorionic gonadotropin), which is not controlled by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
- The district court adopted the PSR: it held that § 4B1.2(b)’s definition of "controlled substance offense" (which references offenses under "federal or state law") permits state convictions even if the substance is not controlled under the CSA.
- The Second Circuit reviewed de novo whether a prior offense qualifies as a § 4B1.2 controlled substance offense and examined whether "controlled substance" in § 4B1.2(b) means substances controlled only by the CSA.
- The court concluded the Guidelines term "controlled substance" is defined by federal (CSA) standards; because NYPL § 220.31 is indivisible and reaches substances (HCG) not in the CSA, Townsend’s NY conviction cannot serve as a § 2K2.1 predicate. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "controlled substance" in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) includes substances controlled only by state law | Government: plain text ("under federal or state law") means state convictions qualify even if the substance is not controlled federally | Townsend: "controlled substance" should be read to mean substances controlled under the CSA; otherwise federal sentencing would vary by state | Held: "controlled substance" refers exclusively to substances listed under the CSA; federal standard governs (Jerome presumption) |
| Whether NYPL § 220.31 is a categorical match with federal controlled‑substance offenses | Government (below): argued divisibility or that the specific substance at conviction was federally controlled | Townsend: NYPL § 220.31 is indivisible and sweeps more broadly (includes HCG, not in CSA) so it cannot qualify | Held: § 220.31 is indivisible; because it criminalizes substances not in the CSA (HCG), it does not categorically match and cannot be a § 2K2.1(a) predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (establishes presumption against importing state standards into federal law)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for federal enhancements)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (modified categorical approach principles)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishing divisible vs. indivisible statutes)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (presumption that conviction rests on least conduct criminalized)
- United States v. Gomez‑Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787 (5th Cir.: "controlled substance" in Guidelines limited to CSA list)
- United States v. Leal‑Vega, 680 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.: similar interpretation limiting to federal schedule)
- United States v. Sanchez‑Garcia, 642 F.3d 658 (8th Cir.: comparable reasoning)
- Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.: NYPL § 220.31 is indivisible)