464 F.Supp.3d 651
S.D.N.Y.2020Background
- Jorge and Victor Torres were convicted in 1988 of heroin distribution conspiracy and a continuing criminal enterprise; initially sentenced to life without parole under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b), later remanded and resentenced under § 848(a) to life without parole.
- They have served about 33 years in federal custody; both are now in their late 50s/early 60s and have exemplary prison records with extensive education, work, mentoring, and religious leadership roles.
- Judge John M. Walker (the original sentencing judge) submitted letters supporting commutation, stating their rehabilitation is unique; prior commutation petitions were denied.
- Under the First Step Act, they submitted requests to their warden (Nov. 8, 2019); after 30 days without a BOP motion, they filed pro se motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
- The government argued the Torreses failed to exhaust administrative issues related to COVID-19 and contested reliance on rehabilitation; the Court rejected an "issue-exhaustion" requirement and considered COVID-19 and rehabilitation together with § 3553(a) factors.
- The Court found extraordinary and compelling reasons (sustained rehabilitation, significant community mentoring/service, and COVID-19 risk given age/health), concluded § 3553(a) factors favored release, and resentenced both brothers to time served, directing the parties to propose release conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative exhaustion / issue exhaustion | Warden request filed; 30 days lapsed so Court may act | Gov't: COVID-related claims weren’t raised to BOP so not exhausted | Court: statutory exhaustion met; issue exhaustion not required; Court may consider COVID claims |
| Scope of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" | First Step Act allows courts to consider broader grounds; rehabilitation plus other factors suffice | Gov't: rehabilitation alone cannot justify release; Commission guidance limits consideration | Court: rehabilitation is relevant in combination with other factors; First Step Act permits district-court discretion |
| Application of § 3553(a) (deterrence, disparity, history) | Long incarceration, exemplary post‑sentence conduct, sentencing disparities favor reduction | Gov't: need for deterrence and original sentencing rationale | Court: Judge Walker’s view that general deterrence goal met; §3553(a) factors favor reduction, disparities weigh for release |
| COVID-19 and health risk | Pandemic increases risk in custody; ages and Jorge’s stroke, hypertension, diabetes elevate risk | Gov't: pandemic not exhausted with BOP (see above) | Court: COVID-19 is an additional extraordinary factor supporting release given ages/health |
Key Cases Cited
- Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (finality rule limits sentence modification)
- Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (analysis of judicially imposed issue-exhaustion in administrative contexts)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (statutory interpretation begins with text when assessing exhaustion requirements)
- Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (similar statutory language not demanding issue exhaustion)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (post-sentencing rehabilitation can inform § 3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating sentence under § 848(b) for erroneous jury instructions)
- United States v. Torres, 941 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to life sentences)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (principle of giving effect to every statutory word)