United States v. Tony Sparkman
973 F.3d 771
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background:
- Tony Sparkman was a gang member convicted of racketeering, drug offenses, and two counts of using a firearm to commit kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
- § 924(c) carried mandatory minimums: 5 years for one violation, 7 years if the firearm was "brandished," and a 25-year consecutive minimum for a second § 924(c) conviction (pre–First Step Act).
- In 2012 the district court imposed a 42-year mandatory minimum (including a 25-year second‑§924(c) term); this sentence was vacated on appeal in Cardena, and Sparkman was resentenced in Oct. 2017 to 40 years after removal of the brandishing enhancement.
- Sparkman appealed the 2017 resentencing; his appeal was pending when the First Step Act of 2018 (§ 403) was enacted, which narrowed when the 25‑year second‑§924(c) mandatory minimum applies and provided relief for some pre‑Act conduct if "a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment."
- Sparkman argued § 403 applied because his sentence was pending on appeal (so, he said, not yet "imposed"); the government and the court relied on precedent holding a sentence is "imposed" when entered by the district court, regardless of appeals.
Issues:
| Issue | Sparkman’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether First Step Act §403 applies when a defendant’s sentence is pending on appeal (i.e., whether a sentence is "imposed" before final appellate disposition) | A sentence is not "imposed" until final disposition; pending appeal means §403 relief applies | A sentence is "imposed" when the district court pronounces it, even if appealed; §403 therefore does not apply | Court followed Pierson: sentence is imposed at district court; §403 does not apply to Sparkman |
| Whether the residual‑clause error in the §924(c) definition of "crime of violence" is structural (requiring reversal despite plain‑error review) | The residual‑clause error is structural and inherently prejudicial | The law of the case bars raising structural‑error theory now; even on merits, Hedgpeth forecloses treating this as structural error | Court held law of the case bars the new structural‑error claim and, on merits, Hedgpeth defeats it; conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (a sentence is "imposed" when entered by the district court despite pending appeal)
- United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacated brandishing enhancement; remanded for resentencing)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (brandishing is an element that must be found by a jury)
- Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated residual clause of §924(c)(3))
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (new, more lenient penalties generally not applied retroactively unless statute plainly provides)
- Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (having one invalid theory among alternative jury theories does not constitute structural error)