United States v. Todd Bryant, 663 F. App'x 420

Background

Todd Bryant pleaded guilty under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to a marijuana-conspiracy count and accepted an agreed 71-month prison term; the agreement stated guideline calculations were moot.
The plea agreement contained an appellate/apply-after-sentencing waiver stating Bryant “knowingly waive[d] the right to challenge [his] sentence in any collateral attack, including…18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).”
After Amendment 782 retroactively lowered drug offense guideline ranges, Bryant moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence to the statutory minimum (60 months).
The district court granted the § 3582(c)(2) motion, reasoning the waiver did not bar § 3582(c) motions and that Bryant’s sentence was based on the Guidelines.
The Sixth Circuit majority reversed: (1) the plea agreement’s waiver expressly covered § 3582(c) motions, and (2) Freeman and its controlling concurrence foreclose § 3582(c)(2) relief for sentences imposed pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that do not expressly use a Guidelines range.
Judge Stranch concurred in part (agreeing on Freeman issue) but dissented on waiver, viewing the waiver language as ambiguous and requiring ambiguities to be construed against the Government.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bryant waived his right to seek a § 3582(c)(2) reduction	Waiver in plea agreement is explicit and covers § 3582(c) motions	Waiver is ambiguous because § 3582(c)(2) motions are not a true “collateral attack,” so defendant did not validly waive this right	Waiver is enforceable; agreement specifically waived § 3582(c) motions, so defendant waived the right
Whether the district court could reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(2) given Freeman	Bryant eligible because parties considered Guidelines and facts supporting an offense level	Under Freeman (Sotomayor concurrence controlling), Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentences are based on the agreement unless the agreement expressly uses a Guidelines range	Not eligible: agreement disavowed Guidelines and did not expressly adopt a Guidelines range, so § 3582(c)(2) relief unavailable
Whether district court could reduce sentence on its own motion despite waiver	Any court-initiated reduction would render waiver harmless	Even if court could act sua sponte, Freeman-based ineligibility prevents reduction	Court lacked authority because Freeman bars reduction where agreement did not expressly use a Guidelines range
Whether plea-waiver ambiguous under contract/constitutional principles	Waiver ambiguous and must be construed against Government; defendant retained § 3582(c)(2) right	Specific waiver language controls despite general terms; defendant bound	Majority: not ambiguous; waiver valid. Dissent: ambiguous and would reach merits (but concurred on ineligibility).

Key Cases Cited

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (principle that specific language governs over general language)
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (plurality and controlling concurrence holding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentences are generally based on the plea agreement unless the agreement expressly uses a Guidelines range)
United States v. McNeese, 819 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying Freeman: § 3582(c)(2) relief unavailable where plea agreement disavows Guidelines)
United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining § 3582(c)(1)(B) modifies sentence following successful attack under other provisions)
United States v. Randolph, 230 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2000) (plea agreements construed against Government; Government held to its promises)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (Marks rule for identifying controlling opinion when no single rationale has majority)
United States v. Smith, 658 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2011) (treating Justice Sotomayor’s Freeman concurrence as controlling in this circuit)