United States v. Tigano
880 F.3d 602
2d Cir.2018Background
- Joseph Tigano III was arrested July 8, 2008 on marijuana- and weapons-related charges after DEA found >1,400 plants; he remained detained throughout pretrial proceedings.
- Tigano repeatedly asserted his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and refused plea offers; his father pleaded guilty in 2013.
- Over ~6 years, the case incurred numerous delays: three court-ordered competency evaluations (all found Tigano competent), administrative failures (USMS transports, late transcript production), congested court calendars, overlapping magistrate referrals, and protracted plea negotiations.
- Defense counsel and Tigano’s father requested or joined multiple adjournments; counsel pursued plea discussions despite Tigano’s insistence on trial and occasional requests to proceed pro se.
- Trial began May 4, 2015 (≈6 years, 10 months after arrest); Tigano was convicted May 8, 2015; the Second Circuit later reversed and dismissed the indictment with prejudice for a speedy-trial violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tigano’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by nearly seven years' pretrial delay | Tigano argued the cumulative delay, the government/court responsibility for most delays, his repeated assertions of the right, and oppressive pretrial incarceration required dismissal with prejudice | Government contended delay was not attributable to it (some delays were neutral or defense-caused) and pointed to competency evaluations and docket congestion | Court held the delay violated the Sixth Amendment and dismissed the indictment with prejudice |
| Weight of reasons for delay (competency exams, administrative failures, plea bargaining, docket congestion) | Reasons for delay largely attributable to government/court (repetitive competency exams prompted by Tigano’s assertion of rights, USMS/transcript delays, prolonged plea negotiations) | Government claimed none of the delay was its responsibility or that many delays were neutral/necessary | Court assigned delay-related fault primarily to government/court and counted those delays against the government |
| Effect of defendant’s counsel seeking continuances contrary to defendant’s insistence on a speedy trial | Tigano argued his own consistent assertions control; counsel’s requests should not waive his constitutional right | Government argued some delays resulted from defense conduct and counsel’s strategy | Court held the defendant’s repeated assertions weigh strongly in his favor; counsel’s contrary actions do not negate Tigano’s constitutional claim |
| Remedy for constitutional speedy-trial violation | Tigano sought dismissal with prejudice | Government opposed drastic remedy given litigation history | Court ordered dismissal with prejudice as the appropriate remedy for the severe Sixth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishes four-factor balancing test for speedy trial claims)
- Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial is fundamental and applicable to the states)
- Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (dismissal with prejudice appropriate remedy when speedy-trial right violated)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (prejudice need not be proven with particularized harm in every speedy-trial claim)
- United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1979) (delay burden shifts to government once delay shown)
- United States v. Vispi, 545 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1976) (government obligation to bring cases to trial; institutional delays chargeable to government)
- United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1977) (institutional delays and court inaction can be charged to the government)
- United States v. Anderson, 394 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant, not court, decides defense strategy)
- United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (attorney must not usurp client decisions)
- Purdy v. United States, 208 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (counsel cannot coerce client into pleading guilty)
