*1
disаgree
I
not exist at all. But the offeror
majority’s
with the
view that
cluded did
all
Tiger
have been free to state that
obligations
is excused from
would not
its
under
problems
antitrust
potential
the law because
fears of
management
Seaboard’s
if its own documents revealed
not choose
unrealistic
misleading
did
to combat
about
quite
it was
concerned
in fact
statements in the
through
tender offer
lit
merger.
implications of the
the antitrust
erature
its own.
favorably
Viewed most
express
case, T.iger chose to
present
In the
Tiger,
Seaboard’s
to sue rather
decision
management’s position
its view on Seaboard
than conduct a
through
battle of words
appropriate
value of
concerning
merely
media would
be “some evidence” on
shares;
having decided to embark on
the issue of materiality. General Time
mate-
path,
obligation
Tiger had an
to avoid
Corp.
Talley Industries,
Inc.,
v.
misleading
rially
statements.
159, 162 (2d
1968),
denied,
Cir.
cert.
393 U.S.
(1969),
S.Ct.
ers.
Nor would requiring greater care on the
part Tiger duty constitute “imposing
self-flagellation
offerors,”
as in Missouri
Portland
Cargill, Inc.,
Cement Co.
America,
Appellee,
UNITED STATES
F.2d
denied,
1974),
cert.
(1974).
successful tender offer. We concluded that Second Circuit. it would have been reasonable under the Argued Dec. circumstances for the to conclude offeror May Decided that no problems antitrust Obvi existed.
ously in approach such a case it would “self-
flagellation” for the offeror raise in its
offer an reasonably issue which it con- had *3 Dershowitz, Mass., Cambridge,
Alan M. Baker, (Ro- Cambridge, and Jeanne Mass. Fine, Mass., senberg, Cambridge, Baker & brief), appellants. Williams, Roger Atty., P. Asst. U. S. Buf- falo, Y., Arcara, Atty. N. Richard J. U. S. *4 York, for the Western District of New Buf- falo, Y., appellee. N. for OAKES, Before and MANSFIELD Cir BARTELS, Judges, cuit District Judge.* BARTELS, Judge: District Appellant operates Levene owns and sev- corporations produce, distribute, eral which pictures. and exhibit motion Appellant Aquarius Releasing, (“Aquarius”), Inc. an corporation entertainment of which Levene presidеnt, acquired sole stockholder and produced allegedly obscene film involved here entitled “Belinda.” The oth- corporate appellant, er New Buffalo (“New Buffalo”), Corp. Amusement is a Theatres, subsidiary Inc., of Loew’s and is operator Buffalo, of the theater in New York, question which the movie shown.
Under the four-count indictment which action, 2,May initiated this filed on Levene, against appellants Aquarius, New Buffalo, other and various defendants not appeal,1 involved in this Levene and Aquar- * York, film, sitting by Of the Eastern District of New in violation of 18 § U.S.C. 1462. The designation. second count —under which New Buffalo Corp. charged Amusement convicted — defendants, 1. Other except defendants named in Aquari- the indictment all that us, Levene and Theatres, Inc., Corporation, “willfully, were knowingly Loews unlawfully Loews did Arena, Abrams, Benjamin Frank Franklin cause be taken from a common carrier” an film, Jr. The first count of the obscene indictment —on also violation of 18 U.S.C. appellants Aquarius charged conspiracy Levene and Releas- 1462. The third § count ing charged the, charged that all de- to commit the substantive crimes convicted — “knowingly, willfully two, fendants did and unlaw- counts one and and the fourth count fully transport commerce, by charged conspiracy in interstate to commit the substan- carriers, using means of common mailing from the State of tive crime of the mails for Jersey City Buffalo,” trailer, New to the an obscene obscene in violation of 18 U.S.C. not until knowingly using
ius wére convicted of
October
1977 that a
carriage
finally empanelled,
in interstate
and even then the trial
common carrier for
film,
postponed
an obscene
and New was
until November
commerce of
knowingly taking
approximately
years
Buffalo was convicted of
four and one-half
after
carrier,
Although
the same film from the common
the date of indictment.
various
govern-
both offenses in violation of 18
contentions have
made
U.S.C.
been
2.2
judgments
explanation
delay,
1462 and
of convic- ment in
of this extensive
§§
July
dispute
tion were entered on
1978 after a
we find no
the actual facts
jury trial
in the United States District
reflected
the record or the docket sheet.
Court for the Western District of New For
clarity
summarizing
the sake
table
York, Curtin,
appeal
J. This is an
periods
is annexed hereto as an
judgments.
those
appendix.
Appellants
many grounds
have asserted
Appellants
specified
alleged
vio
reversal, including
the claim that
speedy
rights according
lations of their
trial
rights
speedy
were denied their
to a
trial
by (1)
to the different
periods
time
covered
speedy
under the
plans
various
applicable
Western District Plans Re
Western District of New York3 and under
garding Prompt Disposition of Criminal
the Sixth Amendment.
we reverse
Since
1, 1976),
(April
July
passed
1973 to
Cases
ground
on the
appellants’
denial of
50(b)
pursuant
to Rule
of the Federal Rules
rights
trial,
Sixth Amendment
to a
Procedure;
(2)
of Criminal
the Western
we need limit
ourselves
Prompt Disposition
District’s New Plan for
trial contentions.
*5
Cases, promulgated pursuant
of Criminal
1974,
Speedy
Trial Act of
18 U.S.C.
While we realize
delay
alone is
1,1976
1,1979);
seq. (July
July
3161 et
§§
insufficient
to constitute a
Amend
Sixth
(3)
speedy
Amendment
trial
Sixth
violation,
ment
chronological
history of
Accordingly,
clause.
the extent and effect
delays
prosecution
action,
in the
of this
presented
of the
involved can best be
for which the appellants must assume some
by
lapse
a discussion of the
time under
of the responsibility, reflects an official in
each Plan.
difference
necessity
to the
speedy
of a
trial
required by
аpplicable
Western Dis
I. WESTERN DISTRICT’S RULE
trict
by
Plans and
the Constitution. Al
50(b) PLANS
though the
2,
indictment
May
was filed on
appellants
1973 and
moved for
Appellants’
predicated
dismissal on
first contention
speedy
grounds
1,1976,4
trial
on June
it was
a violation of Rule 4 of the Western
Procedure,
2. Section
April
1462 of Title 18 of the United States
Criminal
became effective on
provides,
pertinent part,
1,
Code
as follows:
1973. That Plan remained in effect until
September
superseded
when it was
knowingly
any
Whoever
.
.
.
uses
ex-
by
Plan, adopted
press
the Western
company
carrier,
District’s Interim
or other common
pursuant
50(b)
conformity
carriage
“in
to Rule
foreign
in interstate or
commerce—
(a)
obscene,
provisions
Speedy
any
lewd, lascivious,
filthy
Trial Act of 1974.”
or
Plan, p.
picture
;
Interim
1. This Interim Plan was su-
motion
film .
or
1,
perseded
July
on
1976
the Western Dis-
Plan,
pursuant
promulgated
trict’s New
knowingly
Whoever
takes from such ex-
1974,
Speedy Trial Act of
18 U.S.C.
3161 et
§§
press company
any
or other common carrier
seq., and
New Plan will
this
remain in effect
thing
carriage
matter or
of which is here-
1,
July
until
in made unlawful—
$5,000
Shall be fined not more than
or
imprisoned
years,
both,
judge
appellants’
not more than five
or
4. The trial
motion on
denied
23,
reconsideration,
again,
for the first such offense and shall be fined
June
1976 and
after
$10,000
imprisoned
4,
August
not more than
or
on
The latter
was im-
denial
years,
both,
14,
more than
mediately
appealed,
September
for each such
but on
offense thereafter.
—before
briefs on the merits were filed—
appeal
ground
this court dismissed the
on the
Regarding
3. The Western District’s
Plan
and,
the trial
final
court’s order was not
Prompt Disposition
Cases, adopted
of Criminal
therefore,
non-appealable.
was
pursuant
50(b)
to Rule
of the Federal Rules of
2,
1,
May
Plan,
April
and one-half months frоm
1973 to
50(b)
effective
District’s Rule
15,
July
hearing
1974 were consumed
superseded
this Plan was
1973. While
pretrial
motions. Un-
the Western Dis-
and consideration
September
Plan,
50(b) Plan,
pur-
5(a)
period,
this
for all
der Rule
dur-
trict’s Interim Rule
identical,
plans
ing
judice,
are
were sub
must be
poses relevant here
which motions
pertinent provision
July
reads as fol-
From
16 to
and the
November
excluded.5
action, and,
government
lows:
took no
therefore,
charged
it must be
with this
be
government
In all cases the
must
delay.
three and one-half month
ready
for trial within six months
arrest,
summons,
the date of
service of
1, 1974, the
On November
detention,
filing
complaint or
or the
of a
Attorney sent a notice to defense
States
charge upon
of a formal
which
de-
placing the matter on
counsel and the court
fendant is to be tried.
to set a date for trial.
If'
the trial calendar
therefore,
necessary inquiry,
whether
properly
could
be treated as
this motion
government
ready
within
for trial
readiness,
government
should
notice of
indictment,
six months after date of
exclu-
given the benefit of the November
any periods
delay.
sive of
of excludable
However,
not in
procedure
date.
Appellants
government
claim that
accepted
with the
Western Dis
accordance
required
signify
its
for trial
readiness
written notice of
practice
filing
trict
filing timely
writing
notice of readiness in
Pierro,
readiness. See United States
obligation
and that it failed to fulfill that
1973);
(2d
cf. United
F.2d
389 n.3
Cir.
this case.
Lane,
F.2d
1077-78
1978).6
opinion of June
To determine
In his
the effective timeta
ble,
proceed
denying
we
motion for dis
periods
to the excludable
defendants’
trial
grounds,
extend the six-month deadline be missal on
trial
11, 1975
August
yond
expiration
judge specifically
Novem
identified
initial
date of
announce
opinion
government’s
ber
1973 in this case.
In his
as the date of the
trial,
govern
August
and the
denying appellants’
ment of readiness for
motions,
oppo
July
Curtin
the ment’s
1976 memorandum
found —and
*6
the
parties
motion makes
speedy
concede—that
the initial fourteen
sition to the
trial
1973).
Appellants
only
(2d
argue
part
has been inter
5.
This rule
of this four-
388
Cir.
period
requiring
preted
teen
the
and one-half month
should be ex-
in some cases as
cludable,
trial,
grounds (1)
analogous
on the
government
for
notice of readiness
file a
provision
Speedy
1108,
Rollins,
of the
Trial Act —18 U.S.C.
1111
475 F.2d
United States v.
3161(h)(1)(G)
permit
Favoloro,
intended to
exclu-
1973);
(2d
493
v.
United States
—was
Cir.
only
periods actually
by
sion
of time
consumed
623,
1974);
(2d
United States
624
Cir.
F.2d
pretrial hearings,
(2)
provision
that such
1139,
(E.D.N.
Salzman,
F.Supp.
1152-53
417
permissible period
limits the
of advisement
to
(2d
Y.),
grounds,
On November notice defendants moved to inspect grand jury government-with its obli- compliance and to dis minutes miss the District’s Rule gation indictment failure of the under the Western government supply grand jury 50(b) Plans.10 sufficient evidence that films PLAN NEW II. WESTERN DISTRICT’S transported in interstate commerce. Since 1974) (SPEEDY OF TRIAL ACT judice motions were sub June until 1975 when the trial court issued brief Speedy Trial Act Jаnuary On motions, decision denying and order both seq., et became U.S.C. §§ period entire of over seven months man- forth certain effective. This Act set 5(a) must be excluded under Rule required the various datory timetables and Plan, although such extended consideration study plan adopt after district courts to inordinately lengthy.9 motions seems Act, with the in accord formulated 3165-66, pursuant to which
From July §§ June 11 to far as is U.S.C. so plan an interim record, adopted District discernible from the Western no action was (“New Plan”) July taken 1976 to government effective from which would toll predecessor Rule period. July July readiness Unlike Plan, 21; 1975, July however, Plans, required 50(b) this New must attrib- Act, uted to not on the they specifically defendants since Trial focuses Speedy support govern- August opinion again denying In his record is insufficient appellants’ motion, Curtin claim. ment’s government’s did not treat motion set a *7 readiness, equivalent trial date as to a notice of supra. note 5 9. See 1, stating that from date of indictment to June 1976, “there was about four a half supra cited 10. While several of the decisions arguably months of which could be sufficiency support 6 an notice note of oral charged to the Government.” court, persuasive argu- open of readiness in procedure can such a ment be made that government 8. The also claims have satisfied to impermissible where the normal should requirement report- the notice of readiness as, practice a has been to file written notice ing monthly this to the trial case court on indeed, apparently practice in the beginning awaiting basis in as November 1974 time District at the this action was government’s Western trial date. Aside from the own practice Response in United instituted. This court noted States v. reference to such in its to n.3, Pierro, Dismiss, F.2d that “the commend- Defendants’ there 478 at 389 Motion to is no support suggesting practice filing in the record that written notice of able of readi- government or, actually monthly report did if it is followed ... the United States ness did, anyone reports. that Attorney’s received the The trial Southern and West- Offices for the judge practice makes no in reference to such The failure of the ern Districts of New York.” speedy opinions, either of his trial and the comply Attorney States this case United any monthly docket sheet not does reflect that unexplained. procedure with this reports Thus, were made. we conclude that
375 obligation government 6, of the to file a no- asserts in its brief that after December readiness, tice upon obligation adjourn of but of 1976 there was “a whole series of .”11 bring the court request the case to trial within ments at the of the defendants days Plan, 180 conclusory supported of effective date of the This statement is not subject any periods what, by any of exclusion set forth indication in the record as to 3161(h) periods of the Specifically, any, properly Act. Rule if are excludable. Al § 7(a)(1) 13, 5(a)(1) though entry January and Rule of Western Dis- a docket on require govern- trict’s New Plan meeting indicates that a was held and that ready adjourned ment be for trial and January the trial the trial was then from 15, days July commence within 180 February of 1976. 25 to no reasons are case, In this postponement was not selected until stated for the and the record 12, 1977, October days July after does not appellants agreed reflect Nor, actually and trial did not commence waiver of rights. their in the 15, 1977, court, until days findings by November after absence of can the July period, approxi- exception 1976. Of this latter 3161(h)(8)(A) be invoked to mately days properly justice.” serve the excludable. “ends of Mans charges appellants’ field trial counsel with 1,1976, July appellants’ On motion postpone obvious efforts to an imminent speedy dismiss for lack of a trial was by resorting plea trial negotiations from pending finally and was decided January through July 1977 and asserts that August Delay court until occa “permitted the trial court itself to be lulled by pendency subjudice sioned appellants’ by the defendants’ extraordinarily success speedy chargeable trial motion is not delaying ful tactics.” We difficulty because, against appellants observed, believing experienced that the able and tri Didier, F.2d judge al permit would himself to be lulled 1977), to do so “improperly would or that the defense counsel’s conduct can penalize defendants for their invocation of fairly weight bear charge. speedy trial rules and run counter to the it argued While could be time con purposes However, of those rules.” on Au plea negotiations sumed should be ex- gust appellants appealed the trial court’s defendants, cludable since initiated an motion, denial of their trial equally appealing argument can be made appeal, according entry to the docket negotiations that such potentially are September was dismissed government beneficial to the as to the de government’s motion finality. for lack of events, govern fendants. In all both the It period would seem tó us that this must be ment and the obligation court have an excluded because it would otherwise “im negotiations insure that such do not inter properly penalize” the government for the requirements fere with ill-advised action appellants. Decеm On fact, Western District’s New Plan. In un 3, appellants requested adjournment ber 5(f)(1) der Rule New Plan the court beginning on continuing December 6 and responsibility has “the sole setting cases through January 1977, and, therefore, minimum, for trial . .” At if such 44-day period Thus, is also excludable. periods excluded, are to be it seems to us days July through government that the burden is on the or the January days are not excluda court to set forth in the record what are *8 ble. periods excludable or at least what are the January From April operable 19 to leading facts to the exclusion. To sheet, according to otherwise, the docket no action was hold as the suggests, by dissent by taken the party justify- inferring court or either delay by appellants intentional ing period exclusion of the from the manda- wherever the delay reason for a is unre- tory However, timetable. government corded, the would effectively emasculate the Brief, p. Appellee’s
11. 29.
376
Speedy Trial Act delay and would transfer to a the that the July court from 13 to responsibility September defendant which has 1 is “in the interest of the de properly (iii) public”;12 the an ad assigned been to the court fendant and govern- and the journment September from 15 to October ment. Recording is essential to effective 12, again due to illness of defense counsel’s and, implementation indeed, of the Act is period September wife. The from 10(b) Plan, by mandated Rule of the New excludable, September through 14 is not requiring docketing the of all “information however, delay purely because the for respect periods to excludable of time Although the convenience court. . .” In the context of this back- appellants days contend that the 33 from ground, we that days believe the 76 from 15, 1977, when the October 13 to November January April 18 to 1977 are not excluda- commenced, excludable, actual trial are not ble, although, infra, as appears the exclu- 5(e)(2) New Rule of Western District’s period sion of this preclude would not specifically provides Plan that trial in a “[a] violation. jury commence at case shall be deemed to period April The April from 5 to beginning of voir dire.” Because voir 12, 1977 is due to defense coun excludable dire occurred on October we conclude request adjournment sel’s for an necessitat period that thereafter until November ed his schedule. In an April order dated Thus, the 15 is excludable. non-excludable 12, Judge sought Curtin to exclude also the delay July between 1976 and the date of period April from 13 to June 1977 as “in days. trial totals 276 public interest” because of his commit subtracting periods After of ex- ment to the trial of other cases in April, cludable in accordance with the above May early June. Under imposed by computation, 180-day limit 3161(h)(8)(C),however, § the court’s discre Speedy in this Trial Act was exceeded grant tion to upon continuances a finding Even ex by approximately days. case justice” that “the ends of are served there days cluding period the additional explicitly is qualified by the limitation during January April from 19 to that continuance . . . shall be “[n]o sought appellants’ trial counsel granted general because of congestion of negotiate plea agreement, 180-day the court’s calendar . .” See Unit- days. limit exceeded As the Didier, 1188; ed States v. 542 F.2d at Unit- brief, however, government suggests in its Carini, ed States v. (2d 562 F.2d the indictment as a sanction for dismissal of 1977); Roberts, Cir. until violation timetable effective 1975). Therefore, F.2d this the Act. July 1979 is not mandated under 75-day period cannot be excluded. 3162, 3163(c).13 Moreover, this U.S.C. §§ finally empanelled previously court has held that until on October 1977. The following periods Speedy Trial Act date “the violation of immediately preceding that date not, itself, are ex- in and of a sufficient reason (i) adjournment cludable because of dismissing for here.” [indictment] July June 27 to Carini, due to illness of United States wife; (ii) defense however, counsel’s finding may, of Such a violation be con- judge case, period orally The trial states this the record of the either or in writ- 3161(h)(8)(A), ing, finding excludable under 18 U.S.C. its reasons for ends of gives authority justice granting which subsection the court served of such continu- grant finding outweigh public continuances ance the best interests of the justice” thereby. “ends of will be served He and the defendant in a trial.” not, however, comply pro- did with the further subsection, vision of that which states provided 13. While no dismissal sanction is period delay resulting such Plan, “[n]o from a appellants but violation of this could did granted by continuance the court in accordance apply court’s discretion under Rule paragraph with shall be excludable under 48(b) Rules Proce- of the Federal of Criminal forth, this subsection unless the court sets dure for a dismissal.
377
(4)
resulting
weighed together
prejudice
sidered as a factor to be
the
to defendant
531-33,
at
92 S.Ct.
delay.
from the
Id. at
analy-
with other circumstances in a court’s
2192-93;
Vispi,
v.
see also United States
sis of
claimed violation of a defendant’s
Roberts,
333;
v.
trial, and,
545 F.2d at
United States
right
speedy
constitutional
to a
of these
Though
at 645.
each
fact,
515 F.2d
finding may “tip
such a
the scales” in
important, other circumstances
factors is
defendant’s
favor where the balance is
Wingo,
Barker v.
may be relevant as well.
proceed,
close.
Id. at 151-52. We
accord-
At the
92
аt 2193.
407 U.S. at
S.Ct.
ingly,
by appellants’
to the issues raised
time,
the
made it clear that
same
the Court
constitutional claim.
trial cannot
right
speedy
to a
constitutional
specified
number of
quantified
III.
AMENDMENT
“be
into
SIXTH
522, 92
at
days or months.”
Id. at
S.Ct.
Appellants
finally
contend
Instead,
be “a
approach
the
should
delay
54-month
between indictment and
test,
conduct of both
balancing
in which the
date
rights
of trial violated their
under the
are
prosecution
the
and the defendant
speedy
Amendment
Sixth
trial. The
weighed.”
Id. at
92
S.Ct.
guarantees
Sixth Amendment
all
“[i]n
case —four
length
delay
of the
this
prosecutions,
criminal
the
en
accused shall
unquestionably sub-
years
and one-half
joy
right
speedy
public
to a
trial.”
—is
stantial,
may not be conclusive
and while it
government
Both the court and the
in this
issue,
weigh
it must
the constitutional
obligation
appel
case had an affirmative
heavily
support
appellants’
claim that
lants
public generally
bring
and to the
rights
delay
their
have
violated.
been
Such
this matter
promptly,
on for trial
rather
clearly enough
“trigger”
here is
the con-
permitting delay
than
whatever rea
—for
analysis
respect
to the oth-
stitutional
drag
son —to
on for over four and one-half
er elements of the Barker test.
Id.
years.
Vispi,
v.
545 F.2d
(2d
1976). Further,
334
Cir.
where the de
delay
The reasons for the
lay
case,
is as substantial as it
inwas
varied,
indicates,
foregoing analysis
as the
upon
government
prove
burden is
delay—
but
we believe that the bulk of
delay
justified
appel
approximately
chargeable
31 months —was
lants’
rights
trial
were not violated.
inaction,
government’s
the over
Jones,
U.S.App.D.C.
United States v.
173
Western District of
crowded dockets of the
(1975);
United States
York,
New
and the trial court’s failure to
West,
U.S.App.D.C.
187-88,
motions.
expeditiously
appellants’
rule
(1974);
F.2d
256-57
United States v.
had little
governmеnt may
While the
have
Salzman,
F.Supp.
(E.D.N.Y.),
delays” more
control over the “institutional
grounds,
aff’d on other
Barker delay may fact that the have been factors, (1972), L.Ed.2d 101 is of attributable to institutional There, course the back controlling authority. government was not entitled to sit Supreme clearly rely upon pro Court the es notice of enunciated its forma readiness; duty sential factors to be considered in determin it owed the additional ing a denial right monitoring pressing Amendment the case and Sixth (1) to a length reasonably prompt trial as follows: trial. We court for (2) delay; repeatedly emphasized that affirma- delay; reason for the (3) bringing right; government defendant’s assertion tive action *10 during pressing into not for trial” that it “lulled
cases to trial
is mandated and
Carini,
escape
duty
ground
v.
period.
cannot
on the
United States
that
however,
delay
reasons.
important,
that the
is for institutional
F.2d at 149. More
speedy
the June
the fact that after
Vispi,
v.
It is true that
did
circum
plea. We conclude that under such
dismissal,
upon speedy
not move
making
based
appellants’ delay
prior
in
stances
grounds,
trial
approxi
until June
trial is not sufficient
demand for
1976—
mately 40 months after the date of indict
Amend
to vitiate a violation of their Sixth
ment —and that
this is a consideration
rights.
ment
weighed
determining
which must be
under the Barker
The fourth factor
rights.
violation of their Sixth Amendment
appellants
evident in
prejudice to
they
Prior to that
engaged
time
had been
—is
test —
First,
respects.
the extend
plea negotiations
government
this case in two
with
trial,
unavoidably increase the
necessity
avoid
ed
would
and it is not
by appel-
“anxiety
unreasonable to assume
and concern” suffered
Court,
letter,
Wingo,
government
407 U.S.
14. The
15. The
Barker
in its brief cites a
(1972),
September
stated:
dated
from Assistant Unit-
Attorney
ed States
Williams to the
attri-
court
duty
bring himself to
A defendant has no
buting
adjournment
of fifteen scheduled
trial;
duty
well as the
the State has that
solely
appel-
trial dates since June
duty
insuring
is consistent
lants.
In the absence
in the
of corroboration
Moreover,
process.
. soci-
due
required by
10(b)
record as
Rule
of the New
bringing
ety
particular
swift
interest
has
Plan, this assertion must be viewed as a self-
society’s
representatives
prosecutions,
serving
government.
declaration
protect
that interest.
who should
are the ones
lant Levene as a
tween 1972
pending
public
result of
crim-
and 1976
attitudes
*11
Wingo,
inal indictment.
sexually
Barker
toward
films
explicit
and concludes
at
way
S.Ct. at
While
unique
changed
2193.
those
had
in a
attitudes
Levene,
appellant
to
prejudice
this kind of
appellants
specifically,
detrimentаl
to
—
especially significant
becomes
pro-
where
were far
accept-
“attitudes in 1972-73
more
longed for
period
ing
they
during
of four and one-half
and liberal than
have been
years after
Second,
date
year
government
of indictment.
the last
The
[1975-76].”
important,
more
possible
and
impair-
experts
is the
offered no other
in this
to
field
appellants’
ment of
ability
present
to
dispute
a de-
opinion,
expe-
his
in view
and
of his
may
fense which
have been caused
the
qualifications
opinion
rience and
his
can
Barker,
delay. As stated in
id:
Where,
hardly be
as
dismissed
frivolous.17
here,
these
as
on a
of
[interests],
point
Of
the most
case turns
morals
serious is
last,
view,
the
inability
important
because the
it
is
of a defend-
the trial be
ant adequately to prepare
community
his case
framed in terms
the
skews
of
stan-
system.
to fairness of the
existing
entire
There
dards
time
alleged
at the
of the
prejudice
offense,
also
if defense witnesses are
which in this case was 1973. Con-
accurately
unable to recall
events
sequently,
say
it is
to
the
impossible
past.
distant
memory, however,
Loss of
moral
of
prevailing
standards
at the time
always
is not
in the
reflected
record be-
the
years
trial over
later
four
were the
forgotten
cause what has been
can rarely
existing
same as those
on the date of indict-
be shown.
Hence,
ment.
was all the
there
more rea-
son for
government
trial.
Appellant Levene’s uncontradicted affida-
appellant
relies on the fact that
Levene has
vit,
sworn to in June
describes the
been free on bail since 1973 and has failed
delay
difficulties caused
the
in preparing
demonstrate
adverse effect on his
for trial. The art director and the story
reputation
income or
as a result of this
of
longer
editor
“Belinda” could no
be locat-
protracted prosecution. As Barker
indi-
ed,
actresses,
and certain actors and
who
cates, however, prejudice takes various
previously
agreed
testify,
had
refused to
forms,
upon
analysis,
and based
the above
attend trial
they might
for fear that
also be
we find that the
factor of the Barker
fourth
subject to criminal prosecution if a verdict
weighed
test is appropriately
appellants’
in
unfavorable to
defendants
returned
favor.18
jury.16
Also submitted at that time was
Winick,
a letter
written
Finally,
appellants’
Charles
rights
Profes-
of
violation
Sociology
City
sor of
at
College
of New under the
District’s New
Western
Plan —oc-
York, in which
changes
he evaluates
curring
entirety
be-
in
appellants’
its
after
appellant
affidavit,
appears
appeared
In
jour-
Levene’s
it
number of his
studies
during
pendency
this
Filming, Psychiatry,
of
action an actor
nals such as Films and
and
conspiracy by
was convicted of
Review,
federal court
Sociological
American
and he has been
Memphis,
participa-
Tennessee based on his
recipient
grants
period
of federal
over a
allegedly
picture.
in an
tion
Appellants
obscene motion
twenty years.
widely publicized
claim that
this
willingness
conviction chilled the
of several ac-
passing upon
alleged
18. We are not
here
and
tors
actresses
in the film
involved
here in
film,
obscenity
right
but
trial, and,
result,
issue
attend
as a
appellants
Consequently,
trial.
to a
we
agreement
testify
appel-
retracted their
Report
believe
F.B.I.
that the 1973
annexed
lants’ behalf.
appendix
dissent as an
is irrelevant.
If it
annexed to
there could
no
show that
have been
According
Winick,
to Profеssor
his evalua-
prejudice
jury using
because a
from
public
many years
tion of
attitudes is “based on
exactly
to hold
investigation,”
standards would have
the same
1977,
involving
studies conducted
way
sitting
hold
did
we
Marijuana
for the President’s Commission on
much;
juries’
Drug
presupposes
think that
and
too
Abuse and for the Commission on
Obscenity
guessed, especially
simply
Pornography
verdicts
cannot
service as con-
tributing
involving
presumption
editor for
criminal
sex research of
cases
Medical
Opinion and Review
co-editor of the
innocence.
Annual Review of
Studies
Deviance. A
2192. We believe that
sup
which
speedy trial motion —is a factor
significantly
facts in Lane
ports
appellants’
differ
our conclusion that
Sixth
among
Notable
present
facts in the
case.
rights
We
Amendment
have been violated.
Lane
are the absence in
other circumstances
cannot
Mansfield’s state
subscribe
Speedy
of the District Court
of a violation
Speedy
ment
Trial violation is
that a
Plan,
defendant
Trial Act
the failure of
“largely irrelevant” since it has been estab
resulting from
any prejudice
demonstrate
lished in this Circuit that a “violation of
continuing
delay,
the absence of
Speedy
proper
Trial Act is a
factor to be
impor-
mitigate
plea negotiations
weighed
analysis
whether
in our
de
[a
*12
asserting
delay in
tance of the defendant’s
right
his constitutional
was denied
fendant]
right.
speedy
his
Carini,
speedy
to a
trial.”
v.
United States
government
APPENDIX
, at
OAKES,
Judge (concurring spe-
grounds
Circuit
itself
and of
reversal
cially):
the elements
so modifies
least if it
crime, see
it creates a different
crime that
join
I
opinion
Bartels’
respect
212, 80
States,
v. United
Stirone
to the deprivation of a speedy
Al-
trial.
(1960);
parte
Ex
270, 4
L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
though,
if this were the only issue in the
781,
victim
judgment
Thus I
reverse the
on
would
statutory
require
language
did not
such
well,
these
grounds
although
two
knowledge;
indeed the
conceded
defendant
unnecessary
are
to reach if
Bartels
necessary
scienter was not a
element
I
are correct
trial issue.
offense.
Id. at
the Government cites involve
with
statutes
lan-
goods
of the stolen
and hence a statute differ-
guage different from 18 U.S.C.
1462.
§
ent from
one in issue here.
applied
Viruet,
5.
Feola in
We
United States
295,
very
(2d
1976) (per curiam)
point out
539 F.2d
297
6. The
was also
careful
Cir.
court
(unnecessary
prove
merely calling
statutory
requirement
under 18
U.S.C.
659
§
knowledge
hijacked
“jurisdictional”
inquiry;
truck would be mov
not end the
does
ing
commerce),
in interstate
United
“jurisdictional
question
further
is whether
it is
Green,
229,
(2d
523 F.2d
233-34
Cir.
only,” or instead an element of the offense.
denied,
1975),
1074,
858,
cert.
423 U.S.
S.Ct.
n.9,
In enacting
Spеedy
meeting
November
for a
Trial Act Con-
gress recognized
four-year
that a
phase-in
Curtin but there is no record of what
period
required
would be
transpired
before the
meeting.
sanc-
at that
tion of dismissal
non-compliance
might
repeated
What were
for the
the reasons
imposed,
3163(c),
see 18 U.S.C.
it
since
adjournment
Appen-
of the trial date? The
would
many
take
district courts that much
record,
obviously
dix and
while
docketed
time to eliminate their criminal case back-
quite incomplete, furnish sufficient
infor-
logs and to obtain the
personnel,
additional
strong
mation
support
inference that
facilities,
systems
and new
needed to meet
counsel,
defense
than the
rather
Govern-
permanent
time limits
go
which would
court,
mainly responsible
ment or the
'was
into
July
effect
1979. Viewed realistical-
delay.
sought
for the
never
Defendants
ly, the interim time
represented
limits have
trial;
contrary,
they repeatedly
on the
hopes rather
than firm mandates. Cf.
sought to avoid trial.
Amendola,
States v.
1977) (“minimal”
Following
filing
violation of
indictment
Connecticut Speedy Trial Plan
does not May
granted the
Judge Curtin
de-
warrant dismissal).
proceedings
fendants’
defer all
motion to
June, 1973,
until the
when certain
end of
my view,
In
excludability
or non-ex-
cases pending
the United
before
States Su-
cludability of time under the terms of these
preme Court,
could
have affected the
prior
largely
Plans is
irrelevant since their
prosecution
case,
present
would have
standards
substantially
differ
from the
part
been
decided.1 In
latter
of 1973
four-factor
test
established
Barker v.
pretrial
filed
defendants then
numerous
Wingo, 407
*16
motions, including motions to dismiss the
(1972),
L.Ed.2d 101
for determining wheth-
(Cr. 1973-118),
er a
indictment in a
case
related
defendant’s
right
Sixth Amendment
to
a speedy trial,
supported by
distinguished
affidavits and briеfs necessi-
from statu-
tory rights,
tating answering
has
affidavits and briefs from
been violated. When the
Barker Wingo
v.
argument
standards are
oral
applied, it is
Government and
on Feb-
beyond
clear
peradventure
14,
ruary
1974,
that the defend-
which culminated in the
ants’
right
15,
constitutional
to a speedy trial
July
court’s denial of the motions on
California,
15,
California,
(1973); Kaplan
See Miller v.
413 U.S.
93
37 L.Ed.2d
446
2607,
(1973),
115,
2680,
The
hap-
record does not reveal what
23,
pened
Curtin,
June
foregoing
as a result of the
decision dated
Judge
corre-
his
1976,
spondence except
the motion to dis-
promptly
that almost five months
denied
10,
miss,
later
Abrams
Detsky, by
February
directing
letter of
that
if defendant
represented by
was not
Detsky
Thereupon,
he should
it
necessary
appoint
became
to
retain counsel
ready
July
and be
for
Abrams,
trial on
counsel for defendant
whom Det-
20, 1976.
sky again disclaimed as his client after hav-
ing claimed Abrams as his client on other
availing
Instead of
oppor-
himself of the
having appeared
occasions and
as his coun-
tunity to have the
go
defendants
to trial
sel of
“on-again, off-again”
record. This
immediately,
Detsky
Mr.
moved the court
representation of Abrams afforded another
to
decision,
reconsider
contending
its
in a
defense
mechanism for
of trial.
June 28 letter
Judge
to
Curtin that defend-
ants had not moved to dismiss earlier on
course,
busy
Of
district court such as
grounds
because
had been
Western District with
judges
three
trying “to
plea
work out a
corpora-
for the
hardly
can
expected
drop
to
everything
tions
dismissing
as to the individuals”
by
remand of a criminal case
and adding “I assumed that I would receive Court
Appeals
bring
of
that case imme-
word on the
proposals.
aforesaid
I
Instead
diately
However,
Judge
to trial.
Curtin
received a
indicating
statement
readiness
promptly,
acted
scheduling the case for trial
for trial.
I state this so that
the Court
on December
Thereupon
1976.
Mr. Det-
would not believe that
idly by
we sat
abid-
sky, just
effectively
as he had
done in June
ing our
hoping
time
the United States
August
trial,
on the eve of
moved three
would forget we
40).
existed.”
(App.
days before trial for a postponement,
time because of the death in Ireland of the
truth,
course,
of
was that
the U.S.
mother of one of the defendants. Trial was
Attorney
long
had
since repeatedly stated
adjourned
January
until
writing
Detsky
that he would not
agree
any
proposals,
such
despite which
Faced with trial
January
on
Detsky
Detsky had
reopened
thereafter
negotia-
by
January
letter dated
Judge
tions. Not surprisingly,
the court on Au- Curtin offered
Aquarius
defendant
gust
1976, denied defendants’ motion for
Inc.,
Releasing,
perhaps
Loew’s Thea
reconsideration
and set
selection for
tres,
Inc., plead guilty if the case were
August
dismissed as to the individual defendants
(as
and this time advised the court
If there
had been
doubt about
the de-
years,
case for almost
fendants’
see
At
consistent
U.S.
purpose from the in-
1/2
7/28/75,
ception
torney’s
35)
letter
App.
case
delaying trial,
it was
Attorney
removed
had
their
refused to entertain the
next
August
move. On
10, 1976,
Thereupon
offer.
day
meeting
set
the court
held a
selection of the
jury,
January
defendants
filed a
which trial was
appeal
notice of
adjourned
February
Curtin’s
interlocutory,
for reasons
nonap-
pealable
denying
appearing
order
their
the record. Thereafter
motion to dis-
miss
proceeds
vein,
the case for
record
lack of a
in the same
trial.
with
patently
counsel,
This
defense
frivolous move served the
whenever
the court was
purpose
prevеnting
ready
try
case,
the case from
going
successfully obtaining
day
to trial
adjournments,
as scheduled.
Detsky
either because Mr.
was actively pursuing plea negotiations or
anyone
As
slightest
even the
knowl-
actively
engaged in trial elsewhere
edge
practice
of federal
predict-
could have
(see,
77),
e. g., App.
or because he had filed
ed, the appeal
was dismissed
us on Sep-
motions,
new
such as a
change
motion for
tember
jurisdiction.
for lack of
It
venue,
or the like.
may reasonably be inferred from this record
appeal
was taken in bad faith as a With the aid
hindsight
apparent
it is
designed
maneuver
trial,
block a prompt
that the trial court was altogether
too liber-
which it
doing.
succeeded in
The docket
al in permitting itself to
be lulled
shows that
pertinent
papers were not
defendants’
extraordinarily
successful de-
returned
our court
to the Western
laying
Dis-
tactics into believing
postpone-
trict
of New
September
York until
1976. ments were reasonable and might
lead to
*18
it
is not entitled to have
The defendant
disposition
the
without
trial. Part
case
may
what
turn out
undoubtedly
ways
negotiate
attributa-
of their success was
both
—to
judicial
advantageous disposition
lack of sufficient
for him
ble to the court’s
to be an
reached,
Herculean
to dis-
to
personnel
and,
disposition
and its
efforts
is
if no such
huge backlog
July
pose of a
before
of his
Amendment
claim a violation
Sixth
Speedy
the
the date when sanctions under
trial.
right
speedy
to a
go
present pur-
For
Trial Act
into effect.
Carini, supra,
v.
relied on
United States
however,
important
thing is that
poses,
the
inapposite.
majority,
wholly
by the
not be rewarded for
the defendants should
directly respon
There the Government was
permits
manipulation.
their own
To do so
delay.
In satisfaction
sible for
the
distortion,
the
debasement and abuse of
Carini,
against
president
the
charges
right
speedy
to a
trial under
the Sixth
Co., the Government
Carini Construction
Amendment, which was never intended to
guilty plea to
accept
corporate
a
offered to
protect
everything within
those who do
violation of 26
charging
a misdemeanor
power
delay
holding
their
to
or defeat
7512(b) by failing
deposit
with
U.S.C. §
possible.
long
of a trial as
As
Su-
taxes,
he would demon
holding
provided
preme
Wingo,
Court stated in Barker v.
good faith
period
strate over a
of time his
circumstances,
“barring extraordinary
we
by
compliance with the Internal
scrupulous
be
that a
would
reluctant
indeed to rule
withholding requirement.
Revenue Code’s
defendant was denied this constitutional
year
pass
then allowed to
More than
indicates,
right
strongly
on a record that
any plea being
Then the
without
entered.
one,
does this
the defendant did not
withdrawn
the Government
offer was
speedy
want a
trial.” 407
delay
properly
policy reasons. The
at 2195. There are no such “extraor-
because
against
assessed
Government
dinary circumstances” in this case.
offer,
precedent,
to its condition
due
delay
Both the reasons for the
between
delay which the de
proposed an automatic
indictment
and trial and the lack of
time-
could not avoid if he wished to
fendant
ly
speedy
rights
assertion of
should
also United
v. Rob
participate. See
States
weigh heavily against
here.
the defendants
erts,
(2d
1975).
F.2d
Cir.
No
agree
majority’s
I cannot
with the
conclu-
delay
proposed
postponement
such
or
sion that in determining whether a defend-
plead
present
in the
by any of the offers to
right
ant’s
Sixth Amendment
Moreovеr, except
case.
for one flat
violated,
trial has been
time expended
delay and
involving
offer
no
Government
parties
plea negotiations
should
having
precedent,
the offers
no conditions
weighed against the
ne-
Government. Such
appear
proposals by
here all
been
gotiations
one-way
are not a
street but a
defendants,
not the Government.
defendant,
bilateral affair in
which the
majority’s state
agree
can I
with the
Nor
just
public,
the Government or the
stands to
when the de
supra)
(p.
ment
any resulting compromise
benefit from
negotiations
plea
“engaged
fendants
accepted by
A defendant’s
court.
necessity
to avoid
government
with the
obligated
engage
plea
counsel is not
trial,
it is not unreasonable
so,
bargaining. When he does
it is because
into not
they were ‘lulled
assume
process
he believes that the
is in his client’s
cit
period,”
during
trial’
pressing for
prospect
interest and that
of benefit
Carini,
excusing
thus
ing United States
warrants the
occasioned
the bar-
their
asserting
long delay defendants’
gaining.
showing
Absent
of bad faith
here is
record
trial. The
right
to a
unjustified
change
position
negotia
contrary.
plea
exactly
part (as
Government’s
was the case Unit-
reinstituted
initiated and
tions here were
Carini,
ed
defendants,
notwithstanding
1977)),
charge time
there is no reason to
Sep
early as
refusal as
flat
Government’s
plea bargaining against
devoted to
proffered
accept
tember
Government
rather
than the defendant.
*19
problem. Moreover,
corporate pleas
of
the
as far
is
satisfaction
as.the record
charges against the individuals. The infer-
they
long
may
disappeared
concerned
have
inescapable
ence is
the defеndants
before
when the case could first have
using
delaying
were
this tactic as a
maneu-
brought
been
to trial but for the defend-
anyone
ver.
was
If
“lulled” it
the
own delaying
ants’
tactics.
Government,
the
not
defendants.
majority
these
believe
For
reasons I
the
Didier,
Similarly, United States v.
grave
reversing
makes a
the
mistake
1976),
F.2d 1182
the
relied on
dismissing
convictions and
the indictments
majority
proposition
period
for the
that the
ground
on the
the defendants’ Sixth
during
speedy trial
which a
motion was sub
right
Amendment
trial was
judice
charged against
not be
should
the
violated.
defendant,
clearly distinguishable.
There
agree
Nor can I
either of the two
motions to dismiss on
trial
grounds
by Judge
advanced
Oakes warrants
grounds were not filed on the eve of trial
slight
reversal. The
variance between
purpose
delay,
the obvious
of seeking
proof
indictment and the
at trial was clear
here,
was the case
but months before the
ly
now
“[Cjonvictions
immaterial.
are not
first retrial date.
except
resulting
set aside
for variance
disagree
I also
with the majority’s conclu-
prejudice
substantial
to the defendant.”
sion that
any
defendants have made
Knuckles,
United States v.
showing
prejudice
of
as a result of the
(2d Cir.),
denied,
cert.
delay. Appellant
hardly
Levene can
com-
(1978).
In
Judge
apparently
this court
Oakes
already
has
concedes
adopt
ed the
portion
by Judge
distinction made
latter
statute
not
of the
does
Leventhal
States,
in Jackson v.
require knowledge by
recipient
of the
U.S.App.
D.C.
cert.
film
common
removed
carrier
denied,
385 U.S.
actually
transported
it had
inter-
L.Ed.2d
been
(1966):
prosecution
commerce,
Stirone the
state
see
con-
“[i]n
footnote
relying at trial on a complex of
curring
facts
opinion,
dis-
since
Oakes does
Grey-
object
Defendants did
Government Exhibit
into evidence of
admission
hound bus schedule.
aspect
“public
commercial environ-
feel that New
can avail itself of
Buffalo
Congress
protecting.
is
The
argument.3
why
But it is unclear
an ment” which
Greyhound
schedule which was admit-
knowledge
additional
element must be
bus
well
proved against
compared
into
at trial
demonstrates
shipper
ted
evidence
recipient.
how
the common carrier is with
Such an internal inconsisten-
involved
foreign
interstate
commerce even if
cy in the elements of the offense should not
purely
lightly
Congress.
portion
trip
one
intrastate.5
attributed to
purpose
prevent
Congress requires
is “to
defendant
the statute
knowingly
trans-
the channels
interstate commerce from
use a common carrier to
port
knowing
That
use
being used to disseminate” obscene materi
obscene material.
Alpers,
al. United
338 U.S.
of a
carrier establishes that
common
(1950).
willing
pollute
public
70 S.Ct.
3. were scheduled on well focus on Levene and to Aquarius Canada, raising argument; London, in New Buffa- to after a Toronto or some relegated Buffalo, pre- lo is to footnote. one brief which confirms dominately foreign and nature of the interstate argued It could be the obscene material commerce involved. all, long need not cross state lines at as the (in opin- 1 to his Oakes refers Footnote common carrier uses channels of interstate ion) January, routes shown other highways. commerce such as interstate ever, How- publication “Russell’s of a entitled edition beyond since the a found reasonable Guide,” which doubt, Official National Motor Coach following the instructions the trial evidence, court, referred in the trial not in is not fact common carrier in crossed record, York, Jersey court. and not been furnished to the the state line has from New New 31 to that issue is not it is in before this court. The reference to Footnote appellant’s brief. According only Greyhound bus timeta- evidence, guide is not in Since the Russell’s evidence, Greyhound ble Timetable No. available, may ac- and not has been made January, were in Government Exhibit there curately Greyhound bus reflect the actual daily trips 10 bus scheduled from New Buf- New York and schedule in effect between York, NY, Buffalo, (Nos. NY 26, 1973,1 unwilling January am on this falo on 3300, 1505, 351, 333), all but appeal place any it. reliance (No. Paramus, 3300) stopped one of which at Moreover, Jersey. New all but one of the 10 APPENDIX A hands and knees and him behind her. The scene then shifts back to MILLER mastur- Special Notes of Agents Allan M. Davison bating the black woman and back to DOUG and John F. Summarizing Lewis Con- engaging in intercourse with the woman. tents of Film “Belinda” as Viewed ejaculating The scene then shows DOUG Them on Jan. the stomach of the woman. The final scene color, “The began sound film approxi- at rubbing this series shows MILLER and mately 12:10 PM and approxi- ended at masturbating the black woman with his fin- mately 1:28 PM. begin- The credit at the ger. The next scene shows BELINDA de- ning of the film indicated it produced looking faced in a bedroom in a mirror Aquarius Inc., Releasing, and the dialogue while is carried on the soundtrack. begins film with group people, includ- ing person garb, dressed in clerical look- “The next scene shows MILLER and the ing at what is corpse assumed to be a in the together black woman in bed time identification room of a hospital. The next gets MILLER out of bed gets and an auto- scene shows ‘detective’ interviewing an type handgun matic and tells the woman individual in a tavern requests coop- his money that this is how he has coming in as eration in the investigation. person The he gun waves the in front of her. While garb clerical arrives with the others from woman, MILLER talks to the she caresses the hospital and is identified as Father penis his with her hand. The next scene (phonetic). KEENE person being in- talking shows DOUG in the bedroom terviewed begins detective to tell the BELINDA urging go her not to story about his knowledge of the deceased. MILLER. The scene shifts to picture of an individu- “The next scene shows MILLER in bed al MILLER, identified as who dragging with the black woman after which time he shoving BELINDA across a snow cov- gets bed, door, knocks, goes out of ered hill icy area. MILLER throws her and asks for WILLIAM. He then enters down and rubs his hands over her clothing *23 room, apparently which is a bathroom and boyfriend, DOUG, BELINDA’S who has as there is a female sitting on the toilet been watching, jumps MILLER and stool when he ap- enters the room. This begin fight. The scene then shifts to a pears to be the same female who earlier had room where DOUG and BELINDA are kiss- pictured been with DOUG. The female ing while on a couch. stool, then while continuing to sit on the “The next scene shows DOUG with a performs fellatio on MILLER who is stand- woman who is enticing him in what is an ing in front of her. The black woman is infra-red type scene with all red lighting. bed, pictured then groaning rubbing and performs woman fellatio on DOUG. scene, herself. The angle from an below The scene then shifts to a room where a MILLER, girl looking up and the from the black female is performing fеllatio on MIL- floor, rubbing shows them each other and LER who is a white male. The next scene thereafter engaging in intercourse. The shows conversation among participants scene then shifts back to the bedroom back at the tavern. The group next where the black woman is self-masturbat- scenes alternate between the black woman ing. MILLER and the white female come performing fellatio on MILLER and the into engages the bedroom where MILLER other woman performing fellatio on DOUG. in intercourse with the white woman while “Following this, the scene shows DOUG black kissing woman is the white wom- kissing the breasts of the woman he is with an. The black woman then kisses the but- and thereafter engaging in intercourse with. tocks engaged of MILLER while he is her. The scene then shifts to MILLER intercourse with the white female. masturbating the black woman with his fin- ger and then back to DOUG engaging in “The next scene BE- shows DOUG and intercourse with the woman with her on her conversing LINDA in a bathroom. story contin-
tive to leave and decides ues. a “The room where scene shifts back infra-red again “The scene is an next MILLER and black woman and white BELINDA, WIL- type which shows scene talking. woman are in MILLER is bed MILLER dancing and MILLER male, LIAM and holding gun a white and second she is breasts while WILLIAM, caressing BELINDA’S identified as enters the room undress proceeds to MILLER and sit talk. still clothed. all four on the bed and An her and caress thereafter kiss argument then between MILLER her and ensues and WILLIAM and thereafter between breasts.
MILLER and the white female. The scene tav- back to “The next scene reverts then a shifts to tavern where further dia- conver- enters the ‘psychiatrist’ ern a where place logue partici- then takes between the group the entire sation and thereafter pants there. tavern. leaves the story “The continues with BELINDA agаin infra-red “The scene is next meeting edge MILLER ‘on the of town’ sitting and type which shows BELINDA where enters a house with him and she It then corset. standing full-length in a gets argument with the MILLER into an bedroom, removing entering shows her a and black woman where he shoves her tells corset, getting and into bed nylons, her transpiring, her While this to leave. is They be- laying who with nude. DOUG goes to BELIN- WILLIAM the couch where each other at gin to kiss and caress her puts leg. DA seated and his hand on removes kisses breasts and time DOUG her away then MILLER shoves him sits cunnilingus panties. performs He her then begins down on the couch where he to rub her assume a simulated and thereafter legs. BELINDA’S breasts and She resists position. intercourse time, him and at same black woman marquis “The next scene shows theater begins point, to caress WILLIAM. At this it shows the title ‘Belinda’ on the other white woman comes down the at the tavern en- person being interviewed stairs and enters the room. MILLER and shows tering theater. The next scene get argument with WILLIAM into an his standing room with DOUG nude black woman and white woman and at- tied arms his head and outstretched over tempt get leave them to and thereafter rope running his ropes with between forcefully WILLIAM escorts black MILLER, WIL- hands. BELINDA woman and the white woman out the front begins LIAM enter the and MILLER room grabs door. MILLER then BELINDA and *24 begins to DOUG. WILLIAM taunt tells she him give her will whatever he with her BELINDA on bed wrestle with responds, ‘Doug’s wants she resisting him. The movie concludes only one.’ with ‘Be- marquis of the theater scene continu- “The next scene shows discussion leaving the theater. people linda’ it and on ing at the tavern. crediting listed on final “Individuals infra-red again next scene is of an “The the star as TERRY LEVENE and included and the type which shows the black woman having been MELINDA FORREST.” rubbing white each oth- kissing woman woman er’s and thereafter white bodies breasts, performs
kisses the black woman’s her,
cunnilingus inserts and thereafter penis woman’s into black artificial with the
vaginal opening. The scene ends in a simu-
black woman and white woman
lated The scene then position. intercourse where the detec-
shifts back to the tavern
