United States v. Thompson
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21314
| 2d Cir. | 2015Background
- DEA agents executed an arrest warrant at Michael Thompson’s apartment; after cuffing him and a protective sweep, they sought consent to search; Thompson eventually consented.
- At a suppression hearing Thompson claimed consent was coerced by threats that his sister and girlfriend would be arrested; officers testified they warned occupants that anyone found with contraband could be subject to arrest and that Thompson consented after hearing that.
- The district court denied Thompson’s suppression motion, crediting officers’ testimony and finding Thompson’s testimony not credible.
- After a jury conviction for drug conspiracy, the PSR recommended a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on alleged perjured testimony at the suppression hearing; Thompson objected, arguing lack of willful intent to lie.
- The district court adopted the PSR’s calculations without making an independent finding of specific intent to obstruct; it did not explicitly rule on the enhancement at sentencing.
- The Second Circuit considered whether the enhancement could stand absent a district-court finding of willful intent to provide false testimony and whether reliance on the PSR satisfied that requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court may impose §3C1.1 enhancement based on alleged perjury without an explicit finding of specific intent | Government: adoption of PSR and district court crediting officers suffices to support enhancement | Thompson: court erred by not finding willful intent to obstruct; PSR’s reference to suppression ruling is insufficient | Court held enhancement improper because district court made no finding of specific intent and PSR lacked detailed findings required to support a perjury-based enhancement |
| Whether adopting PSR’s conclusory statement satisfies Dunnigan | Government: PSR’s citation to suppression ruling is enough, relying on Lincecum | Thompson: PSR’s bare reference cannot substitute for required findings | Court rejected reliance on bare PSR reference; PSR must set forth reasonably detailed findings per Johns and Dunnigan |
| Whether a district court can infer perjury merely by crediting officers over defendant | Government: credibility choice implies falsity of defendant’s testimony | Thompson: credibility determination alone does not prove willful falsehood (may be mistake/confusion) | Court reaffirmed that crediting officers does not automatically establish willful perjury (citing Agudelo) |
| Whether any error was harmless because sentence would be same anyway | Government: district court said it would have imposed same sentence with relevant variances/departures | Thompson: record does not clearly show same sentence would have been imposed absent enhancement | Court found record insufficient to conclude harmless error and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (district court must find willful intent to provide false testimony before applying perjury-based obstruction enhancement)
- Giraldo v. United States, 80 F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996) (obstruction enhancement requires finding of specific intent)
- Ben-Shimon v. United States, 249 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (district court cannot rely on conclusory PSR statements to satisfy Dunnigan)
- Johns v. United States, 324 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (PSR may be relied on only if it contains reasonably detailed findings supporting perjury conclusion)
- Lincecum v. United States, 220 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming enhancement where defendant’s detailed affidavit was clearly fabricated)
- Agudelo v. United States, 414 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2005) (crediting agents over defendant does not automatically establish knowing falsehood; must consider possibility of mistake or confusion)
- Mandell v. United States, 752 F.3d 544 (2d Cir. 2014) (harmless-error standard for sentencing; district court must clearly indicate it would impose same sentence)
- Jass v. United States, 569 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2009) (same)