United States v. Thomas Wright
774 F.3d 1085
6th Cir.2014Background
- Defendant Wright was interviewed by HSI agents in March 2011; he admitted a sexual relationship with J.S. that began when J.S. was 16 and that he photographed J.S. nude at age 16.
- Seized devices from Wright’s home contained nude Florida photographs dated March 4–9, 2009 (while J.S. was 16) and other images; Wright and J.S. stayed at a Florida hotel during that period.
- A camera installed in Wright’s equestrian-center office recorded videos in July–August 2009 of J.S. masturbating when J.S. was 17.
- Wright was convicted after a bench trial of five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)), one count of transporting images (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)), and one count of possession (18 U.S.C. § 2252A); he appeals convictions on counts 1–6.
- On appeal Wright argued (1) insufficiency of evidence on the § 2251(a) “use” element and (2) insufficiency on the § 2251(a) “producing” element; he also contested the district court’s treatment of the transporting element in count 6.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the view that photographing a minor to create pornography satisfies the statute’s “use” element and that the evidence supported both “producing” and transportation allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Wright) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence sufficed to show Wright “used” the minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) | “Use” is satisfied when a minor is photographed in order to create pornography; circumstantial evidence shows Wright made J.S. the subject of depictions | Wright: “use” requires active or coercive conduct (Ninth Circuit approach); J.S. initiated sessions so § 2251(a) not met | Court: Affirmed that photographing a minor to create pornography satisfies “use”; no requirement of separate proof of coercion or causation beyond making the minor the subject of depictions |
| Proper statutory meaning of “use” in § 2251(a) | Ordinary meaning of “use” applies; circuits (2nd,4th,8th,1st) hold photographing to create pornography suffices | Wright urged adoption of Ninth Circuit’s narrower, active/coercive interpretation | Court adopted the broader, ordinary-meaning approach consistent with Sirois and sister circuits; rejected Wright’s proposed split |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Wright “produced” visual depictions (§ 2256(3)) | “Producing” is broad/non-technical (includes creating, directing, manufacturing); circumstantial facts (photos in his room, on his thumb drive, he appears in photos, he admitted taking nude photos when under 18) support production | Wright argued lack of direct evidence who took Florida photos and no proof of directorial/managerial role | Court held “producing” may be shown by circumstantial evidence; relied on broad statutory definition and precedent (Fadl, Poulin) — evidence was sufficient |
| Whether district court treated transportation element correctly for count 6 | Government had to prove both “use” and that the depictions were transported; district court required both | Wright argued district court treated transportation alone as sufficient | Court confirmed district court required proof of both elements and affirmed conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.) ("use" satisfied when child photographed to create pornography)
- United States v. Fadl, 498 F.3d 862 (8th Cir.) ("producing" construed broadly/non-technical)
- Ortiz-Graulau v. United States, 756 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.) ("use" met when defendant intentionally photographed minor in sexually explicit conduct)
- United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679 (9th Cir.) (addressed related issues; did not resolve the precise content of "use")
- United States v. Poulin, 631 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.) (rejecting an overly technical definition of "producing")
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (Supreme Court’s discussion of "use" in a different statutory context was considered but not adopted for § 2251(a))