897 F.3d 929
8th Cir.2018Background
- Victim B.M. met Szczerba in Houston in 2015, was recruited into prostitution, used alias Avery Monroe, and worked under controls and quotas set by Szczerba and co-defendant Edwards.
- In July 2015 the three traveled through several states advertising on Backpage; B.M. escaped in St. Louis after an incident and called 911; she provided a notebook and details to Sgt. Nijkamp.
- Nijkamp obtained a state search warrant for Edwards’s hotel room and a Mercedes; the warrant described the locations but did not list items to be seized and mistakenly authorized search of “said person.” Officers searched and found prostitution-related evidence.
- A jury convicted Szczerba of conspiracy, interstate transportation for prostitution, and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1952; he was sentenced to 140 months. He appealed suppression, expert testimony admission, mistrial denial, Brady disclosure, and sentencing calculations.
- The district court denied suppression (applying Leon), admitted expert testimony (Detective Stigerts), refused a mistrial after a juror issue, found no prejudicial Brady violation from a late FBI interview summary, and applied Guidelines cross-reference and enhancements at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Szczerba's Argument | Government's/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of evidence seized under warrant | Warrant invalid for authorizing search of “said person” and failing to list items; suppression required because warrant was facially deficient | Warrant was reasonably read to describe the hotel room and vehicle; officers acted in good faith so Leon exception applies | Denied suppression; warrant not so deficient and officers reasonably relied on it |
| Admission of expert testimony (Detective Stigerts) | Testimony violated Rule 16(a)(1)(G) and Rule 702; opinions not based on reliable methods; Confrontation Clause concerns | Government disclosed summary; expert basing opinions on extensive experience and investigations; testimony limited to permissible expert opinion | Expert testimony admissible; disclosure sufficient and Rule 702/Crawford concerns unfounded |
| Mistrial after juror unavailability and recall | Court effectively declared mistrial and then improperly resumed with full jury; mistrial should have been granted | Court did not prejudice deliberations and properly handled juror status | Denied mistrial; court did not abuse discretion |
| Late disclosure of FBI interview summary (Brady/Giglio) | Late disclosure deprived defense of impeachment/useful evidence; material to outcome | Defense received summary during trial, cross-examined agent, met potential witness, used evidence in closing; not material to verdict | No Brady/Giglio violation; delay not prejudicial or outcome-determinative |
| Sentencing: Guidelines cross-reference and enhancement | Cross-reference to §2A3.1 and 2-level injury enhancement improperly applied; acquittals on force counts preclude use; requested variance not addressed | District court may consider relevant conduct by preponderance; jury acquittal on some counts does not bar sentencing findings; court considered materials and declined variance | Cross-reference and enhancement properly applied; sentencing procedures and substantive sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (warrant that fails to identify items cannot be reasonably relied on)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (exclusionary rule requires appreciable deterrence)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (cost-benefit analysis of exclusionary rule; focus on police misconduct flagrancy)
- United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. standard for reviewing suppression rulings)
- United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. upholding expert testimony about prostitution operations)
- United States v. Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877 (sentencing may rely on relevant conduct by preponderance despite jury acquittal)
- United States v. Spencer, 753 F.3d 746 (Brady materiality standard and timing of disclosure)