United States v. Thomas Patrick Keelan
786 F.3d 865
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Keelan, a 51-year-old teacher, groomed and engaged in sexual activity with J.S., a minor (began when J.S. was 15); conduct included travel, sex toys, bondage, and episodes at a hotel leading to arrest.
- Jury convicted Keelan of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (use of interstate commerce to entice a minor). Sentence: 200 months imprisonment (concurrent) and 25 years supervised release.
- District court deferred restitution under the MVRA pending an accounting of J.S.’s mental-health treatment costs; a magistrate hearing produced invoices and expert/therapist statements totaling $104,886.05 (costs before first sexual abuse excluded).
- Magistrate recommended, and the district court adopted, restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A as the offense was a "crime of violence," J.S. suffered "bodily injury," and the treatment costs (including psychiatric care) were proximately caused by Keelan’s offense.
- Keelan appealed, arguing (1) § 2422(b) is not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b); (2) J.S. did not suffer "bodily injury"; (3) mental-health treatment for a physical injury is not compensable; and (4) lack of proximate causation for the treatment costs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2422(b) is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) | Gov: §2422(b) categorically involves substantial risk of force in ordinary cases; previous precedent supports treating sex crimes against minors as violent | Keelan: §16(b) narrower than Guidelines; not all violations involve risk that force will be "used" | Court: Adopted the "ordinary case" categorical approach and held §2422(b) is a crime of violence under §16(b) |
| Whether J.S. suffered a "bodily injury" for MVRA restitution | Gov: J.S. suffered bodily injury (including impairment of mental faculty) from abuse | Keelan: Evidence insufficient; contested factual finding | Court: Keelan forfeited challenge by failing to object below; no plain error shown; finding stands |
| Whether psychiatric/psychological treatment is recoverable under MVRA | Gov: MVRA expressly covers medical services for physical, psychiatric, and psychological care related to bodily injury | Keelan: MVRA limited to treatment of the physical injury, not psychological consequences | Court: MVRA’s plain text covers psychiatric/psychological care; mental-health treatment is compensable |
| Whether Keelan’s conduct proximately caused J.S.’s treatment costs | Gov: District court found a direct, proximate causal link post-first sexual abuse date; prior issues excluded | Keelan: J.S. had pre-existing psychological problems (cutting), so costs not proximately caused by Keelan | Court: No clear error; proximate causation satisfied (defendant need not be sole cause); costs after first abuse were properly attributed to Keelan |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (interpreting categorical approach for offense-element analysis)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (adopting "ordinary case" standard in categorical analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (describing categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir.) (holding §2422(b) is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines)
- United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir.) (comparison of crime-of-violence definitions under different authorities)
- United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir.) (MVRA proximate-causation standard: defendant need not be sole cause)
- United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir.) (sex crimes against minors pose substantial risk that force will be used)