United States v. Texas
599 U.S. 670
SCOTUS2023Background
- In 2021 DHS issued "Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law" prioritizing apprehension/removal of certain noncitizens (e.g., suspected terrorists, recent entrants) and de-prioritizing others.
- Texas and Louisiana sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging DHS violated statutory arrest/detention mandates in 8 U.S.C. §§1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) and asserting state fiscal and related costs from released noncitizens.
- The district court found the States would incur concrete costs, held the Guidelines unlawful, and vacated them; the Fifth Circuit denied a stay of that order.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment and focused on whether the States had Article III standing to sue.
- The Supreme Court reversed: a majority held the States lack Article III standing to challenge executive enforcement priorities; the Court did not decide whether DHS violated the statutes on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing — can States sue over DHS enforcement priorities? | States: monetary and programmatic costs from DHS under‑enforcement are concrete, traceable, and judicially redressable injuries. | U.S.: plaintiffs assert an interest in third‑party prosecutions/ arrests; historical practice and Article II enforcement discretion make such claims nonjusticiable. | Court: States lack Article III standing — injuries are not the sort of judicially cognizable claims to order more arrests/prosecutions. |
| Redressability / remedy (vacatur or injunction) | States: vacatur under the APA (or an injunction) would eliminate guidance causing detainer rescissions, thus redressing harms. | U.S.: statutory bar (§1252(f)(1)) limits lower‑court injunctions; vacatur would not compel discretionary arrests and thus may not redress. | Majority: did not reach merits; concurring opinions (Gorsuch/Barrett) stressed redressability problems and questioned vacatur as an effective or proper remedy. |
| Judicial review of enforcement discretion | States: statutory "shall" duties ( §§1226(c), 1231(a)(2) ) require judicial enforcement of arrest/detention mandates. | U.S.: enforcement/prioritization implicates Article II discretion; courts lack meaningful standards and historical practice counsels against ordering arrests. | Court: historical practice and separation‑of‑powers principles counsel that federal courts are generally not the forum to direct executive arrest/prosecution priorities absent special circumstances. |
Key Cases Cited
- Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements: injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency decisions not to prosecute/enforce presumptively unreviewable under APA absent statutory guidance)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (State standing recognized for regulatory inaction; applied with "special solicitude")
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (Executive enforcement discretion in immigration and foreign‑policy implications)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (history and tradition inform what injuries are judicially cognizable under Article III)
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limits on executive power and importance of separation of powers)