United States v. Terry Davy
713 F. App'x 439
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Terry Davy pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); PSR recommended base offense level 24 under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2) based on two prior felonies and a +2 enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for a stolen firearm; government agreed to -3 for acceptance of responsibility, yielding total offense level 23 and a Guidelines range of 92–115 months.
- At sentencing the district court imposed an in-Guidelines 110-month term; Davy did not object to the PSR calculations at or before sentencing and expressly declined to object when asked after sentencing.
- On appeal Davy raised three challenges: (1) the court erred by not applying the modified categorical approach to determine whether his Ohio felonious assault conviction was a "crime of violence" under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2); (2) the district court inadequately explained its denial of a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) the court relied on PSR statements that the firearm was stolen without sufficient indicia of reliability.
- The government moved for the court of appeals to take judicial notice of Ohio state-court documents (Shepard documents) showing Davy was convicted under subsection A of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11, which tracks the violent-offense language.
- The Sixth Circuit granted judicial notice, held that the Felonious Assault conviction qualified as a crime of violence, found the district court’s sentencing explanation sufficient under the deferential plain-error standard, and concluded that Davy’s failure to object converted the PSR’s statement that the gun was stolen into an admission sufficient to support the enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davy) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court should have applied the modified categorical approach to determine if the Ohio felonious assault conviction was a crime of violence | Court erred by relying on PSR rather than reviewing Shepard documents to determine which subsection of the divisible statute formed the conviction | Shepard documents show conviction under subsection A (violent subsection); judicial notice is appropriate | Court: district court erred procedurally but no plain error because judicially noticed Shepard documents establish conviction under subsection A, so enhancement stands |
| Whether district court gave an adequate explanation for denying a downward variance under § 3553(a) | Explanation was insufficient and failed to address relevant § 3553(a) factors | Court addressed defendant’s history and § 3553(a) factors and provided reasoned basis for denial; explanation need not address every argument when sentence is within Guidelines | Court: explanation—though not exhaustive—was sufficient and not plain error; sentence not procedurally unreasonable |
| Whether PSR statements that the firearm was stolen lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for a § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) enhancement | PSR allegations alone are insufficient under Due Process and USSG § 6A1.3(a) absent independent reliable proof | Davy failed to object; his silence/admissions in PSR and sentencing materials make the fact undisputed and satisfy minimal indicia of reliability | Court: because Davy admitted PSR facts by not objecting (and included the enhancement in his sentencing memo), the stolen-firearm finding was reliable and the enhancement stands |
| Whether the court of appeals may take judicial notice of state court documents to resolve sentencing-dispute | Argues facts in state documents are in reasonable dispute and thus not appropriate for judicial notice | State charging document and journal entries are proper Shepard documents and are the sort of judicial records appropriate for judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201 | Court: granted motion to take judicial notice; state court records clearly show conviction under subsection A |
Key Cases Cited
- Vonner v. United States, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (plain-error standard for unobjected-to sentencing issues)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limiting documents courts may consult when applying categorical/modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 2012) (judicial notice of state-court records and limits of relying on PSR)
- United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing subsections of Ohio felonious assault for violent-felony analysis)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural requirement that district court adequately explain sentence)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (appellate review assesses whether district court gave a reasoned basis for its sentence)
- United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (PSR cannot substitute for Shepard documents when determining nature of prior conviction)
