United States v. Terrell Davis
726 F.3d 434
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Police observed Terrell Davis and Jamar Blackshear in a rented Jeep in a high‑crime Philadelphia neighborhood; officers saw furtive movements, startled expressions, and saw an item tossed into the backseat.
- After stopping both men and finding wads of cash on each, officers opened the driver door, found a handgun, and, during a search justified by officer safety, discovered ~740 grams of cocaine packaged in bricks and several Ziploc bags.
- Davis was tried by jury for possession with intent to distribute and 924(c) firearm offense; convicted on the drug charge (78 months) and acquitted on the firearm count.
- At trial the government introduced two prior Pennsylvania convictions for cocaine possession under Rule 404(b) to prove Davis’s knowledge and intent; the district court admitted them.
- Davis appealed, challenging the stop/search (suppression), the admission of prior possession convictions, the prosecutor’s expert testimony under Rule 704(b), and exclusion of a prior consistent statement. The Third Circuit affirmed suppression but vacated the conviction based on improper admission of the prior possession convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Davis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of stop/search (suppression) | Officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion from observed furtive movements, flight, wads of cash, and high‑crime area; search for weapons was proper under Terry/Long | Window was tinted so officers could not have observed the purported conduct; stop was unlawful, making resulting seizure inadmissible | Affirmed denial of suppression: district court’s finding that front window was not tinted was not clearly erroneous; reasonable suspicion and Terry/Long search upheld |
| Admission of two prior convictions for cocaine possession (404(b)) | Priors show knowledge and intent to distribute; proper non‑propensity purpose | Possession convictions do not show ability to recognize distribution‑style cocaine nor intent to distribute; admission was unduly prejudicial and not probative | Reversed: prior possession convictions inadmissible to prove knowledge or intent in a distribution prosecution; district court abused its discretion |
| Expert testimony re: common practices (Rule 704(b)) | Expert may testify about customs/practices in drug trade; such testimony helps jury infer intent without stating ultimate conclusion | Expert crossed line by implying Davis’s mental state (intent/knowledge) | Affirmed: expert limited to general practices did not violate Rule 704(b); did not state ultimate conclusion about Davis’s state of mind |
| Exclusion of witness’s prior consistent written statement (801(d)(1)(B)) | N/A | Written statement should be admitted to rebut implied charge of recent fabrication of trial testimony | Affirmed exclusion: prior statement was consistent but prosecution did not allege recent fabrication or improper influence, so Rule 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing investigatory stop standard)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (high‑crime area and unprovoked flight support reasonable suspicion)
- Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (vehicle passenger‑area search for weapons during Terry stop)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (404(b) framework: permissible purposes and relevance)
- United States v. Lopez, 340 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (prior distribution convictions admitted to prove knowledge in different‑drug context)
- United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussion of admissibility limits for prior drug convictions)
- United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring district courts to articulate chain of inferences connecting prior acts to permissible purpose)