United States v. Terrance Shaw, 39 F.4th 450

Terrance Shaw was serving six years of supervised release after a federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of a firearm; he had previously served 10 years in prison.
During supervision Shaw repeatedly violated conditions (positive drug tests, driving on a revoked license, falsified documents, failure to attend mandated therapy) and engaged in threatening conduct while serving weekend jail sanctions.
Probation sought revocation; at the revocation hearing Shaw admitted violations and asked to remain on supervision with mandated treatment; the advisory range under the applicable policy statement was 8–14 months, statutory maximum on revocation was 5 years.
The district court revoked supervision and imposed a 24‑month prison term (an upward variance), explaining the sentence as intended to “help” Shaw and allow him to access prison rehabilitative programs, and used paternalistic/religious language (calling Shaw’s conduct a “sin”). The court did not expressly discuss the § 3553(a)/§ 3583(e) factors when explaining the sentence length.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the sentence, holding the district court relied primarily on rehabilitation in selecting the above‑Guidelines prison term—running afoul of Tapia v. United States—and rejecting Shaw’s claim of judicial religious bias.

Issue	Shaw's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court impermissibly lengthened prison term to promote rehabilitation (Tapia)	The court imposed/varied upward to give Shaw prison time to access rehabilitative programs; that violates Tapia	Rehab comments were afterthoughts; other permissible factors motivated sentence	Vacated and remanded: Tapia applies to supervised‑release revocation; record shows rehabilitation drove the 24‑month term
Whether the court failed to consider/justify sentence under § 3553(a)/§ 3583(e)	Court did not state how statutory factors informed the upward variance	Court alluded to some factors; context suffices	Court did not expressly weigh the factors; appellate opinion remanded on Tapia grounds but encouraged explicit § 3583(e)/§ 3553(a) reasoning on remand
Whether the judge’s religious language (calling conduct a “sin”) showed impermissible religious bias	The “sin” comment reflects religiously motivated punishment and requires remand or reassignment	The term was metaphorical/contextual, not an relied‑upon factor; no evidence of bias	Rejected: no clear evidence judge relied on religion; no reassignment warranted

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (district courts may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to promote rehabilitation)
United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2011) (§ 3583(e) requires consideration of § 3553(a) factors on revocation)
United States v. Burrows, 905 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussion of rehabilitation alongside other permissible factors in revocation sentencing)
United States v. Lucas, 670 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012) (court may mention rehabilitation among several valid sentencing purposes where record shows other factors predominated)
United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing Tapia applies to supervised‑release revocation)
United States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2019) (procedures for preserving Tapia objections and appellate review considerations)