United States v. Tereall Green, 946 F.3d 433

At ~1:00 a.m. officer Ehlers observed a black Nissan Rogue he estimated was speeding; the vehicle had a license‑plate frame obscuring characters and the plate returned to a different make/model when checked.
Officer Ehlers stopped the SUV, saw passengers making furtive movements, smelled alcohol and then marijuana, and observed open liquor bottles and a wet floorboard.
Front‑seat passenger identified himself as Tereall Green (known from intel as appearing with a weapon on Facebook); a back‑seat passenger initially gave a false name but was identified as Javonta Herbert.
Ehlers conducted a quick frisk of Green (nothing found); frisk of Deshawn Marks yielded marijuana; Green and Marks were seated in a patrol car; Schaaf then spotted a handgun on the backseat floor where Herbert had been sitting and announced a firearm discovery.
After the firearm announcement, Officer Girsch conducted a more thorough frisk of Green and found a loaded handgun on Green; Herbert was arrested; both were indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
The district court denied Green’s suppression motion and applied a four‑level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to both defendants; both were sentenced to 71 months; this appeal followed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Lawfulness of traffic stop / probable cause	Green: no probable cause; driver obeyed laws	Officers: speeding estimate, obscured plate frame, plate registered to different vehicle justified stop	Stop lawful — probable cause/reasonable suspicion supported the stop
Validity of frisks (initial and second)	Green: officers lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him	Officers: Ehlers had intel tying Green to a weapon, smelled marijuana, saw suspicious movements; discovery of a gun justified a more thorough second frisk	Both patdowns reasonable under totality of circumstances
Applicability of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement	Herbert: Iowa carrying offense is mere possession and not a separate felony for enhancement	Government: binding precedent treats Iowa § 724.4(1) as “another felony offense”	Enhancement applies — Walker controls and requires application
Procedural/extent of Herbert’s upward departure under § 4A1.3	Herbert: court failed to perform incremental analysis and over‑departed (should be two levels)	Government: district court cited extensive, uncaptured criminal history and recidivism risk, justifying three levels	No abuse of discretion; three‑level upward departure and 71‑month sentence reasonable

United States v. Gaffney, 789 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2015) (officer’s visual speed estimate may be credited if reliable)
United States v. Harris, 617 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 2010) (even minor traffic violations supply probable cause for a stop)
United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012) (license‑plate discrepancies can generate reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Binion, 570 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2009) (suspicion of drug activity supports belief a person may be armed)
United States v. Crippen, 627 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2010) (weapons are frequently associated with drug transactions)
United States v. Menard, 95 F.3d 9 (8th Cir. 1996) (discovery of a weapon can justify frisking a companion)
United States v. Walker, 771 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2014) (Iowa § 724.4(1) qualifies as "another felony offense" for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B))
United States v. Ruvalcava‑Perez, 561 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2009) (standards for reviewing upward departures)
United States v. Mosby, 543 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2008) (district court may consider crimes committed while on probation/parole)
United States v. White, 816 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2016) (procedural sentencing‑review principles)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (rejects formulaic, mathematical approach to departures/variances)