United States v. Taylor, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21989

Tommy Taylor was convicted in 2014 of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (2)); originally sentenced to 110 months.
On direct appeal this Court held the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause invalid under Johnson and remanded for resentencing.
On remand the revised PSR treated one prior Oklahoma conviction—assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645)—as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), yielding a base offense level of 20 and a guidelines range of 70–87 months.
Taylor did not object to the revised PSR at resentencing (counsel expressly stated no objections) and was resentenced to 87 months.
On appeal Taylor argued the § 645 conviction does not qualify as a § 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence (invoking Mathis), and that the district court erred in applying the enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.
The Tenth Circuit applied plain-error review (Taylor had raised, but then abandoned, related objections earlier) and affirmed, concluding § 645 categorically requires attempted, threatened, or actual violent force when committed with a dangerous weapon.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether Taylor preserved challenge to the revised PSR / applicable standard of review	Taylor contends earlier objection to the original PSR preserved the issue for resentencing so abuse-of-discretion review should apply	Government: Taylor failed to object to the revised PSR at resentencing; plain-error review applies	Court held plain-error review applies because Taylor did not object to the revised PSR and counsel expressly waived objections at resentencing
Whether Oklahoma conviction under § 645 is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) (elements clause) after Mathis	Taylor argues Mathis requires treating the “dangerous weapon” definitions as means, not elements, nullifying that element and leaving only simple assault/battery (which can be slight touching and thus non-violent)	Government argues § 645 is divisible; the charging document shows conviction under the assault-with-dangerous-weapon alternative, which necessarily involves threatened/attempted/actual violent force sufficient to satisfy the elements clause	Court held § 645 (assault/battery with a dangerous weapon) is divisible and, under the modified categorical approach, the conviction charged (assault/battery with a dangerous weapon) categorically requires attempted, threatened, or actual violent force and therefore qualifies as a § 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence; no plain error shown

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statute with alternative means does not qualify if elements broader than generic offense; limits use of modified categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (distinguishes categorical and modified categorical approaches)
Madrid v. United States, 805 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2015) (applied Johnson to Guidelines’ residual clause)
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (plain-error framework for sentencing guideline errors)
Ramon Silva v. United States, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010) (assault causing apprehension with deadly weapon involves threatened use of violent force)
United States v. Smith, 652 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2011) (simple battery under Oklahoma law may be satisfied by slight touching and thus not always a crime of violence)