United States v. Tanisha Banks, 982 F.3d 1098

Tanisha Banks, a mail clerk, was indicted for conspiracy and aiding/abetting the robbery of the U.S. Post Office; co-defendants included Caffey and Beck (Beck testified for the government).
After a five-day trial the jury deliberated ~4 hours and returned guilty verdicts around 8:45 p.m.
During the post-verdict jury poll Juror No. 32 said “Forced into,” then “I suppose so,” and “I don’t know how to answer”; the judge continued polling and the remaining jurors affirmed, revealing Juror 32 as a lone dissenter.
The court sent the jury back at 9:06 p.m. with an instruction to continue deliberating in “good faith” but did not repeat the Silvern/Silvern-type caution against surrendering honest beliefs.
The jury returned a guilty verdict 29 minutes later; on repoll all jurors confirmed unanimity. Banks appealed, alleging the poll and subsequent events impermissibly coerced the dissenting juror.
The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding the totality of circumstances created a clear and obvious risk of juror coercion (presuming prejudice under plain-error review).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Banks)	Held
Whether the jury poll and follow-up coerced a juror into surrendering honest views	Polling and follow-up questions were neutral, judge reasonably sought clarity; subsequent unanimity cures concern	Judge’s repeated questioning, completion of the poll after a dissent, late hour, and quick 29-minute renewed deliberation coerced the holdout	Vacated: totality shows clear, obvious risk of coercion; prejudice presumed
Whether completing the poll after a juror dissented was improper	Completing the poll was permissible and not per se reversible; clearing up unanimity is valid	Continuing the poll revealed the lone dissenter and increased pressure; wise practice is to stop once non-unanimity appears	Court criticized completing the poll and treated it as a coercive factor in the totality analysis
Whether the supplemental instruction and timing mitigated coercion risk	Prior general instructions were sufficient; no need to repeat Silvern cautions	Failure to give a targeted caution not to surrender honest beliefs at the sensitive moment, late hour, and brief renewed deliberations exacerbated coercion risk	Supplemental instruction was insufficient and timing/brief deliberation heightened coercion concerns

Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (30‑minute supplemental deliberation can suggest coercion)
United States v. Williams, 819 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2016) (totality test for juror coercion and guidance on polling)
United States v. Blitch, 622 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2010) (jurors must not surrender honest opinions; objective juror-perspective inquiry)
United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973) (instruction framework for deadlocked juries discouraging surrender of honest beliefs)
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (per curiam) (jurors may not be coerced into surrendering conscientiously held views)