United States v. Taj Williams, 943 F.3d 606

On Jan. 18, 2015, Chili Express convenience store in Rochester, NY was set on fire; surveillance showed a white Chevy Trailblazer (black hood, missing fuel cap) drive by and a person in a dark gray sweatshirt smash the front glass with a tire iron and throw Molotov cocktails (two lit) into the store.
Rochester Fire Department suspected Taj Williams based on a prior arson at the same store and vehicle records tying a Trailblazer to his girlfriend; Williams was later stopped and arrested for driving without a license.
Police obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and recovered a tire iron, gray sweatshirt, green lighter, gas can, and a ripped U-Haul blanket.
Indicted Feb. 11, 2016 on arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)) and possession of unregistered Molotov cocktails (26 U.S.C. provisions); after a Sept. 2017 jury trial Williams was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 104 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal Williams raised four principal claims: (1) plain error in jury instructions on arson/attempt; (2) legal impossibility due to New York’s ban on Molotov cocktails making federal registration impossible; (3) involuntariness of custodial statements; and (4) erroneous inclusion of a prior NY § 240.50 conviction in criminal-history calculation.

Issue	Government's Argument	Williams' Argument	Held
Jury instruction on attempt/recklessness	Court instructed intent was required for attempt; any error harmless because evidence showed completed arson	Instruction allowed conviction for attempted arson with a reckless mental state (plain error)	No plain error: instruction required intent and overwhelming proof of completed arson so no prejudice
Impossibility defense to registration requirement	Registration of Molotovs is possible; prior registrations existed; Shepardson controls	NY law banning Molotovs made federal registration impossible, so due process prevents conviction	Rejected: registration not impossible; Shepardson forecloses impossibility claim
Suppression of custodial statements (voluntariness)	Interrogation was voluntary; district court credibility findings supported denial of suppression	Officers’ trickery, fatigue, and length rendered statements involuntary	Affirmed: factual findings and credibility determinations not clearly erroneous; no constitutional violation
Criminal-history: inclusion of NY §240.50 conviction	District court permissibly examined underlying conduct; even if inclusion was error it was harmless because CHC unchanged	Inclusion of §240.50 (false reporting) improperly increased criminal history contrary to USSG §4A1.2(c)(1)	Affirmed: any error harmless as it did not change CHC; concurring opinions discuss standards for reviewing §4A1.2(c)(1) determinations

United States v. Prado, 815 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.) (plain-error standard for unpreserved jury-instruction claims)
United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (Supreme Court) (plain-error test articulation)
United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260 (2d Cir.) (harmlessness where jury would have convicted on properly instructed theory)
United States v. Shepardson, 167 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.) (registration not impossible absent federal ban)
United States v. Pabon, 871 F.3d 164 (2d Cir.) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.) (deference to district court credibility findings)
United States v. Medunjanin, 752 F.3d 576 (2d Cir.) (deference where permissible views of evidence exist)
United States v. Morales, 239 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.) (approach to §4A1.2(c) — compare statute text v. underlying conduct)
United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 345 (2d Cir.) (post-Booker treatment of deference in Guidelines application)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (Supreme Court) (sentencing-Guidelines constitutional decision)
United States v. Valente, 915 F.3d 916 (2d Cir.) (examples of district-court factfinding in §4A1.2(c) inquiries)
United States v. Sanders, 205 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.) (statute may be narrow as a matter of law and exclude conduct from history calculation)