118 F.4th 822
6th Cir.2024Background
- Gailes was convicted in Tennessee of multiple misdemeanor domestic violence offenses involving significant physical violence against intimate partners.
- Due to these convictions, Gailes was federally prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) from possessing firearms.
- Police later found Gailes in possession of two loaded pistols following a car accident, leading to his indictment for violating § 922(g)(9).
- Gailes moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional after the Supreme Court’s decision in NYSRPA v. Bruen.
- The district court denied the motion; Gailes pleaded guilty and appealed the statute’s constitutionality in light of recent Supreme Court precedent.
- The Sixth Circuit addressed his facial constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(9) post-Bruen and the Court’s subsequent decision in United States v. Rahimi.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under Second Amendment | The statute facially violates the Second Amendment post-Bruen; the text covers domestic violence misdemeanants' firearm possession | The statute is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation; Bruen and Rahimi support its validity | § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional; statute withstands Bruen challenge |
| Are domestic-violence misdemeanants among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment? | Yes; misdemeanants are part of "the people" protected by the Amendment | Government conceded Gailes is among "the people" protected | Domestic-violence misdemeanants are protected but their status can justify limitations |
| Does nation’s history support the permanent disarmament of domestic-violence misdemeanants? | No direct historical analogue exists for such categorical bans | Founding-era surety and "going armed" laws are relevant analogues supporting such regulation | Sufficient historical analogues exist, supporting disarmament for clear threats |
| Does Rahimi’s distinction between temporary and permanent firearm bans matter? | Rahimi only approved temporary bans for ongoing threats, not permanent bans for prior conduct | Williams upheld a permanent firearm ban for felons; domestic violence recidivism is high | Permanent ban upheld; permanent disarmament not unconstitutional here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (explains the dangers of firearms and domestic violence; supports closing loopholes in gun laws)
- Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 2018) (previously upheld § 922(g)(9) pre-Bruen)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (establishes individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment protection against the states)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (sets new historical-tradition test for Second Amendment challenges)
- United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) (upholds firearm prohibition for those under domestic-violence restraining orders under Bruen framework)
- United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) (applies Rahimi and Bruen, upholds categorical disarmament for felons)