United States v. Swan
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20843
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Carole Swan, a long-time selectperson for Chelsea, Maine, was investigated for directing kickbacks from inflated town sand contracts; a sting by local deputies resulted in Swan accepting marked cash.
- Deputies Reardon and Bucknam confronted Swan in a laundromat parking lot, recovered the bag of money, and suggested discussing the matter at the sheriff’s office; Swan voluntarily drove to the station with Bucknam.
- At the station the deputies told Swan she was not under arrest, was free to leave at any time, and could decline to speak; they briefly held her cellphone, returned it when she needed to call her husband, and left the room while she called.
- During a roughly 90-minute interview Swan made incriminating statements, including admitting receipt of about $25,000 in kickbacks.
- Swan was indicted on Hobbs Act extortion, tax fraud, and false statements; she moved to suppress her stationhouse statements arguing they were the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and/or involuntary.
- The magistrate and district courts denied suppression; Swan was convicted on multiple counts and appealed solely on the suppression/ voluntariness ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Swan was in custody at the station such that Miranda warnings were required | United States: interview was non-custodial because deputies told Swan she was not under arrest and free to leave | Swan: prior parking-lot confrontation, deputies’ retention of her phone, and being driven to the station made her effectively in custody | Court: Non-custodial — reasonable person would feel free to stop the interview and leave |
| Whether Miranda covers statements made after an earlier custodial encounter | United States: custody status focuses on circumstances when the challenged statements were made | Swan: initial parking-lot encounter was custodial, tainting later stationhouse questioning | Court: Even if parking-lot encounter was custodial, station interview was non-custodial so Miranda not required |
| Whether deputies’ temporary retention of Swan’s cellphone rendered the interview custodial | United States: temporary phone retention (with permission and return to permit call) did not amount to custody | Swan: withholding phone and sending call to voicemail showed coercive control | Court: Phone retention was not dispositive and did not convert the interview into custody |
| Whether Swan’s statements were involuntary | United States: interview tone, duration, and lack of physical restraint show voluntariness; suggestions of leniency are not coercive | Swan: promises or implication of leniency overbore her will | Court: Statements were voluntary; officers’ comments about cooperation were permissible and did not overbear will |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Sup. Ct.) (establishes Miranda warnings requirement for custodial interrogation)
- Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (Sup. Ct.) (voluntariness standard for confessions)
- Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (Sup. Ct.) (custody is determined by whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave)
- United States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d 39 (1st Cir.) (focus on custody at time of interrogation; release from restraints can render later questioning non-custodial)
- United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805 (1st Cir.) (factors for custody determination: location, officers present, restraints, duration/character)
- United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir.) (voluntary stationhouse interviews need not trigger Miranda)
- United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428 (1st Cir.) (interview tone, duration, and lack of restraint inform voluntariness and custody analyses)
- United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386 (1st Cir.) (confirming non-custodial interviews where defendants were told they were not under arrest)
- United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727 (1st Cir.) (same)
- United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804 (1st Cir.) (officer promises to inform prosecutors of cooperation do not render statements involuntary)
