United States v. Suarez, 791 F.3d 363

Background

Yesid Rios Suarez ran a large-scale Colombia/Venezuela drug-trafficking organization and was convicted in absentia in Colombia in 2010.
Colombia extradited Suarez to the U.S. in May 2013 after the U.S. requested extradition to prosecute a conspiracy to import/manufacture 5+ kg of cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 963).
Colombia conditioned extradition on U.S. assurances (Diplomatic Note) that Suarez would be prosecuted only for post-1997 conduct, afforded due process protections, and would not be “subjected to ... life imprisonment.”
The U.S. provided those assurances; Suarez pled guilty in Feb. 2014 and was sentenced in June 2014 to 648 months (effectively life) and a $1,000,000 fine.
Suarez appealed, arguing the sentence violated the U.S. assurance that a sentence of life imprisonment would not be sought or imposed because the term exceeded his life expectancy.
The Second Circuit considered whether Suarez had prudential standing to enforce the extradition assurances and whether the sentence breached the Diplomatic Note; it affirmed the district court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Suarez may challenge his sentence as violating the extradition assurance (prudential standing)	Suarez: He may assert that the U.S. breached the Diplomatic Note by imposing an effective life term	Govt/Respondent: Rights under extradition documents primarily protect the surrendering sovereign (Colombia); defendant lacks prudential standing absent an official protest by Colombia	The court treated prudential standing as a threshold issue and held that any right is derivative of the surrendering state; Suarez would only have prudential standing if Colombia officially protested, so defendant’s claim fails absent such protest
Whether the sentence violated the assurance that "a sentence of life imprisonment will not be sought or imposed"	Suarez: The 648-month term is functionally life given his age and thus violates the assurance	Govt/District Court: The assurance bars a life sentence; a long determinate term, even effectively life, is a term of years and does not violate the plain language	The court affirmed: absent Colombian protest, and construing the assurance according to its language, a determinate term of years does not constitute an imposed "life imprisonment" for purposes of the Diplomatic Note

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Baez, 349 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2003) (rule of specialty applies to extradition limits and sentencing; executive remediation contemplated)
United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2007) (rule of specialty applies in sentencing context)
United States v. Banks, 464 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to resolve whether right to enforce extradition terms belongs to surrendering state when no error found)
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (standing includes constitutional and prudential limitations)
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (prudential standing bars asserting third-party rights)
Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2014) (prudential standing requires asserting one’s own legal rights)
Hillside Metro Assoc., LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 747 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2014) (may address prudential standing before Article III standing)
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (treaties and international agreements do not create privately enforceable rights absent express language)
Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973) (principle of specialty seen as privilege of the asylum state, not a private right)
Fiocconi v. Attorney General of U.S., 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972) (rule of specialty applies to extraditions by treaty or comity)
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (offended sovereign must determine whether treaty violation occurred and seek redress)
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (official diplomatic protests by foreign government can support claims about treaty violations)