Aрpellants Fiocconi and Kella, citizens of France, were indicted in the District of Massachusetts on November 20, 1969, for conspiring from September 15, 1968, through April 22, 1969, to import heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174. 1 Bench warrants-were issued but could not be executed. Interpol traced appellants to a town in Italy, where in August 1970 they were arrested by the Italian authorities. A month later the United States Embassy in Rome requested еxtradition. It acknowledged that narcotics crimes were not among those listed in the Extradition Convention between the two govern *477 ments, 15 Stat. 629 (1868), and subsequent amendments. However, the Embassy expressed its understanding that, independent of the Convention, the Italian Government could grant extradition as an act of comity when the offenses for which this was requested were also crimes under the law of Italy, provided that the relevant trеaty did not prohibit extradition for the offenses in question (which the American-Italian Convention did not), and that the offenses with which Fiocconi and Kella had been charged in the United States were in fact crimes under Italian law. Among the papers submitted to the Italian Government were the indictment in and the arrest warrants issued by the District Court for Massachusetts.
After a hearing, a court in Florence directed appellants’ extrаdition “so that they can be subjected to judgment according to the writ of indictment against them formulated by the Grand Jury of the District Court of Appeals of Massachusetts [sic] dated the 20th of November, 1969, and according to the consequent order for arrest on the same date.” After unsuccessful appellate proceedings, Fiocconi and Kella were delivered in Italy to United States authorities and were removed to Boston on October 6, 1971. They pleaded not guilty. Bail was fixed in the amount of $250,000 each, which was met by surety bond secured by a $500,000 certified check drawn on a Swiss bank.
Soon after their release on bail, Fioc-coni and Kella were subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury in the Southern District of New York. When they appeared, they were arrested on warrants issued under an indictment, returned that day, which charged them with the substantive crime of receiving, concealing, selling and facilitating the transportation, concealment and sale of 37 kilograms of heroin in the Southern District of New York on or about May 27, 1970. Bail was fixed at $100,000 for each defendant, a sum which they were unable to post. While a habeas corpus petition was pending, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging appellants and 21 other defendants with cоnspiring to violate the narcotics laws from January 1, 1970 through January 4, 1972 8 and with two substantive offenses in May 1970. 2 3 Bail was again set at $100,000 each, which Fiocconi and Kella were unable to post. We are advised that the United States has requested Italy to broaden the extradition order to include the New York charges; that Fiocconi and Kella have retained counsel in Italy to resist this; and that no response from the Italian Government has yet been received.
Appellants again petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York for release on the ground that their detention there on a charge other than that presented to the Italian Government was an act of bad faith toward the Government of Italy. When the district court denied the petition on March 16, 1972, D.C.,
If the matter were res nova, something could be said for the proposition that appellants’ claim is not a matter proper for judicial cognizance. The argument would be that since appellants were lawfully arrested in the Southern *478 District of New York for an offense allegedly committed there, that should end the matter so far as the courts are concerned; consideration of the effect on this country’s international relatiоns of holding appellants for trial on a charge differing from the one presented to the Italian Government should be a matter solely for the executive departments, which can better weigh the relative importance of the conviction of two alleged large scale narcotics violators against possible difficulties in securing future extradition from Italy and other foreign affairs considerations. The рosition would be that extradition is a matter of treaty or of comity between governments ; that a breach of faith by the receiving government entails international consequences; but that the treaty or practice confers no rights on persons who have been so extradited unless this has been spelled out. 4
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rauscher,
We think the district court read
Rauscher
too narrowly. Although the case indeed concerned extradition under a treaty, Mr. Justice Miller began his discussion by considering what the situation would have been without one. He thought it could “hardly be supposed that a government which was under no treaty obligation, nor any absolute obligation of public duty, to seize a person who had found an asylum within its bosom and turn him over to another country for trial, would be willing to do this, unless a case was made of some specific offense of a character which justified the government in depriving the party of his asylum. It is unrеasonable that the country of the asylum should be expected to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the demanding government without any limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party.”
In light of the analysis leading to Mr. Justice Miller’s conclusion, we cannot agree that the basic principle of
Rauscher
is inapplicable where extradition has been obtained as an exercise of comity by the surrendering government.
6
In his view a rule of internationál law required that the receiving country should not try an extradited person for an offense for which the surrendering country would not have granted extradition; the treaty was important only as clarifying what offenses were or were not extraditable.
7
Rauscher’s conviction of an offense for which he was not and could not have been extradited did not violate the treaty, which was silent as to the rights of a person extrаdited thereunder; it violated a rule of what we would now call United States foreign relations law devised by the courts to implement the treaty. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
However, the
Rauscher
remedy must be applied in light of the considerations that gave it birth. Since the object of the rule was to prevent the United States from violating international obligations, it becomes essential to determine, as best one can, whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution at issue as a breach. In
Rauscher
this was altogether clear, in view of the history of negotiations between the two gоvernments in a prior case where Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had expressed extreme displeasure over an instance where one Lawrence had been tried for an offense different from that named in the demand made under the treaty and had refused to honor a subsequent demand for one Winslow unless the United States specifically agreed not to do this, see
In United States v. Paroutian,
supra,
The “principle of specialty” reflects a fundamental concern of governments that persons who are surrendered should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government, especially for political crimes. Cf. United States v. Rauscher,
supra,
Our conclusion is somewhat fortified by Art. Ill of the Extradition Convention between the United States and Italy, 15 Stat. 631 (1868), which provides that “the person . . . delivered up for the crimes enumerated shall in no ease be tried for any . crime, committed previously to that for which his . surrender is asked.” If the countries had intended that the requesting government could not try the aсcused for any crime committed before the time of his surrender other than the crime for which he was extradited, they could have accomplished this by adopting one of the standard clauses to that end. See 1 J. Moore, Extradition §§ 148-49, at 194-96 (1891). Compare Collins v. O’Neil,
No different conclusion is called for by 18 U.S.C. § 3192.
11
Despite the narrower phrase used in the statute, we rеad the references to a predecessor act in
Rauscher,
We therefore affirm the distriсt court’s denial of the writ.
12
While such affirmance will not preclude Fiocconi and Kella from again raising the point on an appeal from their convictions, this opinion will constitute the law of the case as far as this court is concerned, see Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
Notes
. Section 174 was repealed by Pub.L. Nо. 91-513, tit. Ill, § 1101(a) (2), 84 Stat. 1291 (1970). By the terms of § 1105(a), the repealer became effective on May 1, 1971. However, the repealer contained a saving provision, § 1103(a), as to prosecutions under § 174 for violations committed prior to May 1, 1971.
. The overt acts extended from May 1970 through October 1971.
. These were substantially the same crimes charged in the first New York indictment, as to which the Government filed a nolle prosequi.
. As, for example, in the treaty with France quоted in United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan,
. It seems almost certain that Mr. Justice Gray would have joined Chief Justice Waite in this view if the treaty had stood alone; he concurred since he considered that Rev.Stat. § 5275,
now
18 U.S.C. § 3192, see footnote 11,
infra,
providing for the protection of persons delivered by any foreign government, indicated the intention of Congress to vest extradited persons with a judicial remedy for breаch of an extradition treaty by the United States. See
. Appellants argue that we have already crossed this bridge in United States v. Paroutian,
. It is true that Mr. Justice Miller also discussed the significance of the treaty as a part of the “supreme law of the land, of which courts are bound to take judicial notice of, and to enforce in any appropriate procеeding the rights of persons growing out of that treaty . . . .”
. It is suggested in 2 O’Connell, International Law 805-06 (1965), that if “the rule of specialty” is one of domestic rather than of international law, subsequеnt consent by the surrendering government should be of no avail. We do not follow this. The rule, as applied in Rauscher, partakes of both natures.
*480
But the rule of domestic law conferring a judicial remedy on the extraditee can be a rule according him the remedy only if the surrendering government would object, since the underlying substantive wrong, which grows out of international law, is only to the latter, see United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan,
supra,
. In Baker v. Carr,
. As Chief Justice Taft said in Ford v. United States,
. Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign government to an agent of the United States, for the purpose of being brought within the United States and tried for any offense of which he is duly accused, the President shall have power to take all necessary measures for the transportation and safekeeping of such accused person, and for his security against lawless violence, until the final conclusion of his trial for the offenses specified in the warrant of extradition, and until his final discharge from custody or imprisonment for or on aсcount of such offenses, and for a reasonable time thereafter, and may employ such portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the militia thereof, as may be necessary for the safe-keeping and protection of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
. In order to remove any doubt as to the running of periods for review, we vacate our oral order and direct that this opinion constitute the judgment of the court.
