United States v. Steven Hudson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Steven Hudson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
- The district court increased Hudson’s base offense level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) after finding he had a prior conviction qualifying as a “crime of violence.”
- The prior conviction was for unlawful use of a firearm under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) (exhibiting a weapon in an angry or threatening manner that is readily capable of lethal use).
- The district court relied on this court’s precedent in United States v. Pulliam to treat the Missouri conviction as meeting the guidelines’ “force” clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force).
- Hudson challenged the application of Pulliam, arguing subsequent Supreme Court decisions (Samuel Johnson, Curtis Johnson, Descamps/Mathis) undermined that precedent.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Pulliam remains controlling and the Missouri offense qualifies under the guidelines’ force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hudson’s § 571.030.1(4) conviction is a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1) (force clause) | Hudson: Pulliam is no longer good law because of intervening Supreme Court decisions (Samuel Johnson, Curtis Johnson, Descamps/Mathis) | Government: Pulliam controlling; the Missouri offense involves threatened use of violent force and fits the force clause | The court held Pulliam controls; the conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether Samuel Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause affects Pulliam | Hudson: Samuel Johnson undermines related precedent | Government: Samuel Johnson addressed the residual clause; Pulliam relied on the force clause, so Samuel Johnson is inapplicable | The court held Samuel Johnson does not affect Pulliam because Pulliam relied on the force clause |
| Whether Curtis Johnson’s narrowing of “physical force” excludes the Missouri offense | Hudson: Curtis Johnson redefines "physical force" and may preclude a categorical match | Government: Missouri statute requires exhibition of a weapon "readily capable of lethal use," which constitutes threatened violent force | The court held Curtis Johnson is consistent with Pulliam; the statute’s “lethal” element implies violent force |
| Whether Descamps/Mathis (modified categorical approach limits) undermine Pulliam | Hudson: Descamps/Mathis restrict using records to identify categorical match | Government: § 571.030.1(4) (subdivision (4)) was already treated categorically in Pulliam; subdivision’s alternatives both meet the force clause | The court held Descamps/Mathis do not change Pulliam’s outcome; the statute (and Pulliam’s analysis) remains valid |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009) (held Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) is a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause)
- Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held the ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreted “physical force” to mean violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited application of the modified categorical approach to statutes that list alternative elements)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarified that the modified categorical approach applies only when a statute lists alternative elements, not alternative means)
- United States v. Dixon, 822 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2016) (construed Missouri law regarding whether a weapon must be functional/operational under § 571.030.1(4))
- United States v. Fields, 167 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 1999) (treated § 571.030.1(4) as a crime of violence under the guidelines’ residual clause)
- United States v. Jackson, 462 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2006) (same as to the residual clause)