62 F.4th 258
6th Cir.2023Background:
- Stephen Akridge was convicted in 2001 of crack-cocaine conspiracy and distribution, possession with intent to distribute, and two firearms offenses; he was sentenced as a career offender to a total of 55 years’ imprisonment.
- His career-offender designation under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 raised his base offense level and produced a Guidelines range that, combined with a mandatory consecutive § 924(c) term, yielded the 55-year aggregate sentence.
- After the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act made crack‑punishment changes retroactive, Akridge sought resentencing but his counsel represented that his career‑offender status and Guidelines range remained unchanged.
- At resentencing the district court accepted that representation, recalculated the range as unchanged, considered § 3553(a) factors (noting serious underlying conduct and eleven disciplinary sanctions), and denied a reduction.
- On appeal Akridge argued (for the first time) that the court used the wrong “instant offense” for § 4B1.1(b) (conspiracy vs. possession) and that the court should have considered Havis and Cordero in its § 3553(a) analysis; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court miscalculated Akridge’s career‑offender Guidelines range by using the conspiracy conviction (life max) instead of the possession conviction (30‑year max) for § 4B1.1(b) | Akridge: the court should have used the possession offense as the instant offense, yielding a lower offense level and a lower Guidelines range (applying Havis/Cordero principles) | Government: Akridge conceded the unchanged range at resentencing; Havis/Cordero do not reflect retroactive Fair Sentencing Act changes and do not alter the single variable permitted under the First Step Act | Court: Akridge invited/waived the objection; even if reviewed for plain error, no reversible error—Havis/Cordero are nonretroactive and outside the permissible First Step Act recalculation |
| Whether the district court procedurally erred under § 3553(a) by failing to account for Havis and Cordero when denying relief | Akridge: the § 3553(a) analysis was anchored to the wrong Guidelines range and therefore procedurally incomplete | Government: First Step Act imposes no obligation to consider nonretroactive decisions at § 3553(a); district court sufficiently considered the arguments and explained its decision | Court: No procedural defect—district court considered the arguments, explained reliance on criminal history, conduct, and institutional misconduct, and was not required to apply Havis/Cordero at § 3553(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) (limits on modifications at First Step Act resentencing; deference to district courts)
- Havis v. United States, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (attempt crimes do not qualify as career‑offender predicates)
- Cordero v. United States, 973 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2020) (extends Havis to some conspiracies)
- McCall v. United States, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022) (Havis is nonretroactive)
- McKinnie v. United States, 24 F.4th 583 (6th Cir. 2022) (Havis does not apply retroactively)
- Maxwell v. United States, 991 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2021) (First Step Act permits altering only the Fair Sentencing Act–related variable)
- Foreman v. United States, 958 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2020) (First Step Act imposes no extra constraints on § 3553(a) consideration)
- Boulding v. United States, 960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020) (resentencing must be procedurally and substantively reasonable)
- Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) (plain‑error framework)
- Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (sentencing court must adequately explain chosen sentence)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (waiver vs. forfeiture distinction and consequences)