United States v. Stanley, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15829

Background

Stanley pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) with a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional plea and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
The contested material was found on a computer with a history of ownership and control involving Stanley and his former partner Stockbridge; the computer was password-protected during their relationship and later became Stockbridge’s possession.
After Stanley’s 2004 prison sentence for unrelated charges, Stockbridge took possession of the computer, removed password protection, and allowed it to be repaired by third parties; Stockbridge later handed it to others for repair.
Federal agents, led by Agent Prado, obtained the computer after Trimm (a third party) notified them of probable child-pornography contents and Stockbridge’s asserted joint ownership.
The district court credited Stockbridge’s declaration that she consented and held Stockbridge had authority to consent; Stanley challenges whether she had valid authority to search his files.
The panel affirms the district court’s denial of Stanley’s suppression motion, holding consent could be valid under apparent authority or common/shared authority.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Stockbridge have actual authority to consent to the search?	Stockbridge had co-ownership/common authority over the computer.	Stockbridge did not have co-ownership or common authority; consent was invalid.	No, the majority holds Stockbridge had apparent authority; actual/common authority is contested but not necessary for affirmance.
Does common authority exist where possession does not equal ownership?	Shared use and prior joint possession suffice for common authority.	Possession alone does not confer common authority; facts show lack of joint control.	Common authority is not established; the court instead relies on apparent authority.
Is Stockbridge’s apparent authority sufficient to validate the warrantless search?	Apparent authority, based on the totality of circumstances, justified consent.	Apparent authority rests on misapplied law and facts; it cannot justify.	The court uses apparent authority to uphold the search; dissent rejects this rationale.
Did Stanley have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer contents?	Because Stockbridge could access the computer, Stanley had no reasonable privacy expectation.	Password protection and segregation of files preserved Stanley’s privacy; reliance on password status at time of consent is misplaced.	The majority addresses privacy but ultimately upholds the search on consent grounds; dissent emphasizes privacy protection.
Is the search valid given the warrant was not renewed and consent was questioned?	Consent from Stockbridge validated the search irrespective of warrant renewal.	Consent was invalid and warrant renewal was required; the search violated the Fourth Amendment.	Affirmed on consent grounds; the dissent would reverse.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2005) (mutual use and joint access concept for third-party consent)
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974) (common authority supports third-party consent by those with mutual use)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. 1990) (objective standard for determining consent authority)
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (U.S. 1969) (no need for metaphysical distinctions in apparent authority)
United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993) (possession alone does not confer authority to consent)
United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (joint access does not imply consent to search units within property)
United States v. Brannan, 898 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1990) (common authority requires joint access and control)
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007) (apparent authority evaluated against facts known at search)
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (joint-user password-protected files may not be accessible)