991 F.3d 994
8th Cir.2021Background
- Stacy Lyman pleaded guilty in 2018 to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and to being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court applied the ACCA based on three prior Missouri drug convictions, raising the firearm count penalty to a 15-year mandatory minimum.
- The three predicate convictions stem from 1996 Missouri drug-sale charges to which Lyman pleaded guilty on October 6, 1997.
- Lyman argued in this federal appeal that the Missouri charging documents alleged a mens rea of "knowing or recklessness," so his convictions might rest on recklessness and thus be invalid or not qualify under the ACCA.
- He first sought to collaterally attack the state convictions on mens rea grounds; the court rejected that because Custis bars collateral attack on prior convictions at federal sentencing when the defendant had counsel.
- Lyman also argued the state convictions did not qualify as ACCA "serious drug offenses" unless the state offense required knowledge (not recklessness); the court reviewed that claim for plain error because he did not raise it below.
- The court concluded there was no plain error: the federal ACCA definition does not require a mens rea regarding the illicit nature of the substance, precedent (Smith) supports no implied mens rea, and the Supreme Court in Shular left the question unresolved.
Issues
| Issue | Lyman's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lyman can collaterally attack prior Missouri convictions at federal sentencing based on mens rea errors | Lyman: charging documents alleged knowledge or recklessness, so convictions may have rested on recklessness and be invalid | Government: Custis bars collateral attack on prior convictions when defendant had counsel | Court: Forbid collateral attack under Custis; Lyman had counsel, so claim foreclosed |
| Whether Missouri convictions qualify as ACCA "serious drug offense[s]" if state offense possibly required only recklessness | Lyman: A predicate must require knowledge/purpose; recklessness would not qualify under ACCA | Government: ACCA's text does not require a mens rea about the illicit nature; state convictions qualify | Court: No plain error; ACCA definition does not imply a mens rea requirement and precedent supports counting the convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (defendant may not collaterally attack prior convictions at federal sentencing except for right-to-counsel violations)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (standards for plain-error review)
- United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that no mens rea element with respect to the illicit nature of the substance is expressed or implied in the ACCA definition)
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (Supreme Court considered but did not decide the mens rea question for ACCA drug predicates)
- State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1997) (Missouri court noting confusion about required culpable mental state after repeal of the default mens rea provision)