United States v. Spruill, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21894

Background

Jeff Spruill was convicted by a jury of federal drug offenses (cocaine/cocaine base distribution and possession with intent) and being a felon in possession of a firearm; judgment entered July 12, 2013.
Two controlled buys occurred; police executed a warrant at Spruill’s girlfriend’s residence (18 Glover Place) and found drugs on Spruill and three firearms/related items in the home.
During deliberations the jury sent notes indicating a 11–1 division and that one juror ("Juror 11") felt a conflict due to her work with inmates and worried her "gut" was creating bias.
The district court questioned Juror 11 outside the jury about her ability to be impartial (avoiding inquiry into deliberations), gave her time to consider, and she later asked to be excused; both parties—including Spruill’s counsel—agreed and the juror was replaced with an alternate.
On appeal Spruill argued the dismissal violated the rule from United States v. Thomas ("any possibility" rule re: dismissing holdout jurors), plus challenges to sufficiency of evidence, application of the career-offender enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1), sentence reasonableness, and ineffective assistance for not contesting the § 4B1.1 enhancement. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Removal of deliberating juror (Thomas challenge)	Thomas requires denying discharge where record shows any possibility the request stems from juror’s view of sufficiency of evidence; Juror 11 was lone holdout so dismissal violated Thomas	Removal was for extrinsic bias (juror’s employment-based sympathy), not nullification; court’s limited inquiry did not intrude on deliberations	Affirmed: Thomas’s strict "any possibility" rule did not apply because concern was extrinsic bias and court properly inquired without breaching deliberation secrecy
Waiver of objection to juror removal	Spruill contends removal was improper (invoked on appeal)	District-court inquiry and dismissal were expressly consented to by defense counsel; counsel initially withdrew a peremptory strike and later agreed to the inquiry and excusal	Affirmed: Spruill waived appellate challenge because counsel intentionally agreed to the inquiry and excusal
Sufficiency of evidence (drug counts & firearm count)	(Pro se and counseled) argued evidence insufficient (including alleged missing proof of drug type)	Government argued evidence of controlled buys, drugs on person, and weapons in residence supported convictions	Rejected (per summary order referenced): convictions affirmed
Sentencing — career-offender enhancement (§ 4B1.1)	Argued procedural unreasonableness; enhancement improperly applied based on prior state convictions	PSR relied on state guilty pleas to drug-sale and possession-with-intent; court adopted PSR and applied enhancement but imposed below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months	Rejected (per summary order referenced): district court’s application upheld and 120-month sentence affirmed
Ineffective assistance (failure to challenge § 4B1.1)	Counsel should have contested career-offender enhancement	Government contends no reversible Strickland error; factual record inadequate on direct appeal	Rejected on appeal (issues addressed in separate summary order); may be raised collateral if appropriate

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (announcing the "any possibility" rule for dismissing deliberating jurors when discharge may stem from juror’s view of the evidence)
United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Thomas where juror refusal to deliberate could be investigated without probing deliberations)
United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal where juror was incapacitated/affected by intimidation)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (distinguishing forfeiture from waiver and outlining appellate reviewability)
United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010) (plain-error review framework for unpreserved claims)