United States v. Soud, 3:20-cr-00036

Defendant Mahmoud Ghassan Soud was tried on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) for possessing firearms while subject to a domestic violence protective order.
At trial the government presented evidence that Soud and his attorney were present at the state-court hearing where the judge orally announced a long-term protective order.
The long-term protective order prohibited threatening or committing acts of domestic violence, stalking, or harassment.
The government introduced no direct evidence that the written order was given to Soud or his attorney; counsel testified he did not recall receiving a copy and that none was in his file.
The district court denied Soud’s Rule 29 motion (insufficiency) but granted his Rule 33 motion for a new trial, concluding that although the evidence was abstractly sufficient, the weight of the evidence preponderated against the verdict and a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.
The court scheduled a telephonic conference to set a new trial date.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence showed Soud knew he was subject to the protective order	Gov’t: Presence at the hearing where judge pronounced the order sufficed to prove knowledge	Soud: Government failed to prove he received or reviewed the written order	Held: Sufficient — a rational juror could infer knowledge from his attendance at the hearing
Whether the protective order explicitly prohibited use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force	Gov’t: Order’s prohibition on threatening/committing domestic violence/stalking/harassment is explicit enough	Soud: Order did not use the precise statutory phrasing and was indistinct from a simple no-contact order	Held: Sufficient — order language could be read to explicitly prohibit physical force
Whether Soud knew the order contained an explicit prohibition on physical force	Gov’t: Knowledge could be inferred from judge’s oral pronouncement or counsel informing him	Soud: No proof the order or its terms were distributed or explained to him	Held: Although abstractly sufficient for conviction, the court found the weight of evidence insufficient and—on Rule 33—granted a new trial

United States v. Rosales, 516 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard for sufficiency: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2000) (same sufficiency standard)
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence insufficient when based on mere speculation rather than reasonable inference)
United States v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2002) (credibility and conflict resolution are for the jury on Rule 29 review)
United States v. H.B., 695 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2012) (deference to jury credibility findings on sufficiency review)
United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011) (protective-order language need not be a simple no-contact phrase to qualify as an explicit prohibition)
United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court’s broad power to grant new trial under Rule 33)
United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) (court may independently weigh evidence and assess credibility on Rule 33)
United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1980) (authority supporting new trial when miscarriage of justice may have occurred)
United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1981) (new trials are appropriate only in exceptional cases where evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict)
United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting potential juror confusion from complex statutory constructions)