United States v. Soler, 759 F.3d 226

On Aug. 10, 2010, defendants Soler and Waters entered a Brooklyn home, robbed occupants, and demanded the keys to a car parked about 10–15 feet (a ~5‑second walk) from the front door. The victim retrieved and handed over the keys from inside the house.
The house interior was separated from the street by a closed front door, short driveway, wrought‑iron fence, and sidewalk; the car could be unlocked remotely from the keychain.
Both defendants were tried separately on counts including federal carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and related firearm offenses; each moved under Rule 29 for acquittal on the carjacking count, arguing the car was not in the victim’s “person or presence.”
District courts denied the Rule 29 motions, relying on a multi‑circuit, common‑law gloss that property is “in the presence” if within reach, observation, or control such that the victim could retain it unless overcome by force or fear.
The Second Circuit reviews statutory interpretation and sufficiency de novo, and adopted the common‑law definition (the Burns formulation) for “presence,” affirming the carjacking convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2119’s phrase “from the person or presence of another” requires the vehicle be in the victim’s immediate, front‑of‑person vicinity (close proximity)	Gov’t: adopt the Burns/common‑law definition—property is in presence if within reach, inspection, observation, or control so victim could retain it absent force or fear	Soler/Waters: “presence” means immediate area right in front of or immediately around the person; keys taken inside house while car outside beyond door/fence are not in victim’s presence	Court: Affirmed Burns/common‑law definition; vehicle within reach/observation/control = within presence; convictions affirmed

United States v. Burns, 701 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1983) (approved jury instruction defining “presence” as within reach, inspection, observation, or control)
United States v. Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 1999) (applies Burns formulation in carjacking/robbery context)
United States v. Savarese, 385 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (vehicle in driveway held within victims’ presence)
United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopts common‑law presence gloss)
United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2001) (cars “just outside” where keys taken were in victims’ presence)
United States v. Casteel, 663 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2011) (follows Burns/common‑law definition)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (canon: Congress adopts common‑law meaning of borrowed legal terms absent contrary indication)
United States v. Perez‑Garcia, 56 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting courts generally read § 2119’s “from the person ... of another” consistent with common‑law conception of presence)