United States v. Smith
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13
7th Cir.2012Background
- Police stopped Smith for failing to signal a right turn at a three-way intersection; search revealed gun, marijuana, crack cocaine, and a digital scale; Smith charged with felon-in-possession, possession with intent to deliver, and firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; indictment states events occurred on or about July 13, 2010, but trial showed July 14, 2010; district court denied suppression and motion to acquittal on constructive amendment grounds; jury convicted on all counts; appellate court affirmed denying suppression and acquittal motions.
- Indiana law requires a signal for turning; court looked to Indiana cases for defining turning; intersection involved multiple possible right turns with varying angles; court concluded turning onto Fassnacht constituted a right turn subject to a signal.
- Court held that there was probable cause to stop due to failure to signal; no need to reach alternative grounds such as window tinting; court also held no constructive amendment of the indictment since “on or about” covers approximate dates and date proof at trial did not alter elements.
- Indictment’s date as “on or about July 13, 2010” did not limit charging date given broad phrasing; proof at trial that events occurred July 14 did not impermissibly amend the charge.
- Judgment affirmed: suppression denied, acquittal not warranted on date issue.
- Evidence supports probable cause under Whren and Indiana’s turn-signal statute; no reversible error shown in constructive amendment analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to signal is a traffic violation justifying the stop | Government argues Smith’s failure to signal created probable cause under Indiana law | Smith contends no signal was required for bearing right | Probable cause existed; signal required under Indiana law for this turn. |
| Whether trial proof of a different date constructively amended the indictment | Government contends date is not an element; notice adequate | Smith argues date change at trial alters charged offense | No constructive amendment; indictment broad enough to encompass the date. |
| Whether the indictment’s date limitation affected elements or notice | Government maintains date is approximate, not element | Smith asserts date specification could constrain proof | Not an element; notice adequate under indictment. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608 (7th Cir.2011) (probable cause for traffic stop must be based on prohibited act; officer beliefs must be reasonable)
- United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958 (7th Cir.2006) (good faith belief insufficient when act is legal)
- United States v. Mitov, 460 F.3d 901 (7th Cir.2006) (constructive amendment analysis focuses on whether offense changed)
- United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.2002) (limits on constructive-amendment review)
- United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir.1998) (indictment notice and breadth of “on or about” language)
- United States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384 (7th Cir.2001) (indictment breadth and notice standard)
- United States v. Leibowitz, 857 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.1988) (notice and breadth of charging language)
- Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503 (7th Cir.1998) (plain meaning applied to statutory term turning)
- United States v. Smith, 421 F. App’x 572 (6th Cir.2011) (unpublished; turn requirements and signaling supported)